QUASI-EVIDENTIALISM: INTERESTS, JUSTIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karyn L. Freedman

AbstractIn this paper I argue against what I call ‘strict evidentialism’, the view that evidence is the sole factor for determining the normative status of beliefs. I argue that strict evidentialism fails to capture the uniquely subjective standpoint of believers and as a result it fails to provide us with the tools necessary to apply its own epistemic norms. In its place I develop an interest-relative theory of justification which I call quasi-evidentialism, according to which S has a justified belief that P at time t if and only if S's evidence at time t supports P in proportion to S's interest in P. I take interests as fixed and argue that adjusting our confidence in a proposition in the right way, given our interests, is fine-tuned through the exercise of intellectual virtue, in particular the virtue of epistemic conscientiousness. This theory refocuses epistemic responsibility in the subject and by locating agency in the cultivation of epistemic virtue it also provides a handy solution to the problem of doxastic voluntarism, insofar as the development of our epistemic virtue guides our responsiveness to reason.

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Miller ◽  
Isaac Record

AbstractPeople increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered internet sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users' reliance on internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns within standard theories of knowledge and justification. To shed light on the problem, we introduce a novel conceptual framework that clarifies the relations between justified belief, epistemic responsibility, action and the technological resources available to a subject. We argue that justified belief is subject to certain epistemic responsibilities that accompany the subject's particular decision-taking circumstances, and that one typical responsibility is to ascertain, so far as one can, whether the information upon which the judgment will rest is biased or incomplete. What this responsibility comprises is partly determined by the inquiry-enabling technologies available to the subject. We argue that a subject's beliefs that are formed based on internet-filtered information are less justified than they would be if she either knew how filtering worked or relied on additional sources, and that the subject may have the epistemic responsibility to take measures to enhance the justificatory status of such beliefs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-37
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz

There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.


Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip J. Nickel

AbstractAccording to assurance views of testimonial justification, in virtue of the act of testifying a speaker provides an assurance of the truth of what she asserts to the addressee. This assurance provides a special justificatory force and a distinctive normative status to the addressee. It is thought to explain certain asymmetries between addressees and other unintended hearers (bystanders and eavesdroppers), such as the phenomenon that the addressee has a right to blame the speaker for conveying a falsehood but unintended hearers do not, and the phenomenon that the addressee may deflect challenges to his testimonial belief to the speaker but unintended hearers may not. Here I argue that we can do a better job explaining the normative statuses associated with testimony by reference to epistemic norms of assertion and privacy norms. Following Sanford Goldberg, I argue that epistemic norms of assertion, according to which sincere assertion is appropriate only when the asserter possesses certain epistemic goods, can be ‘put to work’ to explain the normative statuses associated with testimony. When these norms are violated, they give hearers the right to blame the speaker, and they also explain why the speaker takes responsibility for the justification of the statement asserted. Norms of privacy, on the other hand, directly exclude eavesdroppers and bystanders from an informational exchange, implying that they have no standing to do many of the things, such as issue challenges or questions to the speaker, that would be normal for conversational participants. This explains asymmetries of normative status associated with testimony in a way logically independent of speaker assurance.


Author(s):  
Ali Hussein Hameed ◽  
Saif Hayder AL.Husainy

In the anarchism that governs the nature and patterns of international relations characterized by instability and uncertainty in light of several changes, as well as the information revolution and the resulting developments and qualitative breakthroughs in the field of scientific and advanced technological knowledge and modern technologies.  All of these variables pushed toward the information flow and flow tremendously, so rationality became an indispensable matter for the decision maker as he faces these developments and changes. There must be awareness and rationality in any activity or behavior because it includes choosing the best alternative and making the right decision and selecting the information accurately and mental processing Through a mental system based on objectivity, methodology, and accumulated experience away from idealism and imagination, where irrationality and anarchy are a reflection of the fragility of the decision-maker, his lack of awareness of the subject matter, his irresponsibility, and recklessness that inevitably leads to failure by wasting time and Effort and potential. The topic acquires its importance from a search in the strategies of the frivolous state and its characteristics with the ability to influence the regional, and what it revealed is a turning point in how to adapt from the variables and employ them to their advantage and try to prove their existence. Thus, the problem comes in the form of a question about the possibility of the frivolous state in light of the context of various regional and international events and trends. The answer to this question stems from the main hypothesis that (the aim which the frustrating state seeks to prove is that it finds itself compelled to choose several strategies that start from the nature of its characteristics and the goals that aim at it, which are centered in the circle of its interests in the field of its struggle for the sake of its survival and area of influence).


