Legal Rules and International Society. By Anthony Clark Arend. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 208p. $35.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 1029-1030
Author(s):  
Brad R. Roth

The past decade has been marked by an increase in scholarly efforts to bridge the gap between the study of international relations as undertaken by political scientists and the study of international law as undertaken by legal scholars. During the Cold War, when international norms seemed distinctly secondary to ad hoc cost-benefit calculations as influences on state behavior, political scientists largely dismissed international law as rank idealism. International cooperation has palpably broadened and deepened in the current era, and political scientists have started to take a second look.

1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 201-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM WALLACE

The changing structure of European order poses, for any student of international relations, some fundamental questions about the evolution of world politics. Concepts of European order and of the European state system are, after all, central to accepted ideas of international relations. Out of the series of conflicts and negotiations—religious wars, coalitions to resist first the Hapsburg and then the Bourbon attempt at European hegemony—developed ideas and practices which still structure the contemporary global state system: the equality of states; international law as regulating relations among sovereign and equal states; domestic sovereignty as exclusive, without external oversight of the rules of domestic order. The ‘modern’ state system, modern scholars now agree, did not spring fully-clothed from the Treaty of Westphalia at the close of the Thirty Years' War; it evolved through a succession of treaties and conferences, from 1555 to 1714. It remains acceptable, nevertheless, to describe the European state order as built around the Westphalian system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-475
Author(s):  
ASA MCKERCHER ◽  
TIMOTHY ANDREWS SAYLE

AbstractFor the past two decades, Canadian international historians have largely missed the Cold War, or at least a significant portion of it. Certainly, there has been no shortage of studies of Canadian foreign policy featuring the bipolar struggle, and yet historians have largely confined their attention to Canada's admittedly crucial relationship with the United States, while Canadian–Soviet relations have been ignored. Indeed, in the historiography of Canada's Cold War international relations, the communist powers are largely missing. Hoping to challenge this limited focus, we frame our article around two Canada–US air defence exercises held in 1959 and 1960. While historians have viewed these exercises within the context of Canada's relationship with the United States, we highlight the wider Cold War framework in which Canadian policy was formed. After all, these exercises occurred during the mini-détente of the late 1950s and the collapse of the Paris summit in May 1960. As we demonstrate, the failure to take full account of the Cold War is a shortcoming of much of the writing on Canadian international relations, and so we offer an example of the need to take seriously Canada's foreign policy toward the communist bloc.


Author(s):  
Marina Girshovich

This chapter describes the experiences of five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—with international law over the past three decades, identifying some of the distinctive features of Central Asian states’ approaches towards international law. The commonalities in the stance of Central Asian states on matters of international law are determined by the context of their emergence as sovereign states at the end of the Cold War, their common history as former Soviet republics, their belonging to the Eurasian group of continental legal systems, and their common status as landlocked developing states. At the same time, each Central Asian state has its own specifics, with differences in their foreign policy priorities, levels of economic development, and resource endowment. The chapter then reviews the participation of Central Asian states in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), particularly their experiences with the CIS Economic Court.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Michael Reisman ◽  
Andrea Armstrong

The claim by the United States to a right of what has come to be known as “preemptive selfdefense” has provoked deep anxiety and soul-searching among the members of the college of international lawyers. Some have feared that the claim signaled a demand for the prospective legitimation of “Pearl Harbor” types of actions, that is, sudden, massive, and destructive military actions “out of the blue,” by one state against another in the absence of a state of war, with the objective of militarily neutralizing or even eliminating a latent or potential adversary. Since some public intellectuals within the American political system had recommended such a strategy with respect to the People’s Republic of China in the midst of the Cold War, the anxiety could not be dismissed as entirely unfounded or even hysterical. Nor could it be ignored as if it were some sort of exclusively American aberration that could be tolerated as the idiosyncrasy of one state. From the earliest unilateral claims to a continental shelf, a copycat or mimetic dynamic in modern international law has taken shape whenever an enhancement of state power has become available, so that the possibility of similar claims to an expanded notion of preemptive self-defense by many other states could not be excluded. Indeed, while the United States may now have retreated somewhat from its 2002 broad claim to preemption, various other states (including some with nuclear weapons) have adopted the preemptive self-defense claim as their own. If the U.S. claim posed potentially destabilizing consequences for world order, how much more so would proliferation of the claim?


