Coercion and (Global) Justice

2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAURA VALENTINI
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
State Coercion ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Plausible Theory

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice (in general) are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice (in particular). Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice.

Internationalism versus Statism and Globalism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Context Of Discovery ◽  
Plausible Theory

This chapter examines contemporary debates about statism and globalism. Statists need a necessary condition for justice to apply. They must tell us what it is about states that renders such principles applicable, and does so only in states. The quest for such a condition ends inconclusively. This result leads to a pluralist view of the grounds of justice. To use a distinction from the philosophy of science, the debate among versions of statism turns out to be a context of discovery for internationalism as a contender for a plausible theory of global justice. The chapter proceeds by discussing the most prominent version of globalism, the view defended by Charles Beitz, who argues that John Rawls' principles hold globally. To engage with Beitz, the chapter considers the merits of relationism and then suggests that Rawls' principles do not apply to the global order.

The Grounds of Justice

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Systematic Theory ◽  
Comprehensive View ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Pluralist Approach

This book explores the question of what it is for a distribution to be just globally and proposes a new systematic theory of global justice that it calls pluralist internationalism. Up to now, philosophers have tended to respond to the problem of global justice in one of two ways: that principles of justice either apply only within states or else apply to all human beings. The book defends a view “between” these competing claims, one that improves on both, and introduces a pluralist approach to what it terms the grounds of justice—which offers a comprehensive view of obligations of distributive justice. It also considers two problems that globalization has raised for political philosophy: the problem of justifying the state to outsiders and the problem of justifying the global order to all.

A Case of Non-Ideal Guidance: Tackling Tax Competition

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-171
Author(s):  
Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Ideal World ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Guiding Principles ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractIn the global justice literature, growing attention has been given to problems particular to a globalised economy such as tax competition. Political philosophers have started to reflect on how these problems intersect with theories of global justice. This paper explores the idea according to which action-guiding principles of justice can only be formulated at such intersections. This is the starting point from which I develop a ‘non-ideal theory’ of global justice. The methodology of this theory posits that principles of justice are formulated according to the practice they are intended to regulate. Individual practices provide insights about the formulation of principles, for the non-ideal circumstances that prevent the realisation of justice are only revealed through the interpretation of each practice. With regard to the content of principles, I reject the notion that non-ideal theory is applied ideal theory. I offer instead an overview of the main features of a conception of justice for a non-ideal world based on the ideas of compliance, fact-sensitivity, feasibility and path-dependence. The contribution of this paper is twofold: to provide the conceptual framework for an action-guiding non-ideal theory of global justice and to show why this theory is well-suited to address problems of a globalised economy, such as tax competition.

Global Justice and the Role of the State

2020 ◽  
pp. 13-35
Author(s):  
Miriam Ronzoni ◽  
Laura Valentini
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
The State ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Egalitarian Justice

The chapter critically analyzes the role played by the state in the global justice debate. It surveys the different ways in which statists and cosmopolitans invoke the state either to justify the scope and content of their preferred principles of justice or to explain how such principles might be realized. The chapter also distinguishes between two conceptualizations of the state: as a system of institutions and as an agent in its own right. On the basis of this analysis, the authors conclude that both at the level of justification and at that of realization, the most plausible positions with respect to global justice lie somewhere in between full-blown cosmopolitanism and full-blown statism. While principles of egalitarian justice are not confined to the state, they do not extend in identical form to the global realm. Similarly, while the state—as we know it—is insufficient to realize plausible principles of justice (be they statist or cosmopolitan), what realizing justice requires falls short of the creation of a comprehensive global sovereign.

scholarly journals THE LIMITS OF BACKGROUND JUSTICE

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 352-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Porter Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractThe argument from background justice is that conformity to Lockean principles of justice in agreements and transactions does not preclude the development of inequalities that undermine the freedom and fairness of those very transactions, and that, therefore, special principles are needed to regulate society's “basic structure.” Rawls offers this argument as his “first kind of reason” for taking the basic structure to be the primary subject of justice. Here I explore the background justice argument and its implications for questions about the scope of distributive justice. As it turns out, the background justice argument can offer no independent support for conclusions about the scope of distributive justice. For the special principles that it justifies inherit their scope from conclusions that must be established or assumed in advance. These prior conclusions are precisely what is at issue in debates about global justice.

