scholarly journals Judicial Dialogue in Social Media Cases in Europe: Exploring the Role of Peers in Judicial Adjudication

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 915-935
Author(s):  
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou

AbstractThis Article aims to examine the social media jurisprudence of national courts in a selected set of EU Member States by focusing on judicial dialogue specifically via references to the case law of other courts. Do judges in social media cases engage with the case law of peers, and if so how and to what extent? The analysis investigates whether national judges draw on the jurisprudence of higher domestic courts, foreign courts and/or European supranational courts—the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)—and explores the use of such jurisprudence. It is based on 147 cases from the constitutional and/or supreme courts of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although judicial dialogue is generally limited in the cases under study, the analysis illustrates the different ways in which courts interact with the rulings of peers and informs on the latter’s contribution to judicial assessment.

Author(s):  
Michal Bobek

Abstract In multi-panelled higher jurisdictions, a larger, extended formation of judges tends to be established within the court. It bears various names: the grand chamber, the extended chamber, the expanded composition, the reunion of several chambers, a court sitting en banc, an extended section or a division of a court. In larger but not too large jurisdictions, the same role is adopted by the plenary. For ease of reference, I shall refer to all such extended judicial formations with the generic name ‘grand chamber’. To bear the same name does not necessarily mean to perform the same function. As a Czech lawyer, I have always intuitively assumed that the role of such a body within an apex court is to unify the case law. In the Czech Republic, as well as in a number of other supreme continental jurisdictions for that matter, there tends to be only one reason for the presence of a grand chamber within a supreme court: to unify the diverging lines of case law and to set a clear line of precedent. However, that has never really been the job description, least of all the practice, of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’). This begs the question: what may then be other structural reasons for the existence of such a body within an apex jurisdiction? What is the specific role, function, and ensuing justification for the Grand Chamber of the Court? This article offers some personal reflections on that question. It is structured as follows: it begins with a short comparative overview of some of the grand chambers within European (national) courts, overseas in the common law world, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, in order to tease out the functional rationale for various types of extended judicial compositions within those systems (Part I). Next, two types of such functional justifications for grand chambers in the form of ideal models are identified (Part II). Finally, those justifications are then considered in light of the legislative design and the current practice of the Grand Chamber of the Court, before concluding with two modest suggestions (Part III).


Author(s):  
Rafael Bustos Gisbert

El artículo examina los documentos elaborados sobre independencia judicial por distintos órganos del Consejo de Europa. Tiene en cuenta la diferente aproximación en los mismos antes y después de la crisis del Estado de Derecho en algunos de los Estados europeos a partir de 2010. Tras resumir los estándares básicos elaborados en tales textos, se estudia su influencia en el Consejo de Europa y en la UE. En el primer sentido se examina su presencia en la jurisprudencia del TEDH. Respecto a la UE se examina el modo en que ha condicionado la labor de la Comisión en la supervisión del respeto al Estado de Derecho por los Estados miembros desde que comenzara a usarlos para evaluar las candidaturas de los países del Este a ingresar en la UE a finales del pasado siglo, hasta su incorporación al Informe sobre el Estado de Derecho en la UE aprobado en octubre de 2020.This essay focuses on the documents on judicial independence drafted by Council of Europe bodies. It takes into account its diverse approaches before and after the rule of Law backsliding in some European States since 2010. The basic standards elaborated are summarized. Its influence is addressed both at the Council of Europe and at the European Unión. In the first sense it examines the influence of this soft law in the European Court of Human Rights case law. Secondly it focuses in the way it has conditioned the European Commission task of monitoring the effectiveness of rule of law in EU member states. This influence began when they were used to evaluate the candidatures of Eastern European countries to join the EU at the end of the last century but it has kept inspiring the Commision’s activities until the Report on Rule of Law issued in October 2010.