1994 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 39-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecelia Lynch

Just as Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes became etched into the minds of international relations scholars as the oracles of realpolitik during the Cold War, Immanuel Kant appears to be well on his way to becoming the prophet of “progressive international reform” in the post—Cold War era. Not only has Kant's thought provided the underpinnings of one of the major traditions of international law, but there is a groundswell of interest among international relations scholars today in the question of whether contemporary events, particularly the proliferation of republican states and attempts to create them, signal the march forward to the Kantian ideal of republican peace. Yet, prior to asking what contemporary events signify for the attainment of the Kantian ideal, we should analyze the conflicting interpretions fo Kantian political thought so as to understand the meaning and implications of the ideal itself. Such a task is not merely pedantie—it is necessary to determine the utility of political philosophy for providing understanding and guidance in the real world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-105
Author(s):  
Robert Kupiecki

The breach of commitments happen in international relations, sometimes followed by national narratives of betrayal, created and used as tools of foreign policy and domestic legitimisation. In this kind of narratives, the context, truth, disinformation, emotions and deliberate intents are of equal value for their content. This is how the modern myth of ‘Western betrayal’ – developed by Moscow after the end of the Cold War on the susceptible grounds of Russian and Soviet political tradition – should be understood. It has been the most persistent component of Russian information warfare against NATO and the key argument explaining its foreign policy actions. They are interpreted abroad as aggression, violation of international law or undermining the principles of international order, while domestically being portrayed as driven by purely defensive logic of the state surrounded by enemies responsible for the refusal to recognise Russia’s legitimate rights. This narrative also serves to consolidate Russian society around the state’s leadership.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850006
Author(s):  
HUNG-JEN WANG

In the past decade, observers in Western countries have been increasingly challenged to describe China’s rising power in one of two ways: as contributing to established world systems, or as a growing threat fulfilling certain predictions made at the end of the Cold War. For some, perceptions of increasingly assertive regional behaviors confirm that China’s self-proclaimed policy of pacifism is being used to cloak selfish national interest and power goals. The current international relations (IR) literature tends to treat China’s assertiveness as evidence that it is indeed a threat, with few attempts to conceptualize assertiveness as a relational strategy. In this paper, the author uses eight current and historical cases involving four relational strategies — engagement, boycotting, reciprocation, and pressing — to examine conventional assessments of assertiveness that focus solely on perceptions of and responses to threatening statements and behaviors made in defense of Chinese national interests. In the end, this paper tries to contribute to the general IR literature that has tended to misinterpret China’s assertiveness, which is actually an identity issue regarding bilateral relationality instead of power or interest calculations.


Author(s):  
Daniel Ricardo Quiroga-Villamarín

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the content, scope, and extent of extraterritorial human rights obligations has become a pressing concern for international lawyers. On one end of the debate, mainstream scholarship argues that jurisdiction is primarily territorial, identifying a limited range of situations in which jurisdiction (and responsibility) is triggered. On the other end, critical scholars suggest that Empire still haunts jurisdiction. By reconstructing the history of this doctrine, they show that the imperial reach has always been extra-territorial and that the intimate linkage between state, territory, and population is of a rather recent and tenuous origin. In both of these narratives, however, lies the assumption that jurisdiction operates as a secularized power. Even if empires/states were once religious, faith’s legacy remains confined to the past. In this article, conversely, I trace a critical genealogy of Christian authority as a jurisdictional structure, in which territoriality was never presumed. After all, one cannot forget that Catholicism and Universalism were forged in the same etymological crucible. By drawing from Foucault’s analysis of pastoral power, I argue that international law has deep roots in Christianity’s claims of governmentality upon ‘men and souls’ instead of over defined territories.


Author(s):  
Bahgat Korany

This chapter focuses on the Middle East during the post-Cold-War era. It introduces some the key themes that have come to dominate contemporary international relations of the Middle East: oil; new and old conflicts; the impacts of globalization; and religio-politics. In considering the major security patterns and trends in the Middle East, one finds a number of enduring issues, such as the Arab–Israeli conflict and border disputes. At the same time, one can see elements of change, both within these conflicts and with the emergence of recent threats, such as Iranian nuclearization, with profound consequences for regional alliance structures. As old and new security issues mingle in the geopolitical order, events of the past few years reflect a region dominated by conflict clusters. It is no surprise then that the Middle East remains a highly militarized region.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document