Justice and authority in the global order

2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 2059-2072 ◽  
Author(s):  
TERRY NARDIN
Keyword(s):  
Global Governance ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Global Order ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractThe global justice debate has largely ignored law. But that debate presupposes a legal order within which principles of justice could be implemented. Paying attention to law alters our understanding of global justice by requiring us to distinguish principles that are properly prescribed and enforced within a legal order from those that are not. Given that theories of global governance depreciate law and that cosmopolitan and confederal theories are utopian, the most promising context for a realistic global justice discourse is one that is focused on strengthening, not transcending, the international legal order.

Needs and Global Justice

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 51-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian Brock
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Basic Needs ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Special Significance ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Relationship

In this paper I argue that needs are tremendously salient in developing any plausible account of global justice. I begin by sketching a normative thought experiment that models ideal deliberating conditions. I argue that under such conditions we would choose principles of justice that ensure we are well positioned to be able to meet our needs. Indeed, as the experiment aims to show, any plausible account of distributive justice must make space for the special significance of our needs. I go on to offer some empirical support for this view by looking at the important work of Frohlich and Oppenheimer. I then present an account of our basic needs that can meet a number of goals: for instance, it provides a robust theoretical account of basic needs which can enjoy widespread support, and it can also provide an adequate framework for designing policy about needs, and thus help us to discharge our global obligations. I then briefly discuss the relationship between basic needs and human rights, arguing why the basic needs standard is more fundamental than—and required by—the human rights approach. Finally, I tackle a few important sets of objections to my view, especially some objections concerning distributing our responsibilities for meeting needs.

Global Distributive Justice: An Egalitarian Perspective

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Basic Needs ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Thomas Pogge ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
National Boundaries

A good deal of political theory over the last fifteen years or so has been shaped by the realization that one cannot, and ought not, consider the distribution of resources within a country in isolation from the distribution of resources between countries. Thus, thinkers such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge advocate extensive global distributive policies; others, such as Charles Jones and David Miller, explicitly reject the view that egalitarian principles of justice should apply globally and claim that national communities have only duties to help other countries be viable economically and meet the basic needs of their members. In the global justice debate, pretty much all parties acknowledge that we have obligations of distributive justice to for-eigners. The question is how strong those obligations are, and in particular whether national boundaries can make any difference to the distribution of resources between members of different countries.

scholarly journals Two Concepts of the Basic Structure, and their Relevance to Global Justice

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Ronzoni
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Normative Implications

G. A. Cohen argues that John Rawls’s focus on the basic structure of society as the exclusive subject of social justice is misguided. I argue that two understandings of the notion of basic structure seem to be present in the literature, either in implicit or in explicit terms. (1) According to the first, the basic structure is to be equated with a given set of institutions: if they endorse the right principles of justice, the basic structure of society is just; (2) According to the second, a society has a just basic structure if and only if its institutional web manages to realize the relevant principles of justice as well it can. In (2), the institutional structure is not a given: different social circumstances call for different institutional solutions in order to achieve a just basic structure overall. The first part of the paper make a case for (2), and explores some of its normative implications. The second part asks which consequences this understanding may have for the idea of a global basic structure.

Domestic Theories of Justice

2010 ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
The Us ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

In this chapter I will deal primarily with principles of justice for a particular society, a society whose members share benefits and burdens and regard themselves as cooperating members of that society. This type of justice is called domestic justice, to contrast it with transnational or global justice. Usually it is people in a given nation who constitute a society and regard themselves as belonging to a single economic and political unit. As I mentioned in the discussion of globalized institutions in Chapter 2, federal arrangements such as the US and the EU are possible with subsidiary units with partial autonomy, both economic and political.

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