Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts?: the role of causal status in determining feature centrality

Cognition ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
W Ahn
Author(s):  
Margaret Morrison

After reviewing some of the recent literature on non-causal and mathematical explanation, this chapter develops an argument as to why renormalization group (RG) methods should be seen as providing non-causal, yet physical, information about certain kinds of systems/phenomena. The argument centres on the structural character of RG explanations and the relationship between RG and probability theory. These features are crucial for the claim that the non-causal status of RG explanations involves something different from simply ignoring or “averaging over” microphysical details—the kind of explanations common to statistical mechanics. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of RG in treating dynamical systems and how that role exemplifies the structural aspects of RG explanations which in turn exemplifies the non-causal features.


Apeiron ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Proios

Abstract Plato’s invention of the metaphor of carving the world by the joints (Phaedrus 265d–66c) gives him a privileged place in the history of natural kind theory in philosophy and science; he is often understood to present a paradigmatic but antiquated view of natural kinds as possessing eternal, immutable, necessary essences. Yet, I highlight that, as a point of distinction from contemporary views about natural kinds, Plato subscribes to an intelligent-design, teleological framework, in which the natural world is the product of craft and, as a result, is structured such that it is good for it to be that way. In Plato’s Philebus, the character Socrates introduces a method of inquiry whose articulation of natural kinds enables it to confer expert knowledge, such as literacy. My paper contributes to an understanding of Plato’s view of natural kinds by interpreting this method in light of Plato’s teleological conception of nature. I argue that a human inquirer who uses the method identifies kinds with relational essences within a system causally related to the production of some unique craft-object, such as writing. As a result, I recast Plato’s place in the history of philosophy, including Plato’s view of the relation between the kinds according to the natural and social sciences. Whereas some are inclined to separate natural from social kinds, Plato holds the unique view that all naturalness is a social feature of kinds reflecting the role of intelligent agency.


2000 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Woo-kyoung Ahn ◽  
Nancy S. Kim ◽  
Mary E. Lassaline ◽  
Martin J. Dennis

Author(s):  
Beth Preston

Technical functions of artifacts are commonly distinguished from their social functions and from biological functions of organisms. Schemes for classifying functions often encounter what the author calls the continuum problem—the imperceptible merger of function kinds. This is a special case of a debate about natural kinds in philosophy of science, which has resulted in a turn to an epistemological construal of kinds, in contrast to the traditional, purely ontological construal. The author argues for an epistemic analysis of function kinds along the lines of John Dupré’s (1993) “promiscuous realism.” This provides leverage for asking new and important questions about the epistemic purposes served by our various schemes for classifying artifact functions, and about the epistemic role of technical functions in particular. The author argues that the common classification into technical, social, and biological functions has more disadvantages than it has advantages.


2005 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Usha Goswami ◽  
Sabina Pauen

This paper investigates the role of analogies in logical reasoning as an important aspect of scientific thinking. In particular, we studied the role of analogical reasoning in the solution of Piagetian concrete operational tasks. Halford (1993) has suggested that 4- to 5-year olds should be able to solve Piagetian class inclusion tasks on the basis of analogies to the relational structure of the nuclear family. This idea was tested in two studies. Analogy effects on class inclusion reasoning were indeed found. These effects were strengthened by the provision of hints to use an analogy and by deeper initial processing of the relational structure of the analogy. The family analogy was applied equally to sets of natural kinds and artifacts. These results suggest that children use familiar relational structures as a basis for logical reasoning. It seems likely that analogies will be core to scientific reasoning as well.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Brigandt

Abstract Recent rival attempts in the philosophy of science to put forward a general theory of the properties that all (and only) natural kinds across the sciences possess may have proven to be futile. Instead, I develop a general methodological framework for how to philosophically study kinds. Any kind has to be investigated and articulated together with the human aims that motivate referring to this kind, where different kinds in the same scientific domain can answer to different concrete aims. My core contention is that nonepistemic aims, including environmental, ethical, and political aims, matter as well. This is defended and illustrated based on several examples of kinds, with particular attention to the role of social-political aims: species, race, gender, as well as personality disorders and oppositional defiant disorder as psychiatric kinds. Such nonepistemic aims and values need not always be those personally favoured by scientists but may have to reflect values that matter to relevant societal stakeholders. Despite the general agenda to study “kinds,” I argue that philosophers should stop using the term “natural kinds,” as this label obscures the relevance of human interests and the way in which many kinds are based on contingent social processes subject to human responsibility.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth E. Goodpaster

Much has been written about stakeholder analysis as a process by which to introduce ethical values into management decision-making. This paper takes a critical look at the assumptions behind this idea, in an effort to understand better the meaning of ethical management decisions.A distinction is made between stakeholder analysis and stakeholder synthesis. The two most natural kinds of stakeholder synthesis are then defined and discussed: strategic and multi-fiduciary. Paradoxically, the former appears to yield business without ethics and the latter appears to yield ethics without business. The paper concludes by suggesting that a third approach to stakeholder thinking needs to be developed, one that avoids the paradox just mentioned and that clarifies for managers (and directors) the legitimate role of ethical considerations in decision-making.So we must think through what management should be accountable for; and how and through whom its accountability can be discharged. The stockholders’ interest, both short- and long-term, is one of the areas. But it is only one.Peter Drucker, 1988Harvard Business Review


2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Meunier ◽  
Françoise Cordier
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-61
Author(s):  
William Matthews

The canonised Yijing had a decisive influence over the development of so-called “correlative cosmology” in China’s early imperial period, presenting the cosmos as knowable through sixty-four hexagrams and classifiable according to eight trigrams. The exact nature of these correlative categories continues to inspire debate. On the one hand, they appear to be defined relationally, but on the other they purport to describe everything in the cosmos in terms of fixed principles. These apparently discordant properties can be reconciled by paying due attention to the role of scale. This is revealed through a focus on the hexagram images as two distinct but interrelated forms of analogy, as human constructs for symbolic manipulation and as empirical descriptors of cosmic circumstances. Adopting perspectives from cognitive linguistics and anthropology, this symbolic manipulation allows unknown situations to be understood metaphorically via the hexagrams, and then metonymically incorporated into a natural category of cosmic circumstances. This transition between metaphoric and metonymic relations is a function of scale, and is reflected in the Yijing’s correlative categories. These correspond to perceived absolute natural kinds, but maintain a relational character dependant on the salience of metaphorical and metonymic relations at different scales. At time of publication, the journal operated under the old name. When quoting please refer to the citation on the left using British Journal of Chinese Studies. The pdf of the article still reflects the old journal name; issue number and page range are consistent.


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