Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
INDRIDI H. INDRIDASON ◽  
CHRISTOPHER KAM
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Preliminary Test ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Selection Problems

A model of policy implementation in a parliamentary democracy as delegation between the prime minister and her cabinet ministers is introduced. Cabinet reshuffles can be pursued as a strategy to reduce the agency loss which occurs due to the different preferences of the actors. This work thus explains why prime ministers resort to reshuffles: cabinet reshuffles reduce the moral hazard facing ministers. This answer both augments and distinguishes this work from traditional perspectives on reshuffles that have emphasized the deleterious effects of reshuffles on ministerial capacity, and also from recent work that casts reshuffles as solutions to the adverse-selection problems inherent in cabinet government. The conclusion offers a preliminary test of some of the hypotheses generated by this theory.

scholarly journals An empirical examination of moral hazards and adverse selection on PPP projects

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 910-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
De-Graft Owusu-Manu ◽  
David John Edwards ◽  
A.S. Kukah ◽  
Erika Anneli Parn ◽  
Hatem El-Gohary ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Relative Significance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Moral Hazards ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Research Findings

Purpose Failures of public–private partnership (PPP) projects are often ascribed to the agency problem, which arise under conditions of inadequate and asymmetric information when a principal (the client) hires an agent (the contractor). This paper aims to identify the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on PPP construction projects using a synthesis of extant literature (to determine key variables) and analysis of survey questionnaire data collected. Design/methodology/approach Mean score ranking was used to rank the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. One sample t-test was conducted to establish the relative significance of these variables. Findings Effort dimensions (which are not verifiable), low transfer of risk, lack of accurate information about project conditions, wrong party chosen to execute project and renegotiation of contracts were the most significant causes of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. In addition, reduction of competition, high transaction costs, consequences on profitability of project, siphoning of funds and negative implications on enforceability of contract were the most significant effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. Practical implications Application of these findings will help mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection problems occurring when undertaking PPP construction projects. Originality/value Research findings provide guidance to construction stakeholders in the PPP sector on the different causes and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard. This pioneering study is the first to conduct an empirical assessment of the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects in a developing country.

“Why Can’t We Be Friends?” The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics—Insights from Romania

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Presidential Regimes ◽  
Depth Interviews

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.

scholarly journals Employment-Friendly Welfare Policy and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Sweden and Korea

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-152
Author(s):  
Kwon Illoong ◽  
Lee Jin Ho
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Welfare Policy ◽  
Tax Policies ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Welfare Policies ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Theoretical Predictions

This paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analyzing how welfare polices can affect the incentive to work and compares the recent welfare policy reforms of Sweden and Korea. Sweden has systematically reformed its welfare policies in response to slowing population and economic growth and an aging population. This paper shows that recent Swedish reforms of tax policies and unemployment benefits bear out theoretical predictions that such reforms will help reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In comparison, recent Korean reforms of tax policies and unemployment benefits have focused on moral hazard problems but have largely ignored adverse selection problems.

scholarly journals Identifying the Islam-Policies of the Predecessors of the Najib Administration: Has He Abandoned Tradition?

ICR Journal ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-726
Author(s):  
Osman Bakar
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Total Period ◽  
Muslim Population ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Political Independence ◽  
Religious Plurality

Since its political independence Malaysia has seen six Prime Ministers, including the present one, Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib, who is himself a son of the second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. For a post-colonial Muslim state with a huge non-Muslim population (about 45 per cent) and an uninterrupted run of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, six Prime Ministers in a total period of 54 years and, moreover, with a smooth line of succession, indicate a kind of political stability rarely found in the Islamic world. Malaysia is also noted for its relative success in managing its ethnic and religious plurality and diversity, especially when considering the fact that in its cultural makeup and setting ethnicity and religiosity are intricately linked.

Collective Rights–Based Fishery Management: A Path to Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 469-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Holland
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Fishery Management ◽  
Quota System ◽  
Collective Rights ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Individual Transferable Quota ◽  
Monitoring And Enforcement ◽  
Do So

Fishery rents may be dissipated across margins not well defined or controlled by an individual transferable quota system. Collective rights–based fishery management (CRBFM), where catch rights are held by a group, can sometimes generate greater benefits and can also address external impacts of the fishery. I discuss potential failures of individual quotas and how these problems were addressed by CRBFM institutions. I then focus on the role of CRBFM in addressing environmental and social impacts external to the group of fishers, such as bycatch, habitat impacts, and spatial conflicts. The review suggests that CRBFM can effectively address both intrafishery and external impacts, provided there is sufficient incentive to do so, including maintaining access to preferred markets or the threat of further regulation. However, CRBFM can create moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and successful CRBFM institutions generally have homogeneous membership with well-aligned interests and/or formal contracts with monitoring and enforcement provisions.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Prime Ministers and the Public

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Weller
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
Media Management ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
The Public ◽  
Electoral Campaigns ◽  
Technological Capacity ◽  
The Media

Prime ministers are the key campaigners for their governments, not just in electoral campaigns, but every day and in every place. Media management has become a continuing and significant part of the prime ministers’ activities; it is a daily, indeed an hourly, pressure. Speeches have to be planned. The pressure has changed the tone and priorities of governing. It has dangers as well as benefits. Media demands have become more immediate, more continuous, and more intrusive. Prime ministers must respond. The same technical changes allow prime ministers to interact with their voters in a way that bypasses journalists and other intermediaries. They are writ large in campaigns. They are never out of mind or out of sight. Re-election is always a consideration for tactics and strategy. The public leader, the ‘rhetorical prime minister’, is shaped by the demands of the media and organized by the technological capacity.

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