What Are Grand Chambers for?

Author(s):  
Michal Bobek

Abstract In multi-panelled higher jurisdictions, a larger, extended formation of judges tends to be established within the court. It bears various names: the grand chamber, the extended chamber, the expanded composition, the reunion of several chambers, a court sitting en banc, an extended section or a division of a court. In larger but not too large jurisdictions, the same role is adopted by the plenary. For ease of reference, I shall refer to all such extended judicial formations with the generic name ‘grand chamber’. To bear the same name does not necessarily mean to perform the same function. As a Czech lawyer, I have always intuitively assumed that the role of such a body within an apex court is to unify the case law. In the Czech Republic, as well as in a number of other supreme continental jurisdictions for that matter, there tends to be only one reason for the presence of a grand chamber within a supreme court: to unify the diverging lines of case law and to set a clear line of precedent. However, that has never really been the job description, least of all the practice, of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’). This begs the question: what may then be other structural reasons for the existence of such a body within an apex jurisdiction? What is the specific role, function, and ensuing justification for the Grand Chamber of the Court? This article offers some personal reflections on that question. It is structured as follows: it begins with a short comparative overview of some of the grand chambers within European (national) courts, overseas in the common law world, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, in order to tease out the functional rationale for various types of extended judicial compositions within those systems (Part I). Next, two types of such functional justifications for grand chambers in the form of ideal models are identified (Part II). Finally, those justifications are then considered in light of the legislative design and the current practice of the Grand Chamber of the Court, before concluding with two modest suggestions (Part III).

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 915-935
Author(s):  
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou

AbstractThis Article aims to examine the social media jurisprudence of national courts in a selected set of EU Member States by focusing on judicial dialogue specifically via references to the case law of other courts. Do judges in social media cases engage with the case law of peers, and if so how and to what extent? The analysis investigates whether national judges draw on the jurisprudence of higher domestic courts, foreign courts and/or European supranational courts—the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)—and explores the use of such jurisprudence. It is based on 147 cases from the constitutional and/or supreme courts of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although judicial dialogue is generally limited in the cases under study, the analysis illustrates the different ways in which courts interact with the rulings of peers and informs on the latter’s contribution to judicial assessment.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter examines the recovery of unlawful and incompatible State aids, which is one of the cornerstones of free and undistorted competition in the European Union. The repayment of an aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the common market is of utmost importance, as it eliminates the distortion of competition caused by the competitive advantage afforded by the contested aid. In other words, by repaying an unlawful aid, the recipient forfeits the advantage it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market and therefore the previously existing situation is restored; it is common ground in this respect that this objective is attained once the aid in question—increased, where appropriate, by default interests—has been repaid by the recipient.


Author(s):  
VLADIMÍRA PEJCHALOVÁ GRÜNWALDOVÁ

AbstractThis article deals with the implementation, at the national level, of European human rights protection standards as enshrined in theEuropean Convention on Human Rights(ECHR) and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It discusses the principles of interpretation of theECHRby the ECtHR, the interaction and mutual dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts, and the approach of the latter to interpretation and application of the case law of the ECtHR. Using the concrete examples of France and the Czech Republic as case studies, it is shown to what extent and how European constitutional courts take into account and apply the letter of the Convention and its interpretation by the ECtHR.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 64-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract This paper presents the remedies available to persons whose European law rights have been infringed by judgments given by national Courts. The paper firsts presents the concept of state liability for judicial errors in relation to European law, as it stems from the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, then goes on to show how the European Court of Human Rights may give redress to such aggrieved parties. Finally, it discusses the differences in the possibility of redress given by the two courts and the compatibility between their approaches, finally leading to a discussion on the possible convergence of the two.


Author(s):  
Anastasia A. Isaeva ◽  

In this study, the author addresses the problem of the definition and structure of the right to religious autonomy. The object of the study was the content of the two manifestations of this right that the author identified: internal governance and doctrinal autonomy in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The aim of this article is to determine the main areas of protection of the right to religious autonomy of religious associations and the positive experience applicable in the Russian Federation. The author describes the role of the right to religious autonomy, which is an integral part of pluralism in a democratic society and, therefore, acts as a center for protection provided by freedom of conscience. The study is based on the theoretical material of the works of both Russian (P.V. Sergeev, Yu.E. Fedotova, M.O. Shakhov) and foreign (M.E. Chopko, M.F. Moses) researchers. The extensive law enforcement practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the regulations of the European Union are also used. The methodological basis of the study is dialectical, comparative legal, formal legal, and other methods. In particular, the use of the dialectical method helped to determine the content of the concept of the right to religious autonomy, to study the dynamics of the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding a “balanced approach” to protect the autonomy of the internal management of religious associations. The use of comparative legal and formal legal methods helped to identify correlations between the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and acts adopted within the European Union. The use of the functional method made it possible to investigate the place and role of European institutions and the nature of their governing influence on the provision and protection of the right to religious autonomy to various religious associations, including those representing a religious minority. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that religious autonomy in its two possible manifestations—internal governance and doctrinal autonomy—directly follows from the content of the powers of freedom of conscience. Both of the manifestations are protected by European regulations although such protection cannot be considered as absolute. On the one hand, the right to religious autonomy is an integral part of the external manifestation of religious beliefs; on the other, its universal protection will jeopardize the protection of the rights of others. Nevertheless, in a situation in which the governing influence of European states is limited and the enforcement practice of the European Court of Human Rights is not entirely consistent, it seems that European institutions are aware of the importance of the right to religious autonomy. Therefore, the authorities resolve problems associated with its implementation pragmatically, trying to balance it with other rights and legitimate interests.


