Interpersonal Neurobiology as a Lens into the Development of Wellbeing and Reslience

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Siegel

This article reviews the interdisciplinary field of interpersonal neurobiology and its view of developmental trauma and wellbeing. Issues related to the mind, brain and relationships are discussed along with a working definition of both the mind and mental health.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaida Orth ◽  
Brian van Wyk

Abstract Background: Adolescence have been overlooked in global public health initiatives as this period is generally considered to be the healthiest in an individual’s life course. However, the growth of the global adolescent population along and their changing health profiles have called attention to the diverse health needs of adolescents. However, the increased attention toward adolescent health has accentuated existing gaps as global health reports have emphasised that there is a continued need for valid and reliable health data. In this context, evidence has shown that mental health issues constitute one of the greatest burdens of disease for adolescents. The paucity of research on adolescent mental health and wellbeing may be related to the lack of validated instruments. This integrative review aims to unpack the meaning of mental health wellness among adolescents and its associated constructs by analysing and synthesising peer-reviewed empirical and theoretical research on adolescent mental health. In doing this, we will develop a working definition of adolescent mental health wellness that can be used to develop an instrument aimed at measuring adolescent mental health wellness.Methods: The integrative review is guided by the five steps described by Whittemore and Knafl. A comprehensive search strategy which will include carefully selected terms that correspond to the domains of interest (mental health wellness) will be used to search for relevant literature on electronic databases, grey literature and government or non-governmental organisations (NGO) websites. Studies will be included if they describe and/or define general mental health wellbeing in adolescent populations aged 10-19. The screening and reporting of the review will be conducted following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. Data from the integrative review will be analysed using narrative framework synthesis for qualitative and quantitative studies Conclusion: This integrative review aims to search for and synthesise current research regarding adolescent mental health wellbeing to identify how wellbeing is being described and conceptualised. We aim to identify gaps and to contribute to a more comprehensive definition of mental health wellness which can aid in the development of an age- and culturally appropriate measure of adolescent mental health wellness


1971 ◽  
Vol 118 (546) ◽  
pp. 499-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. N. Elnagar ◽  
Promila Maitra ◽  
M. N. Rao

The difficulties of organizing mental health services in developing countries are made all the greater by inadequacy of information about the extent of illness and disability. Some beginnings have been made in India, particularly under the sponsorship of the All India Institute of Mental Health, Bangalore. The Mental Health Advisory Committee of the Government of India (1966) suggested a probable prevalence of mental illness of 20 per 1,000 population in general, 18 per mille for semi-rural and 14 per mille for rural areas. These figures are much lower than the 72 per 1,000 suggested by Sethi et al. (1967). Ganguli (1968) estimated a prevalence rate of 140 per 1,000 in industrial workers near Delhi. Incidence rates have been much less studied than prevalences (Lin and Standley, 1962). A WHO Expert Committee on mental health convened in 1960 suggested as a working definition of a case of mental illness:


Author(s):  
Jarred A. Mercer

Hilary of Poitiers’s doctrine of divine infinity lies at the foundation of his theological project, and its full significance for his overall thought has not been realized. This chapter argues that it cannot be without an exploration of the exegetical foundation of the doctrine in De Trinitate, namely, John 1:1–4. The argument begins by showing first how infinity transforms Hilary’s argument of Father-Son relations. Second, this transformation aids Hilary toward a working definition of divine infinity. Third, this chapter shows that Hilary provides a new interpretation of the critical text of Proverbs 8:22 due to his John 1:1–4 interpretive foundation. This has immense implications for his trinitarian anthropology. Fourth, these implications are elucidated through his understanding of a progressus in infinitum of the mind toward the infinite God. Hilary’s discussion of divine infinity has significant epistemological conclusions, which reorient how humanity is seen to know and relate to God.


1988 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Durham

The definition, given in Section 5 of the new Act, of a “mentally ill person” is examined. It is argued that this “definition” is cumbersome, logically incoherent, and impractical. It is predicted that if given effect it will have very unwelcome consequences. Various sources of inherent misunderstanding and uncertainty are noted. Arguments are presented for allowing severe mental illness itself rather than its consequences to be the ground for involuntary hospitalization in certain circumstances. Various suggestions are proposed for the Section's amendment. These fall into two categories, depending upon alternative assumptions: (1) minor improvements, upon the pessimistic assumption that the main structure and content of the definition will be retained; (2) more radical amendment, involving the abandonment of the entire present structure of the section, and the adoption of a working definition of “mental illness” with clear safeguards against error and abuse. The nature and requirements of such a definition are discussed.


1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
George L. Adams ◽  
Charles C. Cheney ◽  
Michael P. Tristan ◽  
Janice Friese ◽  
Laurence R. Schweitzer

The need to augment the number of primary care physicians throughout the nation has been well documented. Moreover, there is increasing recognition of the importance of mental health in primary care practice. The authors present a working definition of primary care practice, discuss the role of mental health in primary care, and describe an innovative program developed in Houston which integrates primary care mental health training into the education of primary care physicians and mental health professionals.


2019 ◽  
pp. 4-11
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas

This chapter is concerned with definition and the monism–dualism debate. It first deals with two major issues—a definition of consciousness and the mind–brain problem. The former is simply stated as “consciousness is an organism’s awareness of itself.” After arriving at a clear working definition, the chapter turns to the mind–brain problem. It pays particular attention to the monism–dualism debate, the former of which argues that there is only one unifying reality. From here, the chapter jump-starts a discussion on consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain activity, ultimately with a conclusion in favor of epiphenomenalism, in the sense that the mind is a product of the working of the brain.


PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (25) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Farr

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