scholarly journals Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Justification

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Lukas Schwengerer

Abstract Jennifer Lackey (2016) challenged group acceptance accounts of justification by arguing that these accounts make the possession of evidence arbitrary and hence lead to illegitimate manipulation of the group's evidence. She proposes that the only way out is to rely on the epistemic propriety of the individual group members, which leads to a dilemma for group acceptance views: either they are wrong about justification, or they cease to rely only on group acceptances. I argue that there is a third option based on general expectations of epistemic propriety that restricts the group's maximal justification. A group cannot be more justified than any individual in the group's position could be expected to be. I motivate this solution by a discussion of normative defeat and epistemic expectations as proposed by Goldberg (2018).

Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey

Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
Peter Halpin

This paper addresses dynamical interdependence among the actions of group members. I assume that the actions of each member can be represented as nodes of a dynamical network and then collect the nodes into disjoint subsets (components) representing the individual group members. Interdependence among group members’ actions can then be defined with reference to a K-partite network, in which the partitions correspond to the group member components. Independence among group members’ actions can be defined with reference to a network in which the group member components are disconnected from one another. The degree to which the interactions of actual groups correspond to either of these theoretical network structures can be characterized using modified versions of existing network statistics. Taking this approach, I propose a number of network-based measures of dynamical interdependence, discuss the interpretation of the proposed measures, and consider how to assess their reliability and validity. These ideas are illustrated using an example in which dyads collaborated via online chat to complete a grade 12 level mathematics assessment.


2005 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torsten Reimer ◽  
Ulrich Hoffrage

Research on the hidden-profile effect ( Stasser, 1992 ) has revealed that groups often fail to detect the choice alternative with the highest sum score if the individual group members’ information points to another alternative. We conducted a simulation study in which we randomly generated distributions of information such that they did or did not contain a hidden profile. The simulated groups solved the tasks by applying a unit weight linear model or a fast and frugal heuristic (Minimalist or Take The Best). Overall, a communication-based lexicographic heuristic performed best across the different environments. This fast and frugal heuristic makes cue-wise comparisons of alternatives while pooling information during group discussion. Moreover, results show that performance depends on whether group members share and exchange information on valid or on invalid cues. Directions for future research are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mayan Navon ◽  
Yoav Bar-Anan

According to some impression formation theories, when people perceive an individual member of a social group, the information about the group is activated more spontaneously and easily than information specific to the individual. Therefore, the judgment of individual group members might be more sensitive to group information (relatively to individuating information) the more automatic (fast, unintentional, and effortless) the judgment is. We tested this premise with a minimalistic impression formation paradigm that provided evaluative information about eight individuals and assigned them to two novel groups. In one group, three members behaved positively, and one member behaved negatively. In the other group, three members behaved negatively and one positively. In seven main experiments and 12 auxiliary experiments, we examined whether people’s automatic (but not deliberate) judgment of the atypical group members would be determined by the valence of the typical behavior in the group (group information) or the valence of the typical behaviors of that person (individuating information). Individuating information had a larger effect on automatic and deliberate evaluation than group information. The relative effect of group information (vs. individuating information) was slightly stronger on automatic than on deliberate judgment. This discrepancy increased when we increased the salience of group membership upon judgment, or when participants belonged to one of the groups. Our findings suggest that, inherently, automatic judgment of individuals is only slightly more biased than deliberate judgment by group information. Yet, under circumstances that are common in everyday life, that bias increases in automatic but not in deliberate judgment.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Mercer

Can one use emotion at anything other than the individual level of analysis? Emotion happens in biological bodies, not in the space between them, and this implies that group emotion is nothing but a collection of individuals experiencing the same emotion. This article contends that group-level emotion is powerful, pervasive, and irreducible to individuals. People do not merely associate with groups (or states), they can become those groups through shared culture, interaction, contagion, and common group interest. Bodies produce emotion that identities experience: group-level emotion can be stronger than, and different from, emotion experienced as an individual; group members share, validate, and police each others’ feelings; and these feelings structure relations within and between groups in international politics. Emotion goes with identity.


eLife ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pascal Capp ◽  
James DeGregori ◽  
Aurora M Nedelcu ◽  
Antoine M Dujon ◽  
Justine Boutry ◽  
...  

Although individual cancer cells are generally considered the Darwinian units of selection in malignant populations, they frequently act as members of groups where fitness of the group cannot be reduced to the average fitness of individual group members. A growing body of studies reveals limitations of reductionist approaches to explaining biological and clinical observations. For example, induction of angiogenesis, inhibition of the immune system, and niche engineering through environmental acidification and/or remodeling of extracellular matrix cannot be achieved by single tumor cells and require collective actions of groups of cells. Success or failure of such group activities depends on the phenotypic makeup of the individual group members. Conversely, these group activities affect the fitness of individual members of the group, ultimately affecting the composition of the group. This phenomenon, where phenotypic makeup of individual group members impacts the fitness of both members and groups, has been captured in the term ‘group phenotypic composition’ (GPC). We provide examples where considerations of GPC could help in understanding the evolution and clinical progression of cancers and argue that use of the GPC framework can facilitate new insights into cancer biology and assist with the development of new therapeutic strategies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (5) ◽  
pp. 640-649 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Lo Coco ◽  
Salvatore Gullo ◽  
Gabriele Profita ◽  
Chiara Pazzagli ◽  
Claudia Mazzeschi ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

This chapter discusses the implications of Spinoza’s concept of individual bodies, as introduced in the definition of individuum in the physical digression. It begins by showing that this definition allows for an extremely wide application of the term; accordingly, very different sorts of physical entities can be described as Spinozistic individuals. Given the quite distinct use of the terms divisibilis and indivisibilis in his metaphysics, however, the chapter argues that the physical concept of individuality is not universally applied in the Ethics but reserved for physical or natural-philosophical considerations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the problem of collective individuals. It is argued that, while societies or states are described as individual bodies, they do not constitute individual group minds in the strict sense of the term for Spinoza. This in turn indicates that minds are not individuated in the same way as bodies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 3887
Author(s):  
María Luisa Sein-Echaluce ◽  
Angel Fidalgo-Blanco ◽  
Francisco José García-Peñalvo ◽  
David Fonseca

Active educational methodologies promote students to take an active role in their own learning, enhance cooperative work, and develop a collective understanding of the subject as a common learning area. Cloud Computing enables the learning space to be supported while also revolutionizing it by allowing it to be used as a link between active methodology and students’ learning activities. A Cloud Computing system is used in conjunction with an active methodology to recognize and manage individual, group, and collective evidence of the students’ work in this research. The key hypothesis shown in this work is that if evidence management is made clear and evidence is consistently and gradually presented to students, their level of involvement will increase, and their learning outcomes will improve. The model was implemented in a university subject of a first academic year using the active Flipped Classroom methodology, and the individual, group and collective evidence is constantly worked with throughout the implementation of a teamwork method.


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