2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 929-956
Author(s):  
Mateusz Wąsik

The purpose of the paper is to present the tax consequences resulting from the lack of recognition of registered partnerships and same-sex marriages in certain EU member states, taking the example of Poland. These aspects are usually perceived as discrimination of citizens based on their sexual orientation. The author of this paper has focused on various aspects of possible discrimination, mainly concerning discrimination on the grounds of personal taxation, including inheritance and gift taxes. For these purposes, the author analysed the domestic tax rules differentiating couples living in a marriage and couples without that possibility. These legal provisions have been analysed together with the most recent domestic jurisprudence. Furthermore, the paper presents comparative analyses of domestic rules with EU law. Due to the lack of case-law oriented towards fiscal discrimination due to sexual orientation, the relevant CJEU (the Court of Justice of the European Union, hereinafter: the CJEU) and ECHR (the European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter: the ECHR) case-law have been recalled to reveal possible violations of fundamental freedoms and tax discrimination. The author makes a connection between the lack of proper regulations implemented in the domestic law with the unjustified differentiation of cross-border families on tax grounds. In the long run, only the harmonisation of personal taxation at the EU level can lead to a resolution to this situation. Alternatively, as an interim solution, the relevant ECHR judgment may be of assistance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 64-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract This paper presents the remedies available to persons whose European law rights have been infringed by judgments given by national Courts. The paper firsts presents the concept of state liability for judicial errors in relation to European law, as it stems from the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, then goes on to show how the European Court of Human Rights may give redress to such aggrieved parties. Finally, it discusses the differences in the possibility of redress given by the two courts and the compatibility between their approaches, finally leading to a discussion on the possible convergence of the two.


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Vilius Kuzminskas

The article discloses the fixed exclusion regulation of Clause 346 in the Treaty of Function of the European Union in different EU member states. A further assessment of different relevant judicial approaches to regulation are disclosed and evaluated in accordance with the European Court of Justice case law and procurement in the defense area doctrine.


Author(s):  
Anastasia A. Isaeva ◽  

In this study, the author addresses the problem of the definition and structure of the right to religious autonomy. The object of the study was the content of the two manifestations of this right that the author identified: internal governance and doctrinal autonomy in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The aim of this article is to determine the main areas of protection of the right to religious autonomy of religious associations and the positive experience applicable in the Russian Federation. The author describes the role of the right to religious autonomy, which is an integral part of pluralism in a democratic society and, therefore, acts as a center for protection provided by freedom of conscience. The study is based on the theoretical material of the works of both Russian (P.V. Sergeev, Yu.E. Fedotova, M.O. Shakhov) and foreign (M.E. Chopko, M.F. Moses) researchers. The extensive law enforcement practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the regulations of the European Union are also used. The methodological basis of the study is dialectical, comparative legal, formal legal, and other methods. In particular, the use of the dialectical method helped to determine the content of the concept of the right to religious autonomy, to study the dynamics of the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding a “balanced approach” to protect the autonomy of the internal management of religious associations. The use of comparative legal and formal legal methods helped to identify correlations between the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and acts adopted within the European Union. The use of the functional method made it possible to investigate the place and role of European institutions and the nature of their governing influence on the provision and protection of the right to religious autonomy to various religious associations, including those representing a religious minority. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that religious autonomy in its two possible manifestations—internal governance and doctrinal autonomy—directly follows from the content of the powers of freedom of conscience. Both of the manifestations are protected by European regulations although such protection cannot be considered as absolute. On the one hand, the right to religious autonomy is an integral part of the external manifestation of religious beliefs; on the other, its universal protection will jeopardize the protection of the rights of others. Nevertheless, in a situation in which the governing influence of European states is limited and the enforcement practice of the European Court of Human Rights is not entirely consistent, it seems that European institutions are aware of the importance of the right to religious autonomy. Therefore, the authorities resolve problems associated with its implementation pragmatically, trying to balance it with other rights and legitimate interests.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-56
Author(s):  
Anna Kosińska

The present study seeks to answer the question whether the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in cases concerning the exercise of broadly understood cultural policies may in reality affect the extent of implementation of cultural rights—that is, access to products of culture, participation in cultural life and freedom of artistic creativity—at the level of Member States. Cultural rights are traditionally regulated by the constitutions of EU Member States and are classified by legal scholars and commentators as second generation rights. Culture, in turn, according to primary legislation of the European Union, is only a supporting competence (Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). However, a review of the Court’s case law demonstrates that CJEU’s judgments form standards that contribute to a more effective implementation of cultural rights guaranteed in the national law of the Member States and international agreements to which they are parties. This results from the nature of the Union’s law, which penetrates a national system and thanks to the principle of direct effect and supremacy truly affects the situation of EU citizens.


Author(s):  
Thom Snijders ◽  
Stijn van Deursen

Abstract On 29 July 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgments in three eagerly awaited cases, Pelham, Spiegel Online and Funke Medien, which all relate to the relationship between copyright and (other) fundamental rights. Specifically, an issue arising in these cases is whether the EU copyright acquis allows for fundamental rights to be invoked as an autonomous ground for limiting a copyright, outside of the mechanisms incorporated in the Copyright Directive for that purpose. In its judgments, the Court rejects this possibility and instead locates the role for fundamental rights in the interpretation and implementation of the exceptions and limitations of the Directive. We argue that – while this may render satisfactory results in the great majority of cases – in exceptional cases the CJEU’s approach towards balancing copyrights and fundamental rights could be at odds with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, which might reduce the legal certainty sought after by the CJEU. Lastly, we consider the implications of that potential tension for the judicial authorities and other actors within the domestic legal orders of the EU Member States.


2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Ziller

In this paper Professor Ziller addresses the intriguing question of the relationship of the European Union – which is not a state and which has no territory of its own – to the territories of EU Member States. The paper provides a survey of the overseas territories affected and the evolution of the case law of the European Court of Justice on the extent to which the provisions of the EC Treaty apply to the European territories overseas.


Author(s):  
Agustín GARCÍA URETA

LABURPENA: Lan honek, Europar Batasuneko habitatei buruzko Zuzentarauaren eta Justizia Auzitegiaren gaiari buruzko doktrinaren pean, garrantzi erkideko lekuei ken dakiekeen sailkapena aztertzen du. Iruzkinak Auzitegiak onartutako fokatzeari kritikak egiten dizkio, bereziki, Cascina uzian, balizkotasun hura onartzen baitu, Zuzentarauaren hitzez hitzekoak kontserbazio bereziko guneak bakarrik aipatu arren. Agerian jartzen dira baita ere beste alderdi batzuekiko Auzitegiaren jarrerak dakarren sendotasunik eza, besteak beste, kontserbazio bereziko gune izendatu aurretik garrantzi erkideko lekuen babesarekiko eta garrantzi erkideko lekuen behin betiko zerrenda onartzen duen Batzordearen erabakia aurkaratzeko legitimazioarekiko. Azkenik, garrantzi erkideko leku bati sailkapena kentzen zaionean jabetza-eskubideak duen papera ere aztertzen da. RESUMEN: Este trabajo examina la posible desclasificación de los lugares de importancia comunitaria (LIC) bajo la Directiva de hábitats de la Unión Europea y la doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia a este respecto. El comentario plantea una serie de críticas al enfoque adoptado por el Tribunal, en particular en el asunto Cascina, en el que se acepta tal eventualidad a pesar del tenor literal de la Directiva, que solo se refiere a las zonas de especial conservación (ZEC). También se ponen en evidencia las inconsistencias que plantea la postura del Tribunal con otros aspectos, tales como la protección de los LIC antes de designarse como ZEC y la legitimación para recurrir la decisión de la Comisión que aprueba la lista definitiva de LIC. Finalmente, se examina el papel del derecho de propiedad en el caso de la desclasificación de un LIC. ABSTRACT: This contribution examines the declassification of sites of community importance (SCIs) under the European Union Habitats Directive and the case law of the European Court of Justice. The comment criticizes the approach adopted by the Court, in particular in the Cascina case, which admits that possibility despite the Directive’s express wording that only refers to special conservation areas (SCAs). The comment also highlights other inconsistencies derived from the case law such as the provisional protection of SCIs before being designated as SCAs and the locus standi to challenge the Commission’s decision adopting the definitive list of SCIs so far rejected by the Court. The comment also examines the role of private ownership in the declassification procedure.


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