Fake news: How emotions, involvement, need for cognition and rebuttal evidence (story vs. informational) influence consumer reactions toward a targeted organization

2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 102088
Author(s):  
Michail Vafeiadis ◽  
Anli Xiao
Author(s):  
Tetiana Korianova ◽  

The article analyzes the significant role, place, and influence of the new media during information war, which is used as a modern political practice and tool for achieving political goals. The concept of “information war” within the Ukrainian legislation is defined and the peculiarities of its course are established. Since there are many definitions of information warfare, this article formulates this term clearly based on Ukrainian context. Information warfare is actions aimed at achieving information superiority support of national military strategy acting both, local information sources and information systems of the enemy while ensuring security and protection of the information owner. Information warfare is the most promising way to “continue politics by other means” now. We have considered five basic rules used in information campaigns: surveillance, exaggeration, and distortion, orchestration or silence, transfusion, and infection. It was found that the concept of the informational influence of mass media on the person and, society follows from the analysis of these influences. Analysis of information warfare, its principles and methods allows us to understand the essence of these influences. It is very important in the context of Russian aggression in Ukraine in modern conditions. The article also presents and analyzes the most commonly used models of media influence on public opinion. Information influence can be both, positive and negative. Moreover, positive information has an educational function. The purpose of negative information is to inflame social conflicts, exacerbate differences in society. The problems of information warfare should be solved by counteracting the manipulative media technologies and improving methods of counteraction, fight with fake news and misinformation in general. It is proved that the effectiveness of the applied technologies determines the further location of forces in the political arena.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 121-129
Author(s):  
Anastasiya Ilyina

There are various instruments for Russia to have influence on its neighbours, such as using opinion leaders (authorities), intellectuals, and journalists to create a favourable informational context or to place the ordered materials in the media so as to have an impact on public opinion. These are the types of information attacks that can lead to the loss of statehood or the substantial limitation of sovereignty. This hybrid aggression strives to precisely this result. The main questions are: how the Russian information space, mud-slinging and troll farms functioned in Belarus during the presidential election? How the fake news which is produced in Russia impacts societies? Which political scenarios appeared in Belarus following Russia’s informational influence? It is a fact that today the Russian authorities use tools of fake news and propaganda; combined with the extra possibilities of social media. The appearance of fake news is connected with national safety because they jeopardize democratic institutions, lead to the radicalization of society, and change the balance of authority. In the research, the methodologies were used from the sociology of communication, political science and content analysis.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig A. Harper ◽  
Thom Baguley

The concept of ‘fake news’ has exploded into the public’s consciousness since the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency in late 2016. However, this concept has received surprisingly little attention within the social psychological literature. We present three studies (N = 2,275) exploring whether liberal and conservative partisans are motivated to believe fake news (Study 1; n = 722) or dismiss true news that contradicts their position as being fake (Study 2; n = 570). We found support for both of these hypotheses. These effects were asymmetrically moderated by collective narcissism, need for cognition, and faith in intuition (Study 3; n = 983). These findings suggest that partisans across the political spectrum engage with the ‘fake news’ label in a motivated manner, though these motivations appear to differ between-groups. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Gumgum Gumelar ◽  
Erik Erik ◽  
Herdiyan Maulana

The aim of this study is to determine the effect of the need for cognition and the need for affection towards the intention of spreading fake news. This research used an experimental design by giving the participants some manipulations in the form of fake news. The study examined whether the participant spreads the news provided based on their different need orientations. The results of this study indicate that there was a significant relationship between the need for affection and the need for cognition in terms of spreading false news. This study also investigated the variation of the tendency to spread the news based on both need scores. Although predictions are related to participants who have high or low scores who tend to spread false news, further research is needed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie von Stumm

Intelligence-as-knowledge in adulthood is influenced by individual differences in intelligence-as-process (i.e., fluid intelligence) and in personality traits that determine when, where, and how people invest their intelligence over time. Here, the relationship between two investment traits (i.e., Openness to Experience and Need for Cognition), intelligence-as-process and intelligence-as-knowledge, as assessed by a battery of crystallized intelligence tests and a new knowledge measure, was examined. The results showed that (1) both investment traits were positively associated with intelligence-as-knowledge; (2) this effect was stronger for Openness to Experience than for Need for Cognition; and (3) associations between investment and intelligence-as-knowledge reduced when adjusting for intelligence-as-process but remained mostly significant.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malte Schott ◽  
Jule Wolf

Abstract. We examined the effect of presenting unknown policy statements on German parties’ election posters. Study 1 showed that participants inferred the quality of a presented policy from knowledge about the respective political party. Study 2 showed that participants’ own political preferences influenced valence estimates: policy statements presented on campaign posters of liked political parties were rated significantly more positive than those presented on posters of disliked political parties. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with an additional measure of participants’ need for cognition. Need for cognition scores were unrelated to the valence transfer from political parties to policy evaluation. Study 4 replicated the findings of Studies 2 and 3 with an additional measure of participants’ voting intentions. Voting intentions were a significant predictor for valence transfer. Participants credited both their individually liked and disliked political parties for supporting the two unknown policies. However, the credit attributed to the liked party was significantly higher than to the disliked one. Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 2, 3, and 4. Additionally, participants evaluated political clubs that were associated with the same policies previously presented on election posters. Here, a second-degree transfer emerged: from party valence to policy evaluation and from policy evaluation to club evaluation. Implications of the presented studies for policy communications and election campaigning are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (6) ◽  
pp. 408-421
Author(s):  
Ravini S. Abeywickrama ◽  
Simon M. Laham
Keyword(s):  

Abstract. Across two studies we show that attitudes can paradoxically depolarize when people advocate for their own opinions. In Study 1 ( n = 276), we show that attitude depolarization is driven by how much meta-cognitive confidence people place in their advocacy attempt, such that those who experience low confidence during advocacy are more likely to depolarize. In Study 2 ( n = 495), we show that meta-cognitive confidence predicts communicative intentions, such as intentions to engage with those holding dissimilar views. In Study 2, we also show that the confidence–polarization and confidence–engagement links are unaffected by audience attitudes, but are moderated by Need-for-Cognition. The findings suggest that confidence and level of elaboration may predict some self-persuasive effects of pro-attitudinal advocacy.


2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie A. Kerr ◽  
Brian N. Smith ◽  
Michael J. Markus ◽  
Mark F. Stasson

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