Hegel on the Idealism of Practical Life

2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
David V. Ciavatta
Keyword(s):  
Naive Realism ◽  
Individual Agent ◽  
Property Ownership ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
Practical Life

AbstractThis paper investigates Hegel’s thesis that we are, in our practical relation to the world, inherently committed to certain aspects of idealistic metaphysics. For Hegel, our practical attitude is fundamentally at odds with a naïve realism that would take the world to consist ultimately of self-contained, self-sufficient individuals whose relations to one another are fundamentally external to their identities. Hegel contends that our practical attitude is premised upon an overcoming of this mutual externality, and especially the externality which is supposed to hold between individual agent and world. It is shown that his argument hinges on conceiving of external things as inadequately individuated, as compared to living agents, and that it is precisely this ontological deficiency that conditions and motivates our action. Hegel’s discussions of morality and property ownership are appealed to in order to illustrate how we might better understand the nature and practical role of this purported deficiency.

scholarly journals Naive realism in the unmarried cohabitation controversy in the United States

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-55
Author(s):  
Andrea A. McCracken ◽  
Matthew S. McGlone
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Attitudinal Differences ◽  
Egocentric Bias ◽  
Unmarried Cohabitation

We explored the role of “naïve realism” in perceptions of attitudinal differences between proponents and opponents of unmarried cohabitation (UC) in the United States. Participants were presented with UC vignettes, asked to describe their own impressions of the couple in each scenario, and then to speculate about the impressions of the typical UC proponent and opponent. A comparison of these impressions yielded a pattern of false polarization in their perceptions, such that partisans’ self-reported sympathy was reliably more similar than the degree of sympathy either side attributed to the other. Partisans also exhibited egocentric bias regarding the basis for each side’s stances on UC. The relevance of this misperception and faulty assumptions toward the resolution of the debate over unmarried cohabitation is discussed.

False Polarization and False Moderation

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 521-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig W. Blatz ◽  
Brett Mercier
Keyword(s):  
Past Research ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Moderation Effect ◽  
Attitude Certainty ◽  
The World

Past research finds that people hold moderate views on political issues while believing others are extreme. This false polarization has been demonstrated across a variety of different attitude dimensions and is explained by naive realism, the belief that one holds an unbiased view of reality. We argue that because people believe they see the world objectively, they should be very certain about their opinions, more certain than others expect. In three studies, we tested this false moderation of attitude certainty hypothesis and attempted to replicate past research on false polarization of attitude stance and perceived ideology of others. All three studies revealed a false moderation effect on judgements of certainty. Additionally, we replicate the finding that people false polarize others’ ideology but do not find evidence for false polarization of specific stance.

scholarly journals The role of the Other in getting to know the self

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eszter Rembeczki
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
Practical Life

The paper investigates the role of the other in the emergence and understanding of the self both in Descartes’ philosophy and in phenomenological theories based on Descartes. For Descartes, the thinking entity is almost closed into itself, but upon close inquiry it turns out that ideas of other entities filter into its thinking and eventually influence it. Therefore, the ego’s experience of itself depends of its experience of other ideas, while the ego active in practical life is constituted through its relation to things encountered in the world. In some twentieth-century approaches the ego can only understand itself through another ego. For Husserl, the self comprehends itself as the not-Other, while for Levinas the face of the Other constitutes the self of the Ego receiving it, through their radical difference.

Philosophy, Perception, and Neuroscience

Perception ◽  
10.1068/p6025 ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 638-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Smythies
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Visual Perception ◽  
Cholinergic System ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism

This paper presents the results of some recent experiments in neuroscience and perceptual science that reveal the role of virtual reality in normal visual perception, and the use of television technology by the visual brain. This involves particularly the cholinergic system in the forebrain. This research throws new light on the nature of perception and the relation of phenomenal consciousness and its brain. It is directly relevant to criticisms by certain analytical philosophers of aspects of neuroscience relating to these matters. Particular attention is paid to their support for Naive Realism.

