Diritto e natura a Oxford: il caso di H.L.A. Hart

2009 ◽  
pp. 181-192
Author(s):  
Carolina Gasparoli
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Philosophical Background ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

- Hart is one of the most prominent philosophers of law of the last century. Published in 1961, his book The Concept of Law has influenced many of the leading figures in contemporary legal theory. Hart held the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 until 1968 and he chose Ronald Dworkin as his successor. In his last book Diritto e natura. H.L.A. e la filosofia di Oxford, Mario Ricciardi takes the uneasy relationship between the two philosophers as the starting point of his inquiry and claims that Dworkin's critique of Hart's legal theory has misinterpreted many relevant aspects of Hart's approach to law. As a result, many scholars have paid little attention to the cultural and philosophical background of Hart's work. In particular, Ricciardi suggests that, in this work, Hart uses a specific notion of analysis, namely connective analysis, which Gilbert Ryle and Peter F. Strawson had opposed to the decompositive one. Such a reading of The Concept of Law generates a new understanding of the role played by the minimum content of natural law in Hart's legal theory.

Epistemic Uncertainty and Legal Theory by Brian Burge-Hendrix (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008). [ISBN 978-0-7546-7521-1.] All page references in parentheses are to this book.

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-253
Author(s):  
Philip Soper
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Epistemic Uncertainty ◽  
Moral Authority ◽  
Proper Place ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Publishing Limited ◽  
Concept Of Law

Making the perspective of insiders critical to a theory of law, including particularly those who accept and enforce legal standards, has been the hallmark of corrections to John Austin’s theory at least since Hart’s The Concept of Law. Burge-Hendrix’s book continues this tradition and brings its insights to bear on the particular dispute between inclusive and exclusive positivists. That being said, the project has always seemed to me to be incomplete. If the participant’s perspective is indeed the critical one, then the recognition that participants make normative claims about the concept of law itself (not just about their legal standards) surely deserves its own proper place in a legal theory. Those normative claims about law range, at the very least, from claims that coercion is (morally) justified to claims of (moral) authority. If these claims turn out to be false in cases of laws that are extremely unjust, then either they are not “laws” at all according to the participants’ own views(in which case the natural law theorists are correct.) Or, participants will have to give up their normative claims about law and recognize that all that counts is pedigree and the power to coerce. In that case, we will be back to Austin’s coercive account of law, and much of the dispute between exclusive and inclusive positivists will be irrelevant.

scholarly journals El problema de la relación entre derecho y moral

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
José Luis López Fuentes
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Relationship

RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo, con base en las teorías iusnaturalistas y del positivismo jurídico, se busca ofrecer un breve acercamiento al desarrollo que han tenido a través del tiempo las tesis más importantes en torno al problema de la relación entre derecho y moral, hasta llegar a lo que actualmente es denominado antipositivismo jurídico, pues el objetivo de este documento es presentar un análisis y exposición de las aportaciones de esta corriente de pensamiento a la teoría jurídica contemporánea, para lo cual, se analizan las propuestas de Ronald Dworkin y Robert Alexy, en especial de la tesis de los principios, y su relevancia en la interpretación y aplicación de la ley.ABSTRACT: In this work, based on natural law theories and legal positivism, I seek to offer a brief approach  to the development that the most important theses have had throughout time regarding the problem of the relationship between law and morality, arriving at what we now call legal anti-positivism, the objective of this document is to present an analysis and exposition of the contributions of this current of thought to contemporary legal theory, for which the proposals of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy are analyzed, specially the thesis of the principles, and its relevance in the interpretation and application of the law.Keywords: Natural law theories, legal positivism, legal antipositivism, moral, thesis of principles.

scholarly journals The Question To Be Faced Is One of Fact: H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Theory Through His View of International Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Giovanni Bisogni
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Borderline Case ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Central Case ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

