The role of institutional investors and individual investors in financial markets: Evidence from closed-end funds

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily J. Huang
2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Qasim Shah ◽  
Izlin Ismail ◽  
Aidial Rizal bin Shahrin

Purpose The purpose of this study is to empirically test the role of heterogeneous investor’s, i.e. institutional investors, individuals and insiders in deteriorating market integrity. Design/methodology/approach The research is conducted by examining the participants of 244 market manipulation cases of East Asian emerging and developed financial markets for the period of 2001–2016. The empirical analysis is conducted using panel logistic regression. Findings The results show that firms with higher institutional ownership are most likely to be manipulated in both markets. Insiders are potential manipulators in developed markets and deteriorate market integrity. In contrast, individual investors behave differently in both markets. In developed markets, firms with high individual ownership are less likely to be manipulated while in emerging markets, firms with individual ownership are more prone to manipulation because of substantial participation by individual investors which invites manipulative practices. Additionally, the authors found that firms with a higher proportion of passive institutional investors are less likely to be manipulated in emerging markets. Originality/value This study contributes to the existing literature by identifying the potential manipulators in the financial markets who deteriorate market integrity with the additional focus of subdivision of institutional investors as active institutional investors and passive institutional investor. The findings are helpful for regulators in designing policies to ensure market integrity and to enforce the role of institutional investors and insiders.


2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Zhen Zeng ◽  
Peiyu Ou ◽  
Bin Li

This study examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of normal accruals and discretionary accruals using the firms listed in the Chinese A-share Market. The results show that significant overpricing of discretionary accruals exists for individual investors and institutional investors, suggesting that they are both misled by the earnings management, while institutional investors are associated with significantly less overpricing. With respect to normal accruals, we find there is no evidence that institutional investors misprice normal accruals, while the individual investors overprice normal accruals. Our results suggest that institutional investors superiority in mitigating the mispricing of total accruals is mainly due to their accurate pricing of normal accruals, and the reason why institutional investors cannot fully eliminate mispricing of accruals is that they are partly misled by earnings management.


Author(s):  
Jaya M. Prosad ◽  
Sujata Kapoor ◽  
Jhumur Sengupta

This chapter explores the evolution of modern behavioral finance theories from the traditional framework. It focuses on three main issues. First, it analyzes the importance of standard finance theories and the situations where they become insufficient i.e. market anomalies. Second, it signifies the role of behavioral finance in narrowing down the gaps between traditional finance theories and actual market conditions. This involves the substitution of standard finance theories with more realistic behavioral theories like the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the end, it provides a synthesis of academic events that substantiate the presence of behavioral biases, their underlying psychology and their impact on financial markets. This chapter also highlights the implications of behavior biases on financial practitioners like market experts, portfolio managers and individual investors. The chapter concludes with providing the limitations and future scope of research in behavioral finance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yugang Yin ◽  
Bin Tan

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to find out whether the election of star analysts leads to the conflict of interests between analysts\institutional investors and individual investors. And then, further investigate how the election results to influence the individual investors’ decision making. Design/methodology/approach Given the fact that earnings forecasts and stock ratings are the most important foundations for the investor’s investment decision, the authors investigate the relationship among the earnings forecasts, abnormal returns and the election of star analyst. This paper further analyzes the impact factors on investors’ decision. The data used in this paper for star analysts’ information, analysts’ forecast and recommendations, as well as stock performances-related data are from 2005 to 2012. Findings This paper finds that mass media cannot select analysts with high forecast accuracy, and then misleads investors. It demonstrates that the analysts with poorer forecast ability and more optimistic stock recommendations are more prone to be entitled as star analysts by mass media, and these titled star analysts tend to show a poorer performance. Therefore, the star analyst worsens investors’ cognition on analysts forecast ability and then misleads investors’ decision making. Social implications Media plays a critical role in corporate governance, information collection and diffusion and reducing the information asymmetry, however, it is good to know the role of media in financial markets from a broader perspective. Because media may also bring negative factors to the financial markets such as misguiding the investors and intensify the conflict of interests between analyst and individual investors. Originality/value This paper supports a new perspective of the role of mass media in financial market, which is different from existing studies.


2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amber Anand ◽  
Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

AbstractA significant but unresolved question in the current debate about the role of intermediaries in financial markets is whether intermediaries behave as passive traders or whether they actively seek and trade on information. We address this issue by explicitly comparing the informational advantages of intermediaries with those of other investors in the market. We find that intermediaries account for greater price discovery than other institutional and individual investors in spite of initiating fewer trades and volume. Furthermore, intermediary information does not arise from inappropriate handling of customer orders by intermediaries. We propose that our findings are consistent with noisy rational expectations models, where agents extract valuable information from past prices. Intermediaries bear little or no opportunity cost of monitoring market conditions, which gives them an advantage in making profitable price-contingent trades. Lower trading costs may also enable intermediaries to trade more effectively and frequently on their information.


Author(s):  
Boudewijn de Bruin

This chapter argues for deregulation of the credit-rating market. Credit-rating agencies are supposed to contribute to the informational needs of investors trading bonds. They provide ratings of debt issued by corporations and governments, as well as of structured debt instruments (e.g. mortgage-backed securities). As many academics, regulators, and commentators have pointed out, the ratings of structured instruments turned out to be highly inaccurate, and, as a result, they have argued for tighter regulation of the industry. This chapter shows, however, that the role of credit-rating agencies in achieving justice in finance is not as great as these commentators believe. It therefore argues instead for deregulation. Since the 1930s, lawgivers have unjustifiably elevated the rating agencies into official, legally binding sources of information concerning credit risk, thereby unjustifiably causing many institutional investors to outsource their epistemic responsibilities, that is, their responsibility to investigate credit risk themselves.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 714-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Sukumara Panicker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to look at the association between different ownership categories and corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending of selected Indian firms. Design/methodology/approach Random-effects Tobit panel regression is performed on a panel of 4,388 firm years of 1,722 unique firms over a three-year period (2014-2016). Findings Different categories of institutional investors have different preferences for CSR spending of a firm. Promoters of business-group affiliated and unaffiliated firms also behave differently towards CSR activities of their firms. Research limitations/implications Heterogeneous behavior of institutional investors is revealed through the study. Foreign institutions and domestic banks are supportive of CSR investments of a firm. Promoters of family firms and group affiliates also diligently plan CSR activities. Practical implications Managers cannot ignore the heterogeneities of institutional investors in their investment decisions. Individual investors can align their philanthropic preferences with those of different types of institutional investors or firms. Social implications Family-owned firms play a significant role in CSR activities of emerging economies, while individual promoters are not as attracted by the reputational prospects of CSR. Originality/value This paper considers the role of heterogeneities of institutional investors in influencing CSR spending of emerging-economy firms. This heterogeneity has not been previously studied in this context.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-144
Author(s):  
Dini Maulana Lestari ◽  
M Roif Muntaha ◽  
Immawan Azhar BA

Islamic banks are present in the community as financial institutions whose activities are based on the principles of Islamic law for the benefit of the people. This study aims to determine the strategic role of Islamic Banks as financial service institutions, the importance of the existence of Islamic Banks and Islamic-based markets and financial instruments in them. In its development, Islamic banks have a role as institutions that turn on public funds, channel funds to the public, transfer assets, liquidity, reallocation of income and transactions. In the Indonesian economic system, the existence of Islamic Banks is important as an alternative solution to the problem of conflict between bank interest and usury. Islamic financial markets and instruments provide a free society of interest and follow a different set of principles. Distribution of profit/ loss according to evidence of participation in the management fund. The division of rental income in the form of musharaka.


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