scholarly journals Control parlamentario y convergencia entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo

2016 ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier García Roca
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Oversight ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan ya esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/ parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control- responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. There are various kinds of presidential and semi-presidential systems in practice and the differences among them become confusing. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. Current Latin American presidentialism has adopted parliamentary patterns. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree rather than in quality. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation: such a strong separation on behalf of what? The fixed presidential term of office and the idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make mechanisms of political responsibility especially difficult, but certain devices of control-supervision could be enough to achieve checks and balances and parliamentary political representation.

Conditional Accountability for the Economy, Insecurity, and Corruption Across Latin American Party Systems

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 126-152
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Government Performance ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Presidential Popularity ◽  
American Party ◽  
Latin American Countries ◽  
Over Time

ABSTRACTThe association between how citizens perceive economic performance, insecurity, or corruption and how they evaluate the president varies systematically across Latin American countries and within them over time. In particular, while presidential popularity reflects these outcomes in the average Latin American country, survey data from 2006–17 confirm that the connection between government performance and presidential approval is generally stronger when unfragmented party systems or single-party majority governments make assessments of political responsibility easier. While these results suggest that the region’s citizens do not blindly blame the president for outcomes where political responsibility should be shared, they also remind us that there are many countries in the region where fragmented party systems weaken the conditions for effective political accountability.

scholarly journals MAKNA PERSETUJUAN BERSAMA DPR DAN PRESIDEN DALAM PEMBENTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-59
Author(s):  
Aris Arianto ◽  
Afif Hasbullah ◽  
Sholihan Sholihan
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Law ◽  
Mutual Agreement

The establishment of the Act must be approved by the President as stated in Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution paragraph (2). Interesting when Indonesia uses a presidential system with the separation of powers. However, in the formation of the Act involving the President. Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution confirms the necessity of mutual agreement in the discussion and ratification of the Law. However, there are other assertions, namely that in Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution, even without the President's signature, the Act can still be promulgated within 30 days of the Draft Law being discussed. Things like that can't just happen without a reason. Therefore, the writing of this study will look for the meaning of the agreement between the DPR and the President in the formation of the Law and how the legal politics of Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution. The writing of this study is focused on researching and searching for the meaning of mutual agreement and focusing on legal politics from Article 20 paragraph 5 of the 1945 Constitution. The research method in this writing is normative juridical. The results of the research can be concluded that the meaning of the joint agreement between the DPR and the President in the establishment of the Law is an agreement in determining the policy in the form of a Law which is a reflection of the principle of checks and balances. Legal politics Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution is an affirmation of Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution or can be called an affirmation of collective agreement. The establishment of the Act must be approved by the President as stated in Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution paragraph (2). Interesting when Indonesia uses a presidential system with the separation of powers. However, in the formation of the Act involving the President. Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution confirms the necessity of mutual agreement in the discussion and ratification of the Law. However, there are other assertions, namely that in Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution, even without the President's signature, the Act can still be promulgated within 30 days of the Draft Law being discussed. Things like that can't just happen without a reason. Therefore, the writing of this study will look for the meaning of the agreement between the DPR and the President in the formation of the Law and how the legal politics of Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution. The writing of this study is focused on researching and searching for the meaning of mutual agreement and focusing on legal politics from Article 20 paragraph 5 of the 1945 Constitution. The research method in this writing is normative juridical. The results of the research can be concluded that the meaning of the joint agreement between the DPR and the President in the establishment of the Law is an agreement in determining the policy in the form of a Law which is a reflection of the principle of checks and balances. Legal politics Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution is an affirmation of Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution or can be called an affirmation of collective agreement.

Government Systems and Control of Bureaucracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Namık Kemal Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Democratic Government ◽  
Parliamentary System ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Full Effect ◽  
Systems And Control ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
And Control ◽  
Presidential Systems

Control of bureaucracy is essential for democratic government systems based on separation of powers. Because the bureaucracy has the potential to get out of political control and act as a power on its own. It is necessary to determine which mechanisms are effective in the control of bureaucracy among government systems. In general, the parliamentary system is said to be more advantageous than the presidential system in controlling and directing the bureaucracy. The fact that there is a strict separation of powers in the presidential systems causes two negative results in terms of regime. First, the inability of the politicians to have a full effect on the bureaucracy may result in weakening of the system and problems in control of bureaucracy. Second, the lack of coordination over senior bureaucrats, weakens the control capacity of political power.

Part II The Relationship Between the Legislature and the Executive, 4 Kenya’s Budding Bicameralism and Legislative–Executive Relations

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosire Conrad M
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Degree Of Separation ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Overall Effectiveness ◽  
New System

This chapter examines the changes in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, which have resulted in a higher degree of separation of powers between the legislature and executive with an elaborate system of checks and balances. The decision to opt for a presidential system of government (as opposed to a parliamentary or mixed one) and the re-introduction of the Senate are the defining features of the legislative and executive organs. However, the new system is superimposed on a longstanding institutional and political culture that was based on the presence of executive dominance in legislative affairs in a unicameral setting. The new system of government will, therefore, operate in a broader social, political, and historical context that will have a greater impact on their overall effectiveness.