Author(s):  
Agustín GARCÍA URETA

LABURPENA: Lan honek, Europar Batasuneko habitatei buruzko Zuzentarauaren eta Justizia Auzitegiaren gaiari buruzko doktrinaren pean, garrantzi erkideko lekuei ken dakiekeen sailkapena aztertzen du. Iruzkinak Auzitegiak onartutako fokatzeari kritikak egiten dizkio, bereziki, Cascina uzian, balizkotasun hura onartzen baitu, Zuzentarauaren hitzez hitzekoak kontserbazio bereziko guneak bakarrik aipatu arren. Agerian jartzen dira baita ere beste alderdi batzuekiko Auzitegiaren jarrerak dakarren sendotasunik eza, besteak beste, kontserbazio bereziko gune izendatu aurretik garrantzi erkideko lekuen babesarekiko eta garrantzi erkideko lekuen behin betiko zerrenda onartzen duen Batzordearen erabakia aurkaratzeko legitimazioarekiko. Azkenik, garrantzi erkideko leku bati sailkapena kentzen zaionean jabetza-eskubideak duen papera ere aztertzen da. RESUMEN: Este trabajo examina la posible desclasificación de los lugares de importancia comunitaria (LIC) bajo la Directiva de hábitats de la Unión Europea y la doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia a este respecto. El comentario plantea una serie de críticas al enfoque adoptado por el Tribunal, en particular en el asunto Cascina, en el que se acepta tal eventualidad a pesar del tenor literal de la Directiva, que solo se refiere a las zonas de especial conservación (ZEC). También se ponen en evidencia las inconsistencias que plantea la postura del Tribunal con otros aspectos, tales como la protección de los LIC antes de designarse como ZEC y la legitimación para recurrir la decisión de la Comisión que aprueba la lista definitiva de LIC. Finalmente, se examina el papel del derecho de propiedad en el caso de la desclasificación de un LIC. ABSTRACT: This contribution examines the declassification of sites of community importance (SCIs) under the European Union Habitats Directive and the case law of the European Court of Justice. The comment criticizes the approach adopted by the Court, in particular in the Cascina case, which admits that possibility despite the Directive’s express wording that only refers to special conservation areas (SCAs). The comment also highlights other inconsistencies derived from the case law such as the provisional protection of SCIs before being designated as SCAs and the locus standi to challenge the Commission’s decision adopting the definitive list of SCIs so far rejected by the Court. The comment also examines the role of private ownership in the declassification procedure.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 489-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Nascmbene

A. The area of freedom, security and justice and the role of the Court of JusticeOne of the subjects which has aroused particular interest in the study of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam as an objective of the European Union (EU) inherent in the principle of the free movement of persons (see the preamble to, and Article 2, the Treaty on EU) is the role of the European Court of Justice (Court). The interest is both theoretical and practical, because one of the main issues is the Court's jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings and thus relations between national and Community courts and the protection of the interests of individuals before national courts wherever there is a conflict between national and Community law and thus a question of interpretation of Community law arises in national proceedings. The Treaty of Nice, which came into force on 1 February 2003, altered the jurisdiction and organisation of the Community judicature and therefore affected the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.1


Author(s):  
Allan Rosas

Whilst the other contributions to this book focus on the extent to which the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is taken into account in EU neighbouring countries, notably by the national courts of these countries, this chapter deals with the reverse situation; that is, the extent to which the CJEU pays attention to the case law of both international courts and national courts of third countries. This is done mainly by looking at explicit references to such extraneous sources to be found in CJEU judgments and orders. The main focus is on the case law of the Court of Justice, but some information is also provided concerning the case law of the General Court. In the context of references to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law contained in Court of Justice judgments, some examples are also given of references to CJEU judgments which can be found in the case law of the Human Rights Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 565-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irina Domurath

This article analyses the recent case law concerning Uber and other platforms. Its main objective is to examine the question of whether and under what conditions platforms can be considered the contract partners of the individuals who seek goods and services through the platform’s infrastructure. In a first step, the criteria employed by the courts, both the Court of Justice of the European Union and national courts, are identified that characterise the role of platforms in relation to the underlying service provision. In a second step, the article looks at the approach to intermediaries in more traditional consumer contract law. A differentiated image emerges, which underlines the need for legislative clarification.


1997 ◽  
Vol 22 (03) ◽  
pp. 581-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustav Peebles

In this paper I approach the European Union Treaties (Rome and Maastricht) and the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence from a Marxist standpoint. I argue that the treaties and case law of the European Union (EU) revolve around the rights of things (commodities), rather than of people. People primarily gain rights within the EU by demonstrating that they embody exchange value and are therefore personified commodities; people are not accorded rights merely for being human. In essence, the treaties and case law have enshrined Marx's notion of commodity fetishism, which Marx asserted to be a social mystification, into transparent law. Focusing on the grand scheme of the treaties' jurisdiction in this manner also illuminates the role of the court as it struggles to balance the demands of capital's self-valorization with fundamental human rights. I then consider the consequences of this balancing act for the EU integration process. I argue that this phenomenon as a whole also carries implications for EU civil society and for notions of legal equality among persons.


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