Electoral Incentives and Policy Preferences: Mixed Motives Behind Party Defections in Japan

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN R. REED ◽  
ETHAN SCHEINER
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Political Behaviour ◽  
Electoral Connection ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Interaction Terms ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
The Impact

Examining the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan offers an opportunity to gain greater insight into the impact of the various incentives that influence the behaviour of politicians. Surprisingly, previous analyses of the LDP split have been able to demonstrate only weak evidence of any electoral connection driving politicians' decisions. However, by also examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways. Our findings thus confirm the importance of the electoral connection. We are also able to add that a variety of other incentives also shape political behaviour and that politicians do not necessarily all respond to similar stimuli in the same way.

The Political Strategy of Appealing to Religious Nationalism: Examining Motivations to Join Religious Organizations by Japanese LDP Politicians

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Hope Dewell Gentry
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Political Organization ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Religious Nationalism ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Politics And Religion ◽  
Ruling Party

Abstract When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) again took control after the 2012 general election, Japan's ruling party politicians increasingly associated themselves with Shinto Seiji Renmei, a political organization that is affiliated with Shinto, the country's native religion. What are the motivations for joining such a group, considering Japan has institutional regulations regarding the separation of politics and religion, in addition to there being no sign of rising religiosity among the Japanese population? I explain this puzzle by focusing on politicians' electoral incentives in a changing environment of Japan's party politics. As the opposition became fragmented after 2012, the ruling party's candidates found it electorally advantageous to appeal to the core supporters rather than the centrist floating voters. An empirical analysis of an original dataset supports my argument. The findings suggest the changes in Japan's political landscape might affect the future strategies of LDP politicians, particularly regarding the coalition with Komeito. Overall, this study proposes that there is a need to pay closer attention to politicians' strategic use of religion in politics.

scholarly journals Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.

Measuring Voters’ Multidimensional Policy Preferences with Conjoint Analysis: Application to Japan’s 2014 Election

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusaku Horiuchi ◽  
Daniel M. Smith ◽  
Teppei Yamamoto
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Party Manifestos ◽  
Analysis Application ◽  
The Media ◽  
Election Results

Representative democracy entails the aggregation of multiple policy issues by parties into competing bundles of policies, or “manifestos,” which are then evaluated holistically by voters in elections. This aggregation process obscures the multidimensional policy preferences underlying a voter’s single choice of party or candidate. We address this problem through a conjoint experiment based on the actual party manifestos in Japan’s 2014 House of Representatives election. By juxtaposing sets of issue positions as hypothetical manifestos and asking respondents to choose one, our study identifies the effects of specific positions on the overall assessment of manifestos, heterogeneity in preferences among subgroups of respondents, and the popularity ranking of manifestos. Our analysis uncovers important discrepancies between voter preferences and the portrayal of the election results by politicians and the media as providing a policy mandate to the Liberal Democratic Party, underscoring the potential danger of inferring public opinion from election outcomes alone.

Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan

1992 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaru Kohno
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Japanese History ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Average Size

Over the last two decades there have been numerous changes in the organization of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan. The pattern of factionalization has changed significantly in terms of the number of competing major factions, the average size of their membership, and their internal structure. Moreover, a new set of institutionalized norms, such as the seniority and interfactional balancing principles, has emerged to govern organizational processes within the LDP. The conventional approach in the literature on Japanese politics, which focuses on factors unique or distinctive to Japanese history, culture, and social behavior, cannot adequately explain these recent changes in the LDP. This paper proposes an alternative, rational-choice explanation based on the standard microanalytic assumptions. More specifically, it argues that the pattern of the LDP's factionalization is primarily determined by the electoral incentives of two sets of rational actors, LDP politicians and LDP supporters, operating under institutional constraints, such as electoral laws and political funding regulations. It also argues that the organizational norms originate in the promotion incentives of the LDP politicians whose strategies are influenced by the uncertainty in the dynamics of the interfactional political process.

How Much Does Money Matter?

