Collective Rights–Based Fishery Management: A Path to Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 469-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Holland
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Fishery Management ◽  
Quota System ◽  
Collective Rights ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Individual Transferable Quota ◽  
Monitoring And Enforcement ◽  
Do So

Fishery rents may be dissipated across margins not well defined or controlled by an individual transferable quota system. Collective rights–based fishery management (CRBFM), where catch rights are held by a group, can sometimes generate greater benefits and can also address external impacts of the fishery. I discuss potential failures of individual quotas and how these problems were addressed by CRBFM institutions. I then focus on the role of CRBFM in addressing environmental and social impacts external to the group of fishers, such as bycatch, habitat impacts, and spatial conflicts. The review suggests that CRBFM can effectively address both intrafishery and external impacts, provided there is sufficient incentive to do so, including maintaining access to preferred markets or the threat of further regulation. However, CRBFM can create moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and successful CRBFM institutions generally have homogeneous membership with well-aligned interests and/or formal contracts with monitoring and enforcement provisions.

scholarly journals An empirical examination of moral hazards and adverse selection on PPP projects

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 910-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
De-Graft Owusu-Manu ◽  
David John Edwards ◽  
A.S. Kukah ◽  
Erika Anneli Parn ◽  
Hatem El-Gohary ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Relative Significance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Moral Hazards ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Research Findings

Purpose Failures of public–private partnership (PPP) projects are often ascribed to the agency problem, which arise under conditions of inadequate and asymmetric information when a principal (the client) hires an agent (the contractor). This paper aims to identify the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on PPP construction projects using a synthesis of extant literature (to determine key variables) and analysis of survey questionnaire data collected. Design/methodology/approach Mean score ranking was used to rank the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. One sample t-test was conducted to establish the relative significance of these variables. Findings Effort dimensions (which are not verifiable), low transfer of risk, lack of accurate information about project conditions, wrong party chosen to execute project and renegotiation of contracts were the most significant causes of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. In addition, reduction of competition, high transaction costs, consequences on profitability of project, siphoning of funds and negative implications on enforceability of contract were the most significant effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. Practical implications Application of these findings will help mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection problems occurring when undertaking PPP construction projects. Originality/value Research findings provide guidance to construction stakeholders in the PPP sector on the different causes and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard. This pioneering study is the first to conduct an empirical assessment of the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects in a developing country.

scholarly journals Sistem Informasi Dalam Hubungan Prinsipal – Agen Di RSU-BLUD Bahteramas, Kota Kendari Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-85
Author(s):  
Zainul Abidin
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Conventional Systems ◽  
Reporting Procedures

 This study aims to analyze the information systems that occur, especially in terms of reporting procedures, budgeting systems and the role of the supervisory board at the Bahteramas Hospital, Kendari City, Southeast Sulawesi Province. This research uses a qualitative approach. The results show that the reporting procedure uses a combination of computers and manuals, but manual systems are still dominant. The budgeting system still uses conventional systems and also uses performance-based budgets. The supervisory board has carried out its duties, but it is still not optimal. Even so, there is complete information where the principal knows what the agent is doing. Even though in reality, there are still agency problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) both potentially and factually. For example, negligence in the supply of drugs, but on the whole does not hinder the disclosure of information by the principal.

scholarly journals Employment-Friendly Welfare Policy and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Sweden and Korea

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-152
Author(s):  
Kwon Illoong ◽  
Lee Jin Ho
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Welfare Policy ◽  
Tax Policies ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Welfare Policies ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Theoretical Predictions

This paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analyzing how welfare polices can affect the incentive to work and compares the recent welfare policy reforms of Sweden and Korea. Sweden has systematically reformed its welfare policies in response to slowing population and economic growth and an aging population. This paper shows that recent Swedish reforms of tax policies and unemployment benefits bear out theoretical predictions that such reforms will help reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In comparison, recent Korean reforms of tax policies and unemployment benefits have focused on moral hazard problems but have largely ignored adverse selection problems.

Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
INDRIDI H. INDRIDASON ◽  
CHRISTOPHER KAM
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Preliminary Test ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Selection Problems

A model of policy implementation in a parliamentary democracy as delegation between the prime minister and her cabinet ministers is introduced. Cabinet reshuffles can be pursued as a strategy to reduce the agency loss which occurs due to the different preferences of the actors. This work thus explains why prime ministers resort to reshuffles: cabinet reshuffles reduce the moral hazard facing ministers. This answer both augments and distinguishes this work from traditional perspectives on reshuffles that have emphasized the deleterious effects of reshuffles on ministerial capacity, and also from recent work that casts reshuffles as solutions to the adverse-selection problems inherent in cabinet government. The conclusion offers a preliminary test of some of the hypotheses generated by this theory.

scholarly journals Bend Them but Don't Break Them: Passionate Workers, Skeptical Managers, and Decision Making in Organizations

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-125
Author(s):  
Omar A. Nayeem
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
High Tech ◽  
High Tech Industry ◽  
Frontline Workers ◽  
Knowledge Based

This paper explores the useful but delicate role of managerial skepticism in hierarchical knowledge-based organizations. In these settings, the decision-maker principal seeks advice from managers, who instruct expert frontline workers to acquire information. Given unverifiable information quality and private-valued agents, moral hazard and adverse selection arise with workers and managers, respectively. Pairing extremely passionate workers with moderately skeptical managers alleviates both problems; however, the degree of managerial skepticism must be finely tuned: too little skepticism fails to improve workers' incentives, while too much skepticism destroys workers' incentives altogether. Case studies from the high-tech industry support these insights. (JEL D23, D82, M12, M51)

Why Delegate?

Why Delegate? ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Neil J. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Real World ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Wide Applicability ◽  
Political World ◽  
Everyday Lives ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
Do So

There is no escaping the delegation relationship, whether in our everyday lives or in the wider economic or political world. This chapter introduces the central concepts that help us understand delegation such as principal, agent, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, can’t control and won’t control and the various incentives to delegate. The aims of the book are to develop a broader more descriptively useful logic of delegation that has wide applicability and to do so in an informal and accessible way using real world examples. The book is structured around the variety of economic and political incentives to delegate, stretching from saving time and effort to saving reputation and position and finding someone to blame for wrongdoing.

A Re-Appraisal of the Role of Blood Coagulation and Platelets in the Generalized Shwartzman Phenomenon

1966 ◽  
Vol 15 (03/04) ◽  
pp. 519-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Levin ◽  
E Beck
Keyword(s):  
Blood Coagulation ◽  
The State ◽  
Coagulation System ◽  
Renal Lesions ◽  
Intravascular Coagulation ◽  
Renal Glomeruli ◽  
Coagulation Mechanism ◽  
Shwartzman Phenomenon ◽  
Do So

SummaryThe role of intravascular coagulation in the production of the generalized Shwartzman phenomenon has been evaluated. The administration of endotoxin to animals prepared with Thorotrast results in activation of the coagulation mechanism with the resultant deposition of fibrinoid material in the renal glomeruli. Anticoagulation prevents alterations in the state of the coagulation system and inhibits development of the renal lesions. Platelets are not primarily involved. Platelet antiserum produces similar lesions in animals prepared with Thorotrast, but appears to do so in a manner which does not significantly involve intravascular coagulation.The production of adrenal cortical hemorrhage, comparable to that seen in the Waterhouse-Friderichsen syndrome, following the administration of endotoxin to animals that had previously received ACTH does not require intravascular coagulation and may not be a manifestation of the generalized Shwartzman phenomenon.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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