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rialdo Rezeky ◽  
Muhammad Saefullah

The approach of this research is qualitative and descriptive. In this study those who become the subject of research is an informant (key figure). The subject of this study is divided into two main components, consisting of internal public and external public that is from the Board of the Central Executive Board of Gerindra Party, Party Cadres, Observers and Journalists. The object of this research is the behavior, activities and opinions of Gerindra Party Public Relation Team. In this study used data collection techniques with interviews, participatory observation, and triangulation of data. The results of this study indicate that the Public Relations Gerindra has implemented strategies through various public relations programs and establish good media relations with the reporters so that socialization goes well. So also with the evaluation that is done related to the strategy of the party. The success of Gerindra Party in maintaining the party’s image in Election 2014 as a result of the running of PR strategy and communication and sharing the right type of program according to the characteristics of the voting community or its constituents.Keywords: PR Strategy, Gerindra Party, Election 2014


Edupedia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-85
Author(s):  
Mohamad Aso Samsudin ◽  
Ukhtul Iffah

Teaching is an art means that the art of managing people who have a variety of different characters. The teacher should be able to recognize these different characters so that he can easily master them so that the subject is easily mastered by them. However, the teacher is not easy to do that. It is no less difficult in learning to do assessment, because when assessment teachers are required to be careful and meticulous so that the results are not wrong, be careful in determining appropriate measurement tools as measured, or careful in operating the right tools, especially teachers are required able to do a complete assessment (authentic) in three domains (cognitive, psychomotor, and affective). This article reviews how to carry out authentic assessments in Islamic Education (Pendidikan Agama Islam) learning.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 5-13
Author(s):  
V. V. Ershov ◽  
Keyword(s):  

The subject of the article is the right and «wrong» from the standpoint of G. W. Hegel and other researchers. H. W. Hegel refers the «wrong» to the «unreal» right, which should «gradually disappear». In the article, first of all, legal and individual regulators of legal relations are distinguished. Secondly, the «wrong» refers to a type of individual regulators of legal relations, which have distinctive objective features from the right.


Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This chapter completes the account of the explicit criteria for epistemically proper belief. Given a belief formed through a process or processes on which the subject enjoyed a default permission to rely, the belief is epistemically proper just in case it satisfies a version of Process Reliabilism which the author calls Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR). CIR requires that (i) beliefs be formed and sustained through processes that were reliable (or conditionally reliable), and (ii) the propositional content of the belief, as well as the hypothesis asserting the reliability of the processes as used on this occasion, cohere with the subject’s background beliefs. After arguing that such a view is well motivated, the author suggests that condition (ii) amounts to the exemplification of a minimal kind of epistemic responsibility, and goes on to generalize the account to cover all beliefs (not just basic ones).


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maja BRKAN ◽  
Grégory BONNET

Understanding of the causes and correlations for algorithmic decisions is currently one of the major challenges of computer science, addressed under an umbrella term “explainable AI (XAI)”. Being able to explain an AI-based system may help to make algorithmic decisions more satisfying and acceptable, to better control and update AI-based systems in case of failure, to build more accurate models, and to discover new knowledge directly or indirectly. On the legal side, the question whether the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides data subjects with the right to explanation in case of automated decision-making has equally been the subject of a heated doctrinal debate. While arguing that the right to explanation in the GDPR should be a result of interpretative analysis of several GDPR provisions jointly, the authors move this debate forward by discussing the technical and legal feasibility of the explanation of algorithmic decisions. Legal limits, in particular the secrecy of algorithms, as well as technical obstacles could potentially obstruct the practical implementation of this right. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the authors explore not only whether it is possible to translate the EU legal requirements for an explanation into the actual machine learning decision-making, but also whether those limitations can shape the way the legal right is used in practice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


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