Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-394
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Do So

AbstractIn this paper I explore the idea of developing something like Sosa's influential distinction between cognitio and scientia (animal knowledge and reflective knowledge) to epistemic justification. On the assumption that we should, I explore the question of whether we should do so by either (1) beginning with a really basic, intellectually undemanding kind of justification, recognizing more sophisticated intellectually rewarding justification by layering more demanding requirements on that basic sort, or (2) beginning with an ideal sort of justification and recognizing less demanding sorts of justification by stripping away conditions from that ideal justification.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Vicious Circularity ◽  
Direct Answer

AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.

Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification

Episteme ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-218
Author(s):  
Jeremy Koons
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Practice ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
Basic Beliefs ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACTDiscussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic practice. Second, I will attempt to show how our basic beliefs are justified via this principle of conservatism.

Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-367
Author(s):  
Daniel Immerman
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Sensitivity Condition ◽  
Michael Huemer ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensitively believe of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. However, as we shall see, these philosophers are mistaken. You can do so. That said, these philosophers were close to the mark. There are some related propositions that you cannot believe sensitively. These propositions are interesting in another respect: they can be used to construct a new skeptical argument that is superior in some respects to a more traditional skeptical argument. This new skeptical argument also reveals insights about the relationship between internalism, externalism, and skepticism.

scholarly journals UNREFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Difficult Problem ◽  
Knowledge Claim ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Is Success ◽  
The Core ◽  
Types Of Knowledge ◽  
Fake Barn ◽  
Lack Of Knowledge

AbstractVirtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of success from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain the intuitive lack of knowledge in Fake Barn cases, whilst holding on to the core claim that knowledge is success from ability. Ernest Sosa's version of virtue epistemology promises to rise to this challenge. Sosa distinguishes two types of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. He argues that while animal knowledge is present in Fake Barn cases, reflective knowledge is absent and ventures to explain the intuition of ignorance by the absence of reflective knowledge. This paper argues that Sosa's treatment of Fake Barn cases fails as it commits Sosa to a number of highly counterintuitive results elsewhere in epistemology.

scholarly journals Los sueños, la agencia y el juicio

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 315
Author(s):  
Matthew Soteriou
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Virtue Epistemologist

De acuerdo con Sosa, Descartes es un epistemólogo de virtudes, y podemos entender el proyecto epistemológico de Descartes sólo como un proyecto de segundo orden que concuerda con esta manera de entender su epistemología. Mi objetivo en este artículo es el de ahondar en esta comparación con la epistemología de Descartes, principalmente mediante la exploración de una manera en la que uno podría añadir ciertos detalles suplementarios a la postura general de Sosa, con la finalidad de que ésta concuerde de mejor manera con la postura de Descartes, o al menos con la que yo considero que es la postura de DescartesPalabras clave: Ernest Sosa, Descartes, conocimiento animal, conocimiento reflexivo, cognitio, scientia.AbstractAccording to Sosa, Descartes is a virtue epistemologist, and we can make sense of Descartes’ epistemological project only as a second-order project that fits with this view of his epistemology. My aim in this paper is to pursue this comparison with Descartes’ epistemology—principally through exploring a way in which one might add certain supplementary details to Sosa’s general approach, in order to bring it into closer alignment with Descartes’ view, or at least what I take to be Descartes’ view Keywords: Ernest Sosa, Descartes, animal knowledge, reflective knowledge, cognitio, scientia. 

The Efficacy of ACH in Establishing Epistemic Justification and Mitigating Cognitive Bias

2020 ◽  
pp. 61-104
Author(s):  
Martha Whitesmith
Keyword(s):  
Peer Review ◽  
Cognitive Bias ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Intelligence Analysis ◽  
Current Version ◽  
Analytical Technique ◽  
Competing Hypotheses ◽  
Do So

The chapter examines the ability of current versions of the structured analytical technique, assessment of competing hypotheses (ACH) to provide theoretically valid methodologies for establishing justified beliefs in intelligence analysis, to cope with the higher risk of epistemic complexity in intelligence analysis, and to mitigate or reduce cognitive bias. It argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to establish justification for beliefs, or to cope with epistemic complexity, but that the method can be adapted to do so. It also argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to mitigate the risk of cognitive bias, but that the method could be adapted to make the occurrence of some cognitive biases visible to peer review.

scholarly journals Varieties and Levels of Knowledge

Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 87-105
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Case Scenario ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Do So

This chapter considers the different types and levels of knowledge, focusing on apt judgment (and judgmental belief) and on corresponding knowledge above mere subcredal animal knowledge. In a best-case scenario, the agent who judges aptly knows that they would likely enough affirm correctly if they affirmed as they intended. The agent affirms alethically fully and aptly only if guided to a correct and apt affirmation by second-order awareness of their competence to so affirm. The affirmation must be safe because the agent must know that they would succeed aptly if they tried, so that if he affirmed they would do so correctly, which is tantamount to safety of affirmation and, in turn, to safety of judgment.

scholarly journals Traditional Islamic Exclusivism - A Critique

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-209
Author(s):  
Imran Aijaz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Do So

In this paper, I give an account and critique of what I call ‘Traditional Islamic Exclusivism’ – a specific Islamic interpretation of religious exclusivism. This Islamic version of religious exclusivism rests on exclusivist attitudes towards truth, epistemic justification and salvation. After giving an account of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism by explaining its theological roots in the Qur’an and ahadith (reports of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad), I proceed to critique it. I do so by arguing that Islamic epistemic exclusivism, which forms the main core of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism, is implausible. This criticism subsequently opens up further lines of criticism and discussion of both salvific and alethic exclusivism in an Islamic context. I conclude with some remarks about the implications and significance of my criticisms of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism.

scholarly journals Descartes’s Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
First Order ◽  
Cartesian Circle

This chapter discusses how Descartes uses his principle of clarity and distinctness to raise his first-order judgments to the scientia level. Error is what one must avoid, not just falsity; so he seeks not just truth but also aptness. You are to assure yourself that you attain such aptness, which is required for confidence that you avoid error and attain certainty. But this assurance is forthcoming only with assurance that the operative source of your judgment is indeed a reliable-enough competence. This raises an issue of circularity, also known as the Cartesian Circle. The chapter shows how this circle also affects contemporary virtue epistemology when it postulates a level of reflective knowledge above that of animal knowledge.

Holding replication studies to mainstream standards of evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane T. Wegener ◽  
Leandre R. Fabrigar
Keyword(s):  
Replication Studies ◽  
Replication Research ◽  
Standards Of Evidence ◽  
Do So

AbstractReplications can make theoretical contributions, but are unlikely to do so if their findings are open to multiple interpretations (especially violations of psychometric invariance). Thus, just as studies demonstrating novel effects are often expected to empirically evaluate competing explanations, replications should be held to similar standards. Unfortunately, this is rarely done, thereby undermining the value of replication research.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document