Conditional Accountability for the Economy, Insecurity, and Corruption Across Latin American Party Systems

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 126-152
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Singer

ABSTRACTThe association between how citizens perceive economic performance, insecurity, or corruption and how they evaluate the president varies systematically across Latin American countries and within them over time. In particular, while presidential popularity reflects these outcomes in the average Latin American country, survey data from 2006–17 confirm that the connection between government performance and presidential approval is generally stronger when unfragmented party systems or single-party majority governments make assessments of political responsibility easier. While these results suggest that the region’s citizens do not blindly blame the president for outcomes where political responsibility should be shared, they also remind us that there are many countries in the region where fragmented party systems weaken the conditions for effective political accountability.

Author(s):  
Laura Wills-Otero

Since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in the late 1970s, Latin American party systems have confronted several challenges, and they have frequently been transformed. There have been various types of changes. While some systems collapsed in the 1990s (e.g., Venezuela and Peru), others realigned (Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay), or expanded (Argentina and Mexico), or were able to become consolidated and ensure their stability over time (e.g., Brazil). What factors explain the transformations in party systems during the past three decades, and how can Latin American party systems be classified according to their attributes? In trying to answer these questions, scholars of Latin America have undertaken studies that are both theoretically and empirically rich. Their work has increased our knowledge of the party systems and representative democracies in the region. Different factors have been highlighted in order to explain the changes these systems have undergone since the third wave of democratization. Some works emphasize the importance of institutional reforms introduced by politicians or by constitutional assemblies. The questions they address are the following: What political reforms have been introduced into Latin American political systems, and what effects have they had on the party systems in different countries? The researchers do not limit their attention to reforms of electoral systems. For example, some of them also study decentralization processes and their effects on party systems. From a different perspective, other authors focus on changes in electoral preferences and their effects on the configuration of political power, exploring how regional economic, political, and social changes have affected voter preferences and the political configuration of party systems. Still others consider the crises of democratic representation in these countries, underlining the decline in the programmatic character of parties as an explanatory variable for the crises and noting that the level of institutionalization of a party system declines when parties abandon this distinctive feature and become clientelistic or personalistic instead. On the other hand, in order to describe party systems and to observe the changes they have undergone, academics have proposed a set of concepts and measurements that make it possible to identify their levels of institutionalization (i.e., stability vs. volatility), nationalization, and programmatic structuration, among other aspects. The operationalization of these concepts has provided researchers with useful data for describing, comparing, and analyzing the party systems of the region transversely over time. Understanding the transformation and characteristics of Latin American party systems over time sheds light on both the progress democratic regimes have made and the setbacks they have suffered within specific countries and in the region at large.


Author(s):  
Vincent Mauro

A redistributive wave across Latin America provided credence to existing explanations that emphasize the importance of democracy and the political left for democratic redistribution. Yet, neither of these theories tells the entire story behind the contemporary politics of inequality in Latin America. This article stresses the importance of party systems for democratic redistribution, especially their role in increasing the scope of social policy as well as igniting competitive electoral environments that incentivize political elites to redistribute, leading to the amelioration of inequality over time. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional dataset on fifteen Latin American countries covering the period of 1990–2015, and extending the analysis to sixty-five global democracies, this article finds that countries with institutionalized party systems exhibit greater income redistribution and lower levels of inequality than those with inchoate counterparts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402198975
Author(s):  
Ryan E. Carlin ◽  
Timothy Hellwig ◽  
Gregory J. Love ◽  
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo ◽  
Matthew M. Singer

Public evaluations of the economy are key for understanding how citizens develop policy opinions and monitor government performance. But what drives economic evaluations? In this article, we argue the context in which information about the economy is distributed shapes economic perceptions. In high-quality information environments—where policies are transparent, the media is free, and political opposition is robust—mass perceptions closely track economic conditions. In contrast, compromised information environments provide openings for political manipulation, leading perceptions to deviate from business cycle fluctuations. We test our argument with unique data from eight Latin American countries. Results show restrictions on access to information distort the public’s view of economic performance. The ability of voters to sanction governments is stronger when democratic institutions and the media protect citizens’ access to independent, unbiased information. Our findings highlight the importance of accurate evaluations of the economy for government accountability and democratic responsiveness.


Author(s):  
Javier García Roca

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan ya esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/ parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control- responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. There are various kinds of presidential and semi-presidential systems in practice and the differences among them become confusing. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. Current Latin American presidentialism has adopted parliamentary patterns. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree rather than in quality. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation: such a strong separation on behalf of what? The fixed presidential term of office and the idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make mechanisms of political responsibility especially difficult, but certain devices of control-supervision could be enough to achieve checks and balances and parliamentary political representation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-92
Author(s):  
Giovanni E. Reyes ◽  
Alejandro Cheyne ◽  
Alejandro Useche

AbstractThe main aim of this research is to present a study regarding the economic and social performance of Peru in recent years, compared to the countries that constitute the Pacific Alliance, namely: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. This research links Peruvian economic performance in the context of this country’s political dynamics and social implications. It is important to emphasize that Peru is one of the Latin American countries less impacted by the financial crisis of 2008. One of the conclusions of the study points out that there has been a significant degree of economic growth, but the external debt levels are also rising, and this group of countries, with the exception of Mexico, to some extent, continues to be heavily dependent on exports based on raw materials, natural resources and commodities.


Author(s):  
Ryan E. Carlin ◽  
Timothy Hellwig ◽  
Gregory J. Love ◽  
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo ◽  
Matthew M. Singer

Abstract A robust economy is assumed to bolster leaders' standing. This ignores how benefits of growth are distributed. Extending the partisan models of economic voting, we theorize executives are more likely rewarded when gains from growth go to their constituents. Analyses of presidential approval in 18 Latin American countries support our pro-constituency model of accountability. When economic inequality is high, growth concentrates among the rich, and approval of right-of-center presidents is higher. Leftist presidents benefit from growth when gains are more equally distributed. Further analyses show growth and inequality inform perceptions of personal finances differently based on wealth, providing a micro-mechanism behind the aggregate findings. Study results imply that the economy is not purely a valence issue, but also a position issue.


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