A Little Good Goes an Unexpectedly Long Way: Underestimating the Positive Impact of Kindness on Recipients

Performing random acts of kindness increases happiness in both givers and receivers, but we find that givers systematically undervalue their positive impact on recipients. In both field and laboratory settings (Experiments 1a-2b), those performing a random act of kindness predicted how positive recipients would feel and recipients reported how they actually felt. From giving away a cup of hot chocolate in a park to giving away a gift in the lab, those performing a random act of kindness consistently underestimated how positive their recipients would feel, thinking their act was of less value than recipients perceived it to be. Givers’ miscalibrated expectations are driven partly by an egocentric bias in evaluations of the act itself (Experiment 3). Whereas recipients’ positive reactions are enhanced by the warmth conveyed in a kind act, givers’ expectations are relatively insensitive to the warmth conveyed in their action. Underestimating the positive impact of a random act of kindness also leads givers to underestimate the behavioral consequences their prosociality will produce in recipients through indirect reciprocity (Experiment 4). We suggest that givers’ miscalibrated expectations matter because they can create a barrier to engaging in prosocial actions more often in everyday life (Experiments 5a-5b), to the detriment of people’s own wellbeing, to others’ wellbeing, and to civil society.

Visual perspective taking is not automatic in a simplified Dot task

In the Dot task, children and adults involuntarily compute an avatar’s visual perspective, which has been interpreted as automatic Theory of Mind. We conducted three experiments in India, testing newly sighted children (N=5; all girls), neurotypical children (ages 5-10; N=90; 38 girls) and adults (N=30; 18 women) in a highly simplified version of the Dot task. No evidence of automatic perspective-taking was observed, although all groups revealed perspective-taking costs. A newly sighted child and the youngest children in our sample also showed an egocentric bias, which disappeared by age 10. Responding to recent work on what Theory of Mind tasks actually measure, we conclude that the standard Dot task relies so heavily on Executive Control that the alleged evidence of automatic Theory of Mind might simply reveal perspective switching costs.

Let's talk (efficiently) about us: Person systems achieve near-optimal compression

Systems of personal pronouns (e.g., 'you' and 'I') vary widely across languages, but at the same time not all possible systems are attested. Linguistic theories have generally accounted for this in terms of strong grammatical constraints, but recent experimental work challenges this view. Here, we take a novel approach to understanding personal pronoun systems by invoking a recent information-theoretic framework for semantic systems that predicts that languages efficiently compress meanings into forms. We find that a test set of cross-linguistically attested personal pronoun systems achieves near-optimal compression, supporting the hypothesis that efficient compression shapes semantic systems. Further, our best-fitting model includes an egocentric bias that favors a salient speaker representation, accounting for a well-known typological generalization of person systems ('Zwicky's Generalization') without the need for a hard grammatical constraint.

Egocentric Biases are Determined by the Precision of Self-related Predictions

According to predictive processing theories, emotional inference involves simultaneously minimising discrepancies between predictions and sensory data relating to both one’s own and others’ states, achievable by altering either one’s own state (empathy) or perception of another’s state (egocentric bias) so they are more congruent. We tested a key hypothesis of these accounts, that predictions are weighted in inference according to their precision (inverse variance). If correct, more precise self-related predictions should bias perception of another’s emotional expression to a greater extent than less precise predictions. We manipulated predictions about upcoming own-pain (low or high magnitude) using cues that afforded either precise (a narrow range of possible magnitudes) or imprecise (a wide range) predictions. Participants judged pained facial expressions presented concurrently with own-pain to be more intense when own-pain was greater, and precise cues increased this biasing effect. Implications of conceptualising interpersonal influence in terms of predictive processing are discussed.

Cognitive Bias Affecting Decision-Making in the Legal Process

Several empirical research studies have shown that cognitive bias can unconsciously distort inferences and interpretations made by judges either at the hearing, ruling or sentencing stage of a court trial and this may result in miscarriages of justice. This article examines how cognitive heuristics affects judicial decision-making with seven common manifestations of heuristics such as availability heuristics, confirmation bias, egocentric bias, anchoring, hindsight bias, framing and representativeness. This article contends that the different manifestations of heuristics pose a potentially serious risk to the quality and objectivity of any criminal case, despite the professional legal training and experience of judges and magistrates. Therefore, suggestions on how best to avoid and minimise the effects of cognitive heuristics, especially within South African courts are proffered. These include creating awareness raising, cross-examination and replacement.

Lifting the curse of knowing: How feedback improves perspective-taking

People are likely to use their own knowledge as a frame of reference when they try to assess another person’s perspective. Due to this egocentric anchoring, people often overestimate the extent to which others share their point of view. This study investigated which type of feedback (if any) stimulates perceivers to make estimations of another person’s perspective that are less biased by egocentric knowledge. We allocated participants to one of the three feedback conditions (no feedback, accuracy feedback, narrative feedback). Findings showed that participants who were given feedback adjusted their perspective-judgement more than those who did not receive feedback. They also showed less egocentric projection on future assessments. Participants adjusted their perspective within the same trial to the same degree for both feedback types. However, participants’ egocentric bias was only reduced when they received narrative feedback and not when they received accuracy feedback about their performance. Implications of these findings for theories of perspective-taking are discussed.