William James and the stream of consciousness

Author(s):  
Jane Hu

The term ‘stream of consciousness’ was first coined by psychologist William James in The Principles of Psychology in 1893, when he describes it thusly: "consciousness as an uninterrupted ‘flow’: ‘a ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let’s call it the stream of thought, consciousness, or subjective life" (243). The term quickly came to mean a narrative mode that seeks to give the written equivalent of a character’s thought processes, and is sometimes described in terms of an ‘interior monologue’. As such, it differs from the ‘dramatic monologue’ or ‘soliloquy’ where the speaker addresses the audience or an implied receiver. Stream of consciousness style is often identified by fictional techniques such as lack of punctuation, long and sometimes agrammatical sentences, and a series of unrelated impressions. Stream of consciousness technique tries to represent a character’s general mental state before it is condensed, organized, or edited down into narrative coherence or sense. While stream of consciousness is often read as an avant-garde technique, its aims were to get closer to the ‘reality’ of human thought processes. As a narrative technique, stream of consciousness maintains affiliations with other modernist art forms, such as the visual art of German expressionism, Cubism, and modernist film.


Author(s):  
Dora Zhang

Few terms are more associated with the innovations of modernist fiction—and Virginia Woolf’s novels in particular—than ‘stream of consciousness’, yet the contours of the term often remain vague. This chapter argues that Woolf makes distinctive contributions to the genre that have been underrecognized both because of its gendered association with formlessness, and because stream of consciousness is often simply conflated with interior monologue, which she mostly did not use. Instead, Woolf’s contributions include her use of free indirect discourse to overcome the egotism of the first person, experiments with rendering collective streams of consciousness in Between the Acts, and finally, her use of analogies to evoke the feeling of thinking, which also illuminates unappreciated links to William James, the psychologist who coined the term together, Woolf’s strategies refute the charge of intense individualism that is often levied at stream-of-consciousness writing.


1998 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

From within the stream of consciousness, according to William James, there take place very frequently acts of “appropriation” to oneself of other basic durational components of the stream. Some components are thus “owned,” but some are “disowned”; also, “assent” is bestowed on the contents of some states of consciousness, whereas others may be rejected as false or unacceptable. At one point, James suggests that every state of consciousness belonging to one's stream of consciousness is an appropriation to oneself; otherwise, the stream would not hang together as a single mental whole. This article explicates the latter thesis and raises certain objections to it, while acquainting the reader with James's account of the state-appropriative acts. Also addressed here is a “parenthetical digression” that occurs as James introduces the state-appropriative acts: He is strongly attracted by the view, which he sets aside for the present, that no state of consciousness provides unmediated awareness of any other state of consciousness.


1981 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome L. Singer

Imagination was chiefly explored by armchair, self-reflective procedures of Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbes and Leibniz or the Romantic poets such as Wordsworth and Coleridge and by the literary genre of the stream of consciousness. Although William James put it at the center of psychology it was Freud's development of the psychoanalytic method that opened the way for a more systematic consideration of ongoing thought and waking fantasy processes. After a hiatus during the period of behaviorist domination, the exploration of the functions and dimensions of imaginative thought through increasingly precise psychometric and laboratory procedures has again become a major task for psychology. Specific research questions relating to imagery and styles of imagination as well as clinical applications of imaginative thought are reviewed.


1997 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

According to William James, bodily self-awareness (bodily feeling) is pervasive throughout the stream of consciousness; such awareness is included in each and every pulse of mentality that makes up the stream of consciousness. This installment of the present series of articles begins to consider the role that bodily self-awareness plays in the very structure of the basic durational components of James's stream. The focus here is on an account of this role that the prominent phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch preferred. Gurwitsch held that pervasive bodily self-awareness belongs to the margin of consciousness; such bodily self-awareness occurs in the form of distinct acts of awareness possessing a separate content from that of the central thematic process which also characterizes every pulse of consciousness. The present article discusses Gurwitsch's account in order to set up a contrast, which will be drawn explicitly in the next installment, with James's more phenomeno-logically integrated conception of pervasive bodily self-awareness.


1970 ◽  
Vol 41 (116) ◽  
pp. 63-75
Author(s):  
Annette Thorsen Vilslev

CONSCIOUSNESS AS MOVEMENT — ACCORDING TO NATSUME SŌSEKI | In his Theory of Literature from 1907, Japanese writer Natsume Sōseki (1867‑1916) describes feelings as pivotal in literature worldwide. Fredric Jameson places Sōseki among the major modernists in the twentieth century. Like the western modernists, Sōseki was inspired by William James’ concept stream of consciousness, developing his own idea about literature as an affective type of continuity of consciousness. This article investigates how this idea influences the representation of characters in his last, unfinished feuilleton novel, Light and Dark from 1916. The article argues that a comparison with current day affect theory calls attention to how Sōseki not only portrays the bodily emotions, but also consciousness as embodied and embedded in particular social spaces. In this novel Sōseki depictsor sketches minor feelings or everyday affects as closely related to the experience of modernity. By exploiting its feuilleton form, Light and Dark shows how new modes of perception and movementproduce affects that stick to bodies (rather than spring from them). The article thus suggests seeing Light and Dark as a critical and nuanced comment on modernity and its discourses on emotions.


1988 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

Is the stream of consciousness a temporal continuum or a sequence of distinct awarenesses? The present article considers this question in the context of the different theoretical positions of James J. Gibson and William James. The view favored is one that Gibson's treatment of perceptual awareness per se suggests: Awareness qua brain process is a unitary occurrence that, barring interruptions, expands continuously in the temporal domain for an extended duration. The obvious variation in awareness from moment to moment is construed as continuous change in content belonging to a single, developing process. The contrasting view holds that the stream of consciousness consists of pulses or drops of experience. These are distinct, of course, though temporally adjacent one with the next. James's view was of the latter discontinuous type even when he was proposing his now famous characterization of the stream of consciousness as being, among other things, sensibly continuous.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-64
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas

What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O’Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space that is simultaneously occupied by several experiences. Whereas, according to the first conception, emotion is a feature of a temporal segment of the stream of consciousness and colors through and through each consciousness state that instantiates it, the second conception considers an emotion to be a distinct one of a system of simultaneous experiences that interact with each other, for example, limiting each other’s number and intensity. Among other matters discussed is the two theorists’ mutually contrasting conception of how the non-inferential awareness which we have of our states of consciousness is accomplished.


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