scholarly journals From rhetoric to action, a constitutional analysis of populism

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Théo Fournier
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Theoretical Assumption ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Common Strategy ◽  
Comprehensive Reform ◽  
Constitutional Analysis

AbstractThe article considers populism not as common ideology but as a common strategy for implementing various distinct ideologies. Constitutional democracy and populist strategy are inherently connected. Populist strategies develop a specific rhetoric which takes root in the features of constitutional democracy. The populist rhetoric manipulates the rule-of-law and the majoritarian pillars of constitutional democracy by convincing a fictional majority that constitutional democracy gives rise to a tyranny of minorities. Populism in action represents the second facet of the populist strategy. It corresponds to a specific constitutional strategy of legal and constitutional reforms aiming at disrupting constitutional democracy. After exposing my theoretical assumption, I move to a comparative study of two countries, France and Hungary, selected according to the most different cases approach. I analyze first how Viktor Orban based his constitutional strategy on a progressive deconstruction of the post-communist legacy. I study then how Marine le Pen’s strategy consisted of a comprehensive reform of the French semi-presidential system via referendum. I finally conclude by recalling the essential role academics have to play in the fight against populism. My last point is a provocation, what if calling populism by its real diversity (fascism, racism and antisemitism) was the most efficient way to fight them?

scholarly journals A Populist Monster and the future of Constitutional Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.

scholarly journals KEDUDUKAN DAN TANGGUNGJAWAB PRESIDEN DALAM SISTEM PRESIDENSIAL DI INDONESIA

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-190
Author(s):  
Moh Hudi
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The People ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Government ◽  
Head Of Government

The Government system greatly determines the position and responsibility of the president. Even in the same system of government, the president’s position and responsibility may change, depending  on   The  Rule  of   Law  in a particular country. The position and responsibility of the president in the presidential system in Indonesia has change several times. This can be seen before and after the amandement. President in presidential   System   as  Head  of  Government  and   Head  of   State. So that the president has broad authority. The president is not responsible to the parliament, because institutionally the parliament is not higher than the president as the chief executive, but is responsible to the people as voters.

THE RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SOME HOME TRUTHS

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-8
Author(s):  
Mark Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Public Service ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
True Value ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Lord Chancellor

MISAPPREHENSIONS about the UK's constitution are ten-a-penny. Most prominent among them, perhaps, are the notions that the UK “has no constitution” and that fundamental rights cannot meaningfully exist without an “entrenched” or “written constitution”. To that list of misunderstandings can now be added the ideas – brought to light by the Supreme Court's judgment in R. (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 W.L.R. 409 – that the judicial system, far from being a non-negotiable feature of any constitutional democracy, is nothing more than a public service, and that access to it can be regulated by the executive accordingly. To describe UNISON as a welcome corrective to such misconceptions would be to engage in rash understatement. In a tour de force that ought to be compulsory reading for every Minister and parliamentarian, the Court elucidates the true value of independent courts and tribunals, illuminates the common law's potential as a guarantor of basic rights, and reiterates an axiomatic set of constitutional home truths.

scholarly journals Harnessing Distrust and the Power of Intercession for the Separation of Powers

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Yann Allard-Tremblay
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Party Members

In what follows, I reflect on themes arising from my reading of Jacob Levy’s The Separation of Powers and the Challenge to Constitutional Democracy. According to Levy, the separation of powers in contemporary constitutional democracies is failing, thus endangering the rule of law. Briefly, this is because political parties have bridged the gap between the legislature and the executive: by giving rise to partisan politics that cross the institutional divide, political parties have dampened, if not disabled, the institutional incentive and motivation of the legislature to keep the executive in check. Furthermore, when this is combined with the myth of the united and undifferentiated people, which the executive, populistically, can easily claim to embody, the simple act of opposing the executive may be framed as seditious. In the end, the power of the executive is set free by the partisan loyalty of fellow party members and by the framing of opposition as disloyal and deleterious to the polity.

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