2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY W. COX ◽  
MICHAEL F. THIES
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Expected Performance ◽  
The Impact

Japanese elections are notorious for the money that flows between contributors, politicians, and voters. To date, however, nobody has estimated statistically the impact of this money on electoral outcomes. Students of American politics have discovered that this question is difficult to answer because, although performance may depend on spending, spending may also depend on expected performance. In this article, the authors specify a two-stage least squares model that explains the vote shares of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidates as a function of their own spending, spending by other candidates, and a battery of control variables. The multiple-candidate nature of Japanese elections means that district-level demographic variables are largely unrelated to any particular LDP candidate's vote share, so that these variables can be used to create instruments for campaign spending. The authors find that the marginal dollar of campaign spending buys the spender a great deal more in Japan than is true in the United States.

Ruling party landslide empowers South Korea’s Moon

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Living Standards ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Content Type ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time ◽  
Ruling Party

Subject The results of the 2020 National Assembly election in South Korea. Significance President Moon Jae-in’s liberal Democratic Party won an unprecedented 180 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly in the four-yearly parliamentary election on April 15. Despite COVID-19, voting was smooth and turnout reached 66.2%, a 26-year high. The conservative opposition leader lost his seat and has resigned. A prominent North Korean defector won a constituency seat for the first time. Impacts Unless the next two years are catastrophic, this win augurs well for the Democrats to retain the presidency after Moon’s term ends in 2022. Even if a conservative retakes the presidency in 2022, their first two years will be thwarted by a parliament now overwhelmingly liberal. Moon will be emboldened to resist US demands on paying for US troops, take a hard line towards Tokyo and pursue peace with Pyongyang. In economic policy, the priority will be to minimise the impact of COVID-19 on GDP, exports and living standards.

Infrastructure as the Magnet of Power: Explaining Why Japanese Legislators Left and Returned to the LDP

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Saito
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Party Switching ◽  
The Government

By examining party-switching decisions among members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), this article shows how distributive policy programs exclusively available to the governing party attract incumbents to the party in power. In a stable electoral environment where the government party is likely to stay in power, legislators elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies are effectively tied to the party. However, when the party's electoral prospects are uncertain, legislators behave more sincerely and switch parties to match their policy preferences. It is also found that defectors elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies tended to return to the LDP once the party installed a stable surplus coalition.

The DPJ and Women: The Limited Impact of the 2009 Alternation of Power on Policy and Governance

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alisa Gaunder
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Critical Mass ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Lower House ◽  
House Election ◽  
Veto Points

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) saw forty of its forty-six female candidates elected in the 2009 lower house election; twenty-six were first-time candidates. Recently, both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the DPJ have supported more women as “change” candidates in response to changing electoral incentives that favor broad appeals. The DPJ's victory, however, has not had a large impact on women in terms of governance or policy. An exploration of child allowance, day care provision, and dual surname legislation under the DPJ reveals that low seniority and the lack of a critical mass have prevented DPJ women from overcoming significant veto points. The electoral incentives of the emerging two-party system have resulted in a larger number of women in office, but the volatility of the system has sustained a weak voice for women in policymaking.

Prime Ministerial Popularity and the Changing Electoral Fortunes of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

Asian Survey ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Patterson ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Postwar Period ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Japanese Prime Minister ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the impact of prime ministerial popularity on the changing electoral fortunes of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). We show that the popularity of the Japanese prime minister exerted a modest but definite impact on aggregate vote shares captured by the LDP throughout the postwar period.

scholarly journals Pitting prime minister cues with party cues in a multiparty system: a survey experiment in Japan

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-106
Author(s):  
Tomoya Yokoyama ◽  
Tetsuro Kobayashi
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
The Public ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
System A ◽  
Multiparty Systems

AbstractMotivated by a previous finding that single-party cues have no effect in Japan and by the increasing ‘presidentialization’ of Japanese politics, the present study examined whether the use of prime minister cues in place of single-party cues helps Japanese voters form policy preferences. In addition, to probe the effect of party cues that are unique to multiparty systems, the effect of multiple-party cues, which indicate that a policy is supported by multiple rather than single ideologically distinct parties, was investigated. The results of a survey experiment showed that while prime minister cues are not utilized by the supporters of incumbent parties, the supporters of opposition parties demonstrated significantly reduced approval of a policy when there was an indication that the prime minister supported it. The effect of prime minister cues on opposition supporters was stronger than that of Liberal Democratic Party cues, suggesting that leader cues are effective in Japan. Furthermore, a cue indicating that ideologically distinct parties support a policy enhances approval for that policy among the public, which suggests that multiple-party rather than single-party cues are informative in multiparty systems. Theoretical implications are discussed.

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