Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress

2019 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 270-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL E. SHEPHERD ◽  
HYE YOUNG YOU
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Exit Strategy ◽  
Future Career ◽  
Bill Sponsorship ◽  
Comprehensive Data ◽  
Revolving Doors ◽  
Congressional Staff ◽  
Legislative Productivity

Although the majority of research on revolving-door lobbyists centers on the influence they exercise during their postgovernment careers, relatively little attention is given to whether future career concerns affect the behaviors of revolving-door lobbyists while they still work in government. We argue that the revolving-door incentivizes congressional staffers to showcase their legislative skills to the lobbying market in ways that affect policymaking in Congress. Using comprehensive data on congressional staffers, we find that employing staffers who later become lobbyists is associated with higher legislative productivity for members of Congress, especially in staffers’ final terms in Congress. It also is associated with increases in a member’s bill sponsorship in the areas of health and commerce, the topics most frequently addressed by clients in the lobbying industry, as well as granting more access to lobbying firms. These results provide the systematic empirical evidence of pre-exit effects of the revolving-door among congressional staff.

Problematizing Goldman Sachs: indoctrination, paradigm shift and revolving doors

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoann Bazin
Keyword(s):  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Investment Bank ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Cultural Paradigm ◽  
Revolving Doors ◽  
New Employee

Purpose – The aim of this article is to open a dialogue between several books written on Goldman Sachs and the academic literature. Design/methodology/approach – Greg Smith's “Why I Left Goldman Sachs” and the French investigation of Marc Roche entitled “THE Bank: How Goldman Sachs Rules the World” are closely studied to identify recurring topics regarding the investment bank. Findings – Three major dynamics are identified: the intense socialisation that every new employee encounters (almost an indoctrination), the cultural paradigm shift that Goldman Sachs underwent during the 1990s and 2000s and the intensity of the revolving doors between Goldman Sachs' managers and the public regulatory sector. Originality/value – Focusing on revolving door dynamics, this article opens a dialogue with the academic literature allowing for a problematization: the constant circulation of personnel between regulatory institutions and regulated organisations generates a convergence of actors' habitus that weakens regulation as a whole.

The Value of Marriage to Family Firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 611-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pramuan Bunkanwanicha ◽  
Joseph P. H. Fan ◽  
Yupana Wiwattanakantang
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
Price Increases ◽  
Comprehensive Data ◽  
The Family ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

AbstractThis paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations. The results, based on a uniquely comprehensive data set from Thailand, show that the family firm’s stock price increases when the partner is from either a prominent business or a political family. Abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks. In contrast, marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns. These findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular.

scholarly journals Strategic leniency: insights from game theory and empirical evidence

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-85
Author(s):  
Martynas Jablonskis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Disruptive Effect ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Exit Strategy ◽  
Legal Rules

Strategic leniency signifies potential exploits of leniency that could generate detrimental effects. Leniency could be exploited in three distinct ways: (1) used to punish cartel deviator; (2) used as a cartel exit strategy; (3) used as a way to report false cartels hoping that rivals will be fined. Strategic leniency has roots in game theory and has been used in theoretical works on leniency. However, it is difficult to verify, whether firms actually conceive leniency strategically. The article addresses the problem by analysis of 42 cartel cases, investigated by the European Commission, throughout the years 2010–2018. We find some support for the strategic leniency, but evidence is more indicative, rather than conclusive. We also find that 2002 leniency reform in the European Union generated no immediate disruptive effect on pre-reform cartels. Besides the article argues for insufficiency of leniency to uncover cartels in a form of concerted practices, and spots a seeming legal gap: there are no legal rules in current Leniency Notice to prevent abuses of leniency. Overall, the success of leniency should not be overstated.

scholarly journals Comunicación en período de crisis y puertas giratorias en el caso Abengoa: análisis en prensa económica.

Obra digital ◽  
2016 ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Clara De Uribe Salazar Gil ◽  
Núria Arimany Serrat ◽  
Anna Sabata-Aliberch
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Crisis Communication ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Environmental Engineering ◽  
Financial Strategy ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Revolving Doors ◽  
Insolvency Proceedings

En este estudio se analiza la comunicación de crisis y el revolving doors de la empresa Abengoa, a raíz de la arriesgada estrategia financiera de la multinacional andaluza, especializada en ingeniería dedicada a energía y medio ambiente, que desembocó en el pre concurso de acreedores. Se analiza por qué la empresa llega a presentar el pre concurso de acreedores y la comunicación de crisis en este periodo, mediante un análisis de prensa económica de gran tirada según la Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión (OJD). También se relaciona la comunicación de crisis con las puertas giratorias para el caso Abengoa.Communication in crisis period and revolving doors in the case Abengoa: economic analysis press.AbstractIn this article we analyse the crisis communication and revolving door policy at the Abengoa company, following the high-risk financial strategy of this Andalusian multinational specialising in energy and environmental engineering solutions, which led to the initiation of insolvency proceedings. We analyse why the company reached this point and the crisis communication during this period, by means of an analysis of the highest circulation business newspapers and magazines, according to the Spanish Audit Bureau of Circulation. We also relate the crisis communication to the revolving door policy in the Abengoa case.Keywords: crisis communication, case study, revolving doors, Abengoa.

scholarly journals The Common Interests of Health Protection and the Economy: Evidence from Scenario Calculations of COVID-19 Containment Policies

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Dorn ◽  
Sahamoddin Khailaie ◽  
Marc Stoeckli ◽  
Sebastian C Binder ◽  
Berit Lange ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Health Protection ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Economic Costs ◽  
Exit Strategy ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
The Common ◽  
Pharmaceutical Interventions ◽  
Opening Process

Several countries use shutdown strategies to contain the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic, at the expense of massive economic costs. While this suggests a conflict between health protection and economic objectives, we examine whether the economically optimal exit strategy can be reconciled with the containment of the epidemic. We use a novel combination of epidemiological and economic simulations for scenario calculations based on empirical evidence from Germany. Our findings suggest that a prudent opening is economically optimal, whereas costs are higher for a more extensive opening process. This rejects the view that there is a conflict with health protection. Instead, it is in the common interest of public health and the economy to relax non-pharmaceutical interventions in a manner that keeps the epidemic under control.

Do Career Concerns Affect the Delay of Bad News Disclosure?

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Baginski ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Lisa A. Hinson ◽  
David S. Koo
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Severance Pay ◽  
The Public ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Theoretical Evidence ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Theory argues that career concerns (i.e., concerns about the impact of current performance on contemporaneous and future compensation) encourage managers to withhold bad news disclosure. However, empirical evidence regarding the extent to which a manager's career concerns are associated with a delay in bad news disclosure is limited. Across multiple proxies for career concerns, we find that the extent to which managers delay bad news is positively associated with their level of career concerns. Then, we hand-collect data on a compensation contract that firms use to reduce CEOs' career concerns (i.e., ex ante severance pay agreements). We find that if managers receive a sufficiently large payment in the event of dismissal, they no longer delay the disclosure of bad news. Overall, our findings support prior theoretical evidence that managers delay bad news disclosure due to career concerns and suggest a mechanism through which firms can mitigate the delay. JEL Classifications: M12; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

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