4. Neo-functionalism

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Strøby Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
Spillover Hypothesis

This chapter examines the main assumptions of neo-functionalism, especially with regards to European integration. The fundamental argument of neo-functionalists is that states are not the only important actors on the international scene. They claim that supranational institutions and non-state actors, such as interest groups and political parties, are the real driving force behind integration efforts. The chapter first provides an overview of the main features of neo-functionalist theory and its historical development since the 1950s before discussing three hypotheses advanced by neo-functionalists: the spillover hypothesis, the elite socialization hypothesis, and the supranational interest group hypothesis. After explaining the concepts of supranationalism and spillover, the chapter considers the main critiques of neo-functionalist theory. It concludes by describing the revival of interest in neo-functionalism and giving some examples that illustrate how today's neo-functionalists differ from those of the 1950s.

4. Neo-functionalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Strøby Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Middle Range ◽  
Range Theory ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Supranational Institutions

This chapter reviews a theoretical position, neo-functionalism, which was developed in the mid-1950s by scholars based in the United States. The fundamental argument of the theory is that states are not the only important actors on the international scene. As a consequence, neo-functionalists focus their attention on the role of supranational institutions and non-state actors, such as interest groups and political parties, who, they argue, are the real driving force behind integration efforts. The chapter that follows provides an introduction to the main features of neo-functionalist theory, its historical development since the 1950s and how neo-functionalism is used today. It focuses, more specifically, on three hypotheses advanced by neo-functionalists: the spillover hypothesis; the elite socialization hypothesis; and the supranational interest group hypothesis. The chapter also considers the main critiques of the theory and discusses the ups and downs in the intellectual use of neo-functionalism over the last 50 years. The final section scrutinizes the revival of interest in neo-functionalism and provides some examples of how today’s neo-functionalists differ from those of the 1950s. While neo-functionalism used to be conceptualized as a ‘grand theory’, it is now looked upon and used as a middle-range theory that explains only part of the European integration process.

scholarly journals The contingent character of interest groups–political parties’ interaction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Laura Chaqués-Bonafont ◽  
Camilo Cristancho ◽  
Luz Muñoz-Márquez ◽  
Leire Rincón
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Issue Salience ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Western Democracies

Abstract This article examines the conditions under which interest groups interact with political parties. Existing research finds that interest group–political party interactions in most western democracies have become more open and contingent over time. The close ideological and formal organisational ties that once characterised these relations have gradually been replaced by alternative, more pragmatic forms of cooperation. However, most of this research stresses the importance of the structural factors underpinning these links over time and across countries, but sheds little light on the factors driving short-term interest group–party interactions. Here, by drawing on survey data on Spanish interest groups obtