scholarly journals Verona Integron-Encoded Metallo-Beta-Lactamase (VIM)–Producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa Outbreak Associated with Acute Care

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (S1) ◽  
pp. s26-s26
Author(s):  
Allison Chan ◽  
Alicia Shugart ◽  
Albert Burks ◽  
Christina Moore ◽  
Paige Gable ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Pseudomonas Aeruginosa ◽  
Acute Care ◽  
Tap Water ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Public Health Laboratory ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Contact Precautions ◽  
Hygiene Measures

Background: Contaminated healthcare facility plumbing is increasingly recognized as a source of carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs). In August 2019, the Tennessee State Public Health Laboratory identified Tennessee’s twelfth VIM-producing carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (VIM-CRPA), from a patient in a long-term acute-care hospital. To determine a potential reservoir, the Tennessee Department of Health (TDH) reviewed healthcare exposures for all cases. Four cases (33%), including the most recent case and earliest from March 2018, had a history of admission to intensive care unit (ICU) room X at acute-care hospital A (ACH A), but the specimens were collected at other facilities. The Public Health Laboratory collaborated with ACH A to assess exposures, perform environmental sampling, and implement control measures. Methods: TDH conducted in-person infection prevention assessments with ACH A, including a review of the water management program. Initial recommendations included placing all patients admitted to room X on contact precautions, screening for CPO on room discharge, daily sink basin and counter cleaning, and other sink hygiene measures. TDH collected environmental and water samples from 5 ICU sinks (ie, the handwashing and bathroom sinks in room X and neighboring room Y [control] and 1 hallway sink) and assessed the presence of VIM-CRPA. Moreover, 5 patients and 4 environmental VIM-CRPA underwent whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Results: From February to June 2020, of 21 patients admitted to room X, 9 (43%) underwent discharge screening and 4 (44%) were colonized with VIM-CRPA. Average room X length of stay was longer for colonized patients (11.3 vs 4.8 days). Drain swabs from room X’s bathroom and handwashing sinks grew VIM-CRPA; VIM-CRPA was not detected in tap water or other swab samples. VIM-CRPA from the environment and patients were sequence type 253 and varied by 0–13 single-nucleotide variants. ACH A replaced room X’s sinks and external plumbing in July. Discharge screening and contact precautions for all patients were discontinued in November, 5 months following the last case and 12 consecutive negative patient discharge screens. Improved sink hygiene and mechanism testing for CRPA from clinical cultures continued, with no new cases identified. Conclusions: An ICU room with a persistently contaminated sink drain was a persistent reservoir of VIM-CRPA. The room X attack rate was high, with VIM-CRPA acquisition occurring in >40% of patients screened. The use of contaminated plumbing fixtures in ACH have the potential to facilitate transmission to patients but may be challenging to identify and remediate. All healthcare facilities should follow sink hygiene best practices.Funding: NoDisclosures: None

scholarly journals Aggressive Colonization Screening and Infection Control Measures in Containment of NDM-5 Carbapenemase-Producing CRE

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. s458-s459
Author(s):  
Ishrat Kamal-Ahmed ◽  
Kate Tyner ◽  
Teresa Fitzgerald ◽  
Heather Adele Moulton-Meissner ◽  
Gillian McAllister ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Infection Control ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Healthcare Facility ◽  
The United States ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Clinical Culture ◽  
Medical Histories ◽  
Asymptomatic Case

Background: In April 2019, Nebraska Public Health Laboratory identified an NDM-producing Enterobacter cloacae from a urine sample from a rehabilitation inpatient who had recently received care in a specialized unit (unit A) of an acute-care hospital (ACH-A). After additional infections occurred at ACH-A, we conducted a public health investigation to contain spread. Methods: A case was defined as isolation of NDM-producing carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) from a patient with history of admission to ACH-A in 2019. We conducted clinical culture surveillance, and we offered colonization screening for carbapenemase-producing organisms to all patients admitted to unit A since February 2019. We assessed healthcare facility infection control practices in ACH-A and epidemiologically linked facilities by visits from the ICAP (Infection Control Assessment and Promotion) Program. The recent medical histories of case patients were reviewed. Isolates were evaluated by whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Results: Through June 2019, 7 cases were identified from 6 case patients: 4 from clinical cultures and 3 from 258 colonization screens including 1 prior unit A patient detected as an outpatient (Fig. 1). Organisms isolated were Klebsiella pneumoniae (n = 5), E. cloacae (n = 1), and Citrobacter freundii (n = 1); 1 patient had both NDM-producing K. pneumoniae and C. freundii. Also, 5 case patients had overlapping stays in unit A during February–May 2019 (Fig. 2); common exposures in unit A included rooms in close proximity, inhabiting the same room at different times and shared caregivers. One case-patient was not admitted to unit A but shared caregivers, equipment, and devices (including a colonoscope) with other case patients while admitted to other ACH-A units. No case patients reported travel outside the United States. Screening at epidemiologically linked facilities and clinical culture surveillance showed no evidence of transmission beyond ACH-A. Infection control assessments at ACH-A revealed deficiencies in hand hygiene, contact precautions adherence, and incomplete cleaning of shared equipment within and used to transport to/from a treatment room in unit A. Following implementation of recommended infection control interventions, no further cases were identified. Finally, 5 K. pneumoniae of ST-273 were related by WGS including carriage of NDM-5 and IncX3 plasmid supporting transmission of this strain. Further analysis is required to relate IncX3 plasmid carriage and potential transmission to other organisms and sequence types identified in this study. Conclusions: We identified a multiorganism outbreak of NDM-5–producing CRE in an ACH specialty care unit. Transmission was controlled through improved infection control practices and extensive colonization screening to identify asymptomatic case-patients. Multiple species with NDM-5 were identified, highlighting the potential role of genotype-based surveillance.Funding: NoneDisclosures: Muhammad Salman Ashraf reports that he is the principal investigator for a study funded by an investigator-initiated research grant.

scholarly journals 161. Prevalence and Risk Factors for Candida auris Colonization Among Patients in a Long-term Acute Care Hospital—New Jersey, 2017

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (suppl_1) ◽  
pp. S14-S14
Author(s):  
Faye Rozwadowski ◽  
Jarred McAteer ◽  
Nancy A Chow ◽  
Kimberly Skrobarcek ◽  
Kaitlin Forsberg ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Acute Care ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Resistant Organism ◽  
Invasive Infection ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Candida Auris

Abstract Background Candida auris can be transmitted in healthcare settings, and patients can become asymptomatically colonized, increasing risk for invasive infection and transmission. We investigated an ongoing C. auris outbreak at a 30-bed long-term acute care hospital to identify colonization for C. auris prevalence and risk factors. Methods During February–June 2017, we conducted point prevalence surveys every 2 weeks among admitted patients. We abstracted clinical information from medical records and collected axillary and groin swabs. Swabs were tested for C. auris. Data were analyzed to identify risk factors for colonization with C. auris by evaluating differences between colonized and noncolonized patients. Results All 101 hospitalized patients were surveyed, and 33 (33%) were colonized with C. auris. Prevalence of colonization ranged from 8% to 38%; incidence ranged from 5% to 20% (figure). Among colonized patients with available data, 19/27 (70%) had a tracheostomy, 20/31 (65%) had gastrostomy tubes, 24/33 (73%) ventilator use, and 12/27 (44%) had hemodialysis. Also, 31/33 (94%) had antibiotics and 13/33 (34%) antifungals during hospitalization. BMI for colonized patients (mean = 30.3, standard deviation (SD) = 10) was higher than for noncolonized patients (mean = 26.5, SD = 7.9); t = −2.1; P = 0.04). Odds of colonization were higher among Black patients (33%) vs. White patients (16%) (odds ratio [OR] 3.5; 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.3–9.8), and those colonized with other multidrug-resistant organism (MDRO) (72%) vs. noncolonized (44%) (OR 3.2; CI 1.3–8.0). Odds of death were higher among colonized patients (OR 4.6; CI 1.6—13.6). Conclusion Patients in long-term acute care facilities and having high prevalences of MDROs might be at risk for C. auris. Such patients with these risk factors could be targeted for enhanced surveillance to facilitate early detection of C. auris. Infection control measures to reduce MDROs’ spread, including hand hygiene, contact precautions, and judicious use of antimicrobials, could prevent further C. auris transmission. Acknowledgements The authors thank Janet Glowicz and Kathleen Ross. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

scholarly journals 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (suppl_1) ◽  
pp. S385-S385
Author(s):  
Colleen M Clay ◽  
Leonardo Girio-Herrera ◽  
Faheem Younus
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Health ◽  
Acute Care ◽  
Influenza A ◽  
Average Length ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Prevention Measures ◽  
Influenza Outbreak ◽  
Hospital Acquired