H.L.A. Hart says that The Concept of Law is focused on municipal or domestic law because that is the “central case”1 for the usage of the word ‘law.’ At the beginning of the book he states that “at various points in this book the reader will find discussions of the borderline cases where legal theorists have felt doubts about the application of the expression ‘law’ or ‘legal system,’ but the suggested resolution of these doubts, which he will also find here, is only a secondary concern of the book.”2 Yet among those borderline cases there is one that is rather intriguing, since Hart closely discusses a particular instance of them: it is international law, to which he devotes an entire chapter—the final one—of The Concept of Law. My goal in this article is therefore to make clear why the ‘resolution’ of the borderline case of international law is not entirely ‘secondary’ to Hart’s overall project in The Concept of Law and, in so doing, to show that Chapter X is not as unhappy as many think it is.

scholarly journals What is Offered to the Modern Science by Leon Petrażycki? (Following Three Descriptions of Legal Principles)

Studia Humana ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-10
Author(s):  
Sławomir Tkacz
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Theoretical Knowledge ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

Abstract The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The attention was paid to the problem of various characteristics of legal principles. In further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper.

scholarly journals Contra o Conceito do Direito: Ontologia e Epistemologia no Problema da Definição do Direito

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ítalo Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Epistemological Problem ◽  
Specific Object ◽  
Advance Research ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Ontological Problem ◽  
Concept Of Law

The problem of definition of the concept of law or at least the description of features of legal phenomenon presents variation about the implications of its solution and about the worries around it. The forms of this problem I am interested in are related to ontology and epistemology in legal philosophy: ‘What is the law?’ as (1) a question about the definition of the essence of law and (2) about the definition of a specific object of investigation for sciences about the supposed legal phenomenon – philosophy of law, legal theory, and science of law, for instance. Challenging its premises and trying to avoid both the ontological problem and epistemological problem, I propose a change of perspective from pragmatic concerns what I call the “manager's point of view”: a vision of who should manage the finite economic resources to finance scientific activity in the area of law. I argue that, starting from there, the problem of defining the concept of law as an ontological problem and as a epistemological problem is an unnecessary problem whose solution is useless to advance research in the field of law. I propose a reorientation of the controversy that has implications on how to see the researches and the education in this field.

Two Puzzles from the Postscript

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Soper
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Beliefs And Values ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Law

Conversions occur in legal theory about as often as they do in religion, which is to say rarely—so rarely that they fascinate as much for the fact that they happen at all as for the reasons they happen. It should not surprise, then, that the Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's famous work on jurisprudence reveals “the outstanding English philosopher of law of the twentieth century” reaffirming, rather than revising in any significant way, the two central tenets that distinguish his theory from that of both classical natural law theorists and modern “new naturalists” like Ronald Dworkin: (1) There is no necessary connection between law and morality; and (2) judges inevitably confront cases where the decision is “not dictated by the law” and the judge “must act as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and values” (p. 273).

Judicial Discretion and the Concept of Law

1976 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Legal Argument ◽  
Judicial Reasoning ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

In a series of recent papers Professor Ronald Dworkin has presented a critique of the legal positivist's analysis of law as typified by the work of H. L. A. Hart. Dworkin argues that the “model of rules” provides an incomplete and inadequate characterisation of the nature of legal argument and judicial reasoning and, hence, of law, by virtue of its failure to recognise that judges are bound, in making decisions, not only by rules, but also by principles which have rather different logical properties.

scholarly journals Patterson D. M. Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts / trans. from Engl. A. B. Didikin, S. A. Aleksandrov

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-93
Author(s):  
A. B. Didikin ◽  
◽  
S. A. Aleksandrov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Recent Comment ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

In a recent comment on H. L. A. Hart’s «Postscript» to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts maybe understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like «tiger», «gold» and «water». This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent to the scientific method. Thus, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts. Finally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin’s arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. The problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the «fit» side of the fit/justification model of adjudication that lies at the heart of his theory of law

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