The Presidency in Latin American Politics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeria Palanza
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
American Presidency ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Presidential Systems

Presidents derive support from electoral endorsement at the polls, but once in office, how they exercise power is also determined by the checks other actors impose on the presidency. By design, the presidential system was intended to function within a carefully conceived structure of checks and balances. As the executive branch in a system of separation of powers, the presidency was granted veto power over the lawmaking process. Congress and the judiciary were in turn granted prerogatives to check the executive in its own realm of action. Latin American presidential systems, however, have equipped presidents with extraordinary capacities, setting incentives in a different direction, where presidents often take the place of the most determinative decision maker within the political system. Juan Linz came to believe that presidentialism was not conducive to stable democracy (Linz, 1990), and his influential work spearheaded an era of studies that ultimately contradicted his arguments and led research in a new direction, while the third wave of democracy brought about stable yet unbalanced presidential systems. In order to understand the incentives that underlie this newfound stability, a deeper understanding of the institutional arrangements that govern it is necessary, and key among these, those structured around the legislative process. The institutions that make up the Latin American presidency as it stands in the early 21st century define incentives that lay out its unique character and distinct form of concentration of power. These can be organized into three sets: (a) elections, (b) lawmaking, and (c) cabinet management. Considering the institutions, and practices, that govern these three areas and how they vary across countries provides the building blocks to understanding the complexity of the presidency in Latin America. Whether presidents are elected indirectly via an electoral college or through direct votes by citizens, the specification of the type of majority required to win the presidency, the length of terms, and whether reelection is allowed are details that, when combined in diverse ways, present politicians and citizens with different sets of incentives to govern their behavior. These arrangements underwent different reforms over the turn of the 21st century. The institutions surrounding the lawmaking process are chief in lending the Latin American presidency its reputation of centralizing power, as constitutions are packed with arrangements that blur the separation of powers. Presidential legislative proposal power, presidential control of the legislative agenda through constitutional urgency authority (fast-track), variations in the veto prerogative, variations in override requirements, the delimitation of areas to exclusive presidential proposal rights, restrictions on congress to increase spending, and constitutional decree authority; all of these work to extend the legislative capacities of presidents, enabling them to counter the will of congress in ways unthinkable to the Founding Fathers when they first created this system. Latin American presidents also face challenges in managing cabinets, which in some cases are a fundamental component to articulate coalitions in the legislature—much like in parliamentary systems. Partisan dynamics come to life in the cabinet, and cabinets may work as important tools to manage otherwise fragmented party systems. Finally, understanding the influence of gender on presidential systems presents a promising avenue of research.

scholarly journals Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia: Pendekatan Teori dan Praktik

Lentera Hukum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 248
Author(s):  
Ahmad Yani
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Governmental System

Abstract Indonesia’s presidential system requires the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judiciary) as it is based on checks and balances. It is stated in the Indonesian Constitution, but it still needs further reform, particularly on the limitation of such tripartite powers. This article uses legal research to analyse and discuss theoretical and practical issues on the governmental system of Indonesia. Theoretically, the authority of state institutions in Indonesia encourages an executive-centered government system. In fact, in carrying out functions and authorities, state institutions do not reflect that the Indonesian system of government embraces the separation of powers. In addition, this study recommends the need for refinement and improvement efforts, to enforce ideal concept and practice. Keywords: Theory and  Practice, Governmental System, Indonesia

Populism and Political Parties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth M. Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Body Politic ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
National Party ◽  
Theoretical Integration

Populism and party politics are often studied separately, yet neither can be understood in isolation from the other. Any explanation for the rise of populism must inevitably address the deficiencies of party-based modes of political representation for which populism claims to offer a corrective. Indeed, populism thrives where mainstream parties are in crisis, or at least where they exclude or ignore major currents of opinion in the body politic. The study of populism, therefore, must be situated in the larger domain of political representation, and it is necessarily intertwined with the study of party politics. To enhance this theoretical integration, this chapter begins with an analysis of the representational deficiencies that are conducive to the rise of populist challengers, giving special attention to the recent European and Latin American experiences. It then explores the construction of populist parties and their transformative effects on national party systems.

Part 4 Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers, 4.8 Indonesia: A Presidential System with Checks and Balances

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hosen Nadirsyah
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Muslim Country ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The World ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
State Method ◽  
Islamic Political Parties

This chapter focuses on the presidential system of Indonesia. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution have transformed the constitution from a vague and incomplete document rooted in the antidemocratic political philosophy of organic statism into a more coherent, complete, democratic framework for a presidential system with significant separation of powers and checks and balances. The very fact that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world did not lead Islamic political parties to propose that Indonesia should become an Islamic state. According to the amendments, Indonesia remains a republic, with a presidential system and three branches of government. The chapter discusses the form of the Indonesian state, method of election, requirements, accountability, and relationship among the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary.

A political–institutional explanation of environmental performance in Latin America

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 295-311
Author(s):  
Denis Rey ◽  
Joshua Ozymy
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Environmental Performance Index ◽  
Consistent Picture

This research utilizes the 2010 Environmental Performance Index to examine how electoral rules affect environmental performance in 20 Latin American democracies. Using supporting time-series analysis with dependent variables for habitat protection, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide emissions from 2000 to 2008, our study finds that proportionality and party systems influence environmental performance in the region. Results show that representation impacts ecosystem vitality more so than public health. We account for this gap by arguing that levels of political representation influence the allocation of public and private goods which, in turn, help determine environmental outcomes. Our findings do not always paint a consistent picture, which may be attributed to the difficulties of operationalizing complex concepts such as environmental performance within and across countries and examining how these relationships change over time. Additional research is warranted to tease out these relationships.

Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

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