Abstract Background Behavioral health units (BHU) have been implicated in influenza outbreaks due to group activities, low availability of alcohol-based hand gels and unique host factors. We describe the management of an unusual influenza outbreak, which started in the BHU and then spilled over to the acute care hospital (ACH). Methods University of Maryland Harford Memorial Hospital is a 95-bed ACH with a 14-bed closed-door adult BHU located on the fifth floor. Two cases each of hospital-acquired influenza were identified in our BHU during 2016 and 2017. In January 2018, however, hospital-acquired influenza cases in the BHU spilled over to the adjacent ACH to cause an outbreak. A case was defined as a patient with fever of >100.4°F, presence of influenza-like illness, and a positive influenza test >72 hours after admission. Outbreak control measures included twice daily fever screening, enhanced droplet precautions, visitor restrictions, discontinuing community activities, enforcing hand hygiene at all hospital entrances, and hospital-wide chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir. Results On January 15, 2018, the index patient developed influenza in the BHU followed by a second case in BHU 4-days later. Over the next 10 days, five more patients on the third and fourth floors of ACH tested positive. Attack rate was 3% and average length of stay was 8.9 days. Chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir 75 mg orally once a day was given to 71% of all eligible hospitalized patients for a week (at a cost of $17,000). All seven patients yielded influenza A, subtype H3N2 and were successfully treated with oseltamivir 75 mg orally twice a day for 7 days. The outbreak lasted 11 days. Figure 1 shows the epidemiologic curve. Conclusion Special attention should be paid to influenza prevention in the BHUs due to the risk of spillover effect to sicker patients in the adjacent ACH. A short, 7-day course of hospital-wide oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis, in addition to promptly implementing the infection prevention measures was effective in controlling the outbreak. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

scholarly journals COVID-19 Outbreak in an Acute-Care Hospital: Lessons Learned

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (S1) ◽  
pp. s56-s57
Author(s):  
Supriya Narasimhan ◽  
Vidya Mony ◽  
Tracey Stoll ◽  
Sherilyn Oribello ◽  
Karanas Yvonne ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Acute Care ◽  
Infection Prevention ◽  
Environmental Control ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Additional Patient ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Eye Protection ◽  
Containment Measures

Background: We describe the infection prevention investigation of a cluster of 15 healthcare workers (HCWs) and 7 patients in a single non–COVID-19 unit of an acute-care hospital in September 2020. Methods: The infection prevention team was notified of 13 SARS-CoV-2–positive, symptomatic HCWs in an acute-care non–COVID-19 unit in 1 week (August 30, 2020, to September 3, 2020). In the same week, 2 patients who had been on the unit were diagnosed with nosocomial COVID-19. An epidemiologic investigation identified the exposure period to be between August 19, 2020, and September 3, 2020. The following immediate containment measures were implemented: closing the unit to new admissions, restricting float staff, moving existing patients to private rooms, mandatory masking of patients, and mandatory respirator and eye protection on unit entry for all HCWs. Exposed unit staff were tested immediately and then every 4 days until September 18, 2020. Likewise, exposed patients, including those discharged, were notified and offered testing. Hospital-wide HCW surveillance testing was conducted. Enhanced environmental control measures were conducted, including terminal cleaning and ultraviolet C (UV-C) disinfection of common areas and patient rooms and a thorough investigation of airflow. Detailed staff interviews were performed to identify causes of transmission. Multiple town hall meetings were held for staff education and updates. Results: In total, 108 total patients were deemed exposed: 33 were inpatients and 75 had been discharged. Testing identified 5 additional patient cases among 57 patients who received testing; 51 chose to self-monitor for symptoms. Staff testing identified 2 additional cases. Thus, 15 HCWs and 7 patients were linked in this cluster. The containment measures successfully ended staff transmission as of September 5, 2020. The last patient case was detected on September 10, 2020. Secondary cases were noted in 6 HCW families. We identified staff presenteeism, complacency, and socialization in break rooms and outside work as major causes of transmission. Suboptimal compliance with universal eye protection and hand hygiene (67%) were contributing factors. We determined by contact tracing and temporality that the outbreak could have stemmed from nursing home patient(s) through floating HCWs to staff on the affected unit. Directionality of transmission was from staff to patients in this cluster. Conclusions: Many facets of pandemic fatigue were apparent in this outbreak, namely, inability of HCWs to adhere to changing PPE guidance, presenteeism pressures due to workforce needs, and socialization with peers due to a false sense of security conferred by biweekly surveillance testing. Ongoing PPE education, repeated reinforcement, as well as engagement in staff wellness are crucial to combatting pandemic fatigue, conserving our workforce, and preventing future outbreaks.Funding: NoDisclosures: None