Consequences for Philosophy of Perception

2020 ◽  
pp. 206-233
Author(s):  
Maura Tumulty
Keyword(s):  
Naive Realism ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
The World

If experiences are alienable, it is impossible for philosophers of perception to embrace a particular form of naïve realism. Naïve realism is the appealing view that in perception we are perceptually related to objects and properties in the world. But anyone acknowledging alien experiences of the bias-driven kind will find a full embrace of naïve realism challenging. The strongest form of naïve realism, austere relationalism, rejects any explanatory role for representations. But with respect to the kinds of experiences from which we might most often feel alienation, austere relationalists are forced into an untenable position. In order to account for ways racist and sexist bias could affect perception, we should therefore adopt a hybrid of naïve realism and representationalism.

Neopragmatism and Philosophy of Perception

2021 ◽  
pp. 107-126
Author(s):  
Joshua Gert
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Positive View ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Related Idea ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Insight Into

Neopragmatism is an anti-metaphysical approach to philosophical problems. It addresses such problems by taking the focus off of metaphysics, and turning it onto language. That is, the neopragmatist seeks philosophically uncontentious explanations of the sort of talk that often gives rise to the sense that there is a deep philosophical puzzle to solve. In the domain of perception, reflection on apt ways of describing perceptual experiences have led to various metaphysically committing theories, including (i) sense data theory, (ii) representationalism, and (iii) naïve realism. This chapter uses neopragmatist techniques to undermine the case for the last of these. The attack is two-pronged. First, some of the metaphysical commitments of naïve realism are criticized. Second, neopragmatism is used to explain some of the ideas that were thought to lend naïve realism support. These include the idea that perceptual experience has a peculiar sort of openness or presentational character, and the related idea that such experience gives insight into the mind-independent character of the world. Beyond forming the basis for criticizing other views, neopragmatism also suggests a positive view of perception. This is a form of adverbialism that relies on the idea that our sensory states are information-bearing, but not, in any robust sense, representational.

A Privileged Point of View: Effects of Subjective Socioeconomic Status on Naïve Realism and Political Division

2020 ◽  
pp. 014616722092104
Author(s):  
Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi ◽  
Kristjen B. Lundberg ◽  
Aaron C. Kay ◽  
B. Keith Payne
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Subjective Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Knowledge And Beliefs ◽  
The World

In the United States, both economic inequality and political conflict are on the rise. We investigated whether subjective socioeconomic status (SSS) may help explain why these dual patterns emerge. We hypothesized that higher SSS may increase naïve realism—the belief that one perceives the world as it is, rather than as interpreted through one’s own knowledge and beliefs—regarding political issues. Using a representative sample of the American electorate, we found that higher SSS predicted more political naïve realism toward those from a different political party (Study 1). The remaining experiments examined the causal relationship between SSS and political naïve realism (Studies 2–5). We extended these findings by investigating whether SSS influenced participants’ willingness to exclude those with contrary views from a vote (Studies 4 and 5). Together, these studies demonstrate that SSS enhances political naïve realism and can lead to the exclusion of others with contrary opinions.

Seeing Qualia and Positing the World

1991 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 129-151
Author(s):  
Ted Honderich
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
The World

It is the business of philosophy to deal without presupposition with the question of the general nature of the world and with the question of how or indeed whether we can know that nature. These are questions to which answers are given in the realism of ordinary belief, as it can be called, the phenomenalism of Berkeley, the pragmatism and the scientism of Quine, and the varieties of scepticism. The ontological and the epistemological questions are bound up with another, that of the nature of perception—the question of what it is, in general, that happens when we perceive. What is called naive realism is an answer, as are representation theories, and phenomenalism again. If the question might be better defined, so as to distinguish it from the related scientific question, it is no matter of mere conceptual analysis. Let us start with this question of the nature of perception.

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