scholarly journals Impact of an antimicrobial stewardship programme on antimicrobial utilization and the prevalence of MDR Pseudomonas aeruginosa in an acute care hospital in Qatar

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mazen A Sid Ahmed ◽  
Hamad Abdel Hadi ◽  
Sulieman Abu Jarir ◽  
Abdul Latif Al Khal ◽  
Muna A Al-Maslamani ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Pseudomonas Aeruginosa ◽  
Acute Care ◽  
Antimicrobial Stewardship ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Antibiotic Use ◽  
Significant Rise ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Antimicrobial Consumption ◽  
Healthcare Facilities

Abstract Background The excessive and inappropriate use of antibiotics is universal across all healthcare facilities. In Qatar there has been a substantial increase in antimicrobial consumption coupled with a significant rise in antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Antimicrobial stewardship programmes (ASPs) have become a standard intervention for effective optimization of antimicrobial prescribing. Methods A before–after study was conducted in Hamad General Hospital (603 bed acute care hospital): 1 year before implementation of a comprehensive ASP compared with the following 2 years. The ASP included a hospital-wide pre-authorization requirement by infectious diseases physicians for all broad-spectrum antibiotics. Prevalence of MDR Pseudomonas aeruginosa was compared with antimicrobial consumption, calculated as DDD per 1000 patient-days (DDD/1000 PD). Susceptibility was determined using broth microdilution, as per CLSI guidelines. Antibiotic use was restricted through the ASP, as defined in the hospital’s antibiotic policy. Results A total of 6501 clinical isolates of P. aeruginosa were collected prospectively over 3 years (2014–17). Susceptibility to certain antimicrobials improved after the ASP was implemented in August 2015. The prevalence of MDR P. aeruginosa showed a sustained decrease from 2014 (9%) to 2017 (5.46%) (P = 0.019). There was a significant 23.9% reduction in studied antimicrobial consumption following ASP implementation (P = 0.008). The yearly consumption of meropenem significantly decreased from 47.32 to 31.90 DDD/1000 PD (P = 0.012), piperacillin/tazobactam from 45.35 to 32.67 DDD/1000 PD (P < 0.001) and ciprofloxacin from 9.71 to 5.63 DDD/1000 PD (P = 0.015) (from 2014 to 2017). Conclusions The successful implementation of the ASP led to a significant reduction in rates of MDR P. aeruginosa, pointing towards the efficacy of the ASP in reducing AMR.

scholarly journals 1268. Transmissibility of Candida auris by Type of Inpatient Healthcare Facility

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (suppl_1) ◽  
pp. S386-S387
Author(s):  
Prabasaj Paul ◽  
Kaitlin Forsberg ◽  
Snigdha Vallabhaneni ◽  
Shawn R Lockhart ◽  
Anastasia P Litvintseva ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Acute Care ◽  
Reproduction Number ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Healthcare Facility ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Candida Auris ◽  
Healthcare Facilities ◽  
Colonization Pressure ◽  
Facility Type

Abstract Background Candida auris is a multidrug-resistant yeast causing outbreaks in healthcare settings. Stopping the spread of C. auris requires rapid identification of healthcare facilities at risk of higher transmission to help targeted implementation of infection control measures. We used data collected during public health investigations to quantify transmissibility of C. auris by type of healthcare facility. Methods In two states, 3,159 patient swabs were collected during 96 C. auris point prevalence surveys conducted at 36 inpatient healthcare facilities in November 2016 and April 2018. We estimated facility transmissibility and facility reproduction number (number infected by one index colonized patient per day, and per stay, respectively, at the facility) of C. auris based on estimated colonization pressure, a count of newly colonized patients between successive surveys at the same facility, and mean lengths of stay at facilities (estimated from CMS administrative data). The results were summarized by facility type: acute care hospital (ACH), long-term acute care hospital (LTACH) or ventilator unit at skilled nursing facility (VSNF), and were compared with previous estimates for transmissibility of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE). Results Swabs were collected from 13 ACHs, 12 LTACHs, and 11 VSNFs. The C. auris facility reproduction number may exceed the critical value of 1 in both ACHs and VSNFs, and may exceed that for CRE in ACHs (table). Conclusion Transmissibility of C. auris is comparable to that of CRE. The transmissibility within VSNFs emphasizes their potential role as amplifiers in the outbreak. Understanding transmissibility by facility type helps evaluate the potential impact of interventions in various settings. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

scholarly journals Interfacility Spread of OXA-23–Producing Carbapenem-Resistant Acinetobacter—Connecticut, 2018–2019

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. s304-s304
Author(s):  
Sydney Jones ◽  
Meghan Maloney ◽  
Anu Paranandi ◽  
Dana Pepe ◽  
Elizabeth Nazarian ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Acute Care Hospital ◽  
Care Facility ◽  
Care Hospital ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Environmental Cleaning ◽  
Healthcare Facilities ◽  
Contact Precautions ◽  
Carbapenem Resistant ◽  
Carbapenemase Gene

Background: Carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB), a multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacterium, can cause difficult-to-treat infections with mortality in approximately half of CRAB cases. CRAB can spread among healthcare facilities after transfer of an infected or colonized patient. Strategies to limit CRAB spread include adherence to contact precautions, environmental cleaning with bleach, and screening to identify colonized patients. During July–September 2018, the Connecticut Department of Public Health (DPH) worked with an acute-care hospital (hospital A) to contain an outbreak of OXA-23–producing CRAB (OXA-23 is an enzyme that confers resistance to carbapenems). During November 2018–March 2019, statewide CRAB surveillance identified additional cases of related OXA-23–producing CRAB at other healthcare facilities. DPH, Connecticut State Public Health Laboratory (SPHL), and the Antibiotic Resistance Laboratory Network (ARLN) investigated to prevent additional cases. Methods: Since January 2017, CRAB isolates have been routinely sent to SPHL and ARLN for carbapenemase gene detection and whole-genome sequencing (WGS) to determine isolate relatedness. During November 2018–March 2019, DPH collected patient healthcare history for patients with CRAB isolates to identify outbreaks and provide assistance in infection control and prevention to healthcare facilities reporting CRAB cases. Beginning May 2019, DPH and ARLN offered facilities screening to identify patients colonized with OXA-23–producing CRAB. Results: Of 10 OXA-23–producing CRAB isolates reported to DPH during November 2018–March 2019, 3 were closely related to the 9 isolates from hospital A’s outbreak by WGS (single-nucleotide polymorphism difference range, 1–16). One isolate was from a patient who had been admitted to hospital A during July 2018. All 3 patients with CRAB isolates shared a history of residence at long-term–care facility A (LTCF A). Two patients received a CRAB infection diagnosis upon admission to hospital B after transfer from LTCF A. Both LTCF A and hospital B performed environmental cleaning with bleach and placed CRAB-identified patients on contact precautions. LTCF A declined screening patients for CRAB, whereas hospitals B and C, which receive frequent transfers from LTCF A, screened all patients on admission from LTCF A. During May–September 2019, among 6 patients screened, 1 was colonized with OXA-23–producing CRAB and was placed on contact precautions. Conclusions: Transfer of patients who are infected or colonized with CRAB among hospitals and LTCFs can facilitate the regional spread of CRAB. Strategies for containing the spread of carbapenemase-producing organisms include adherence to contact precautions, colonization screening, interfacility communication, and collaboration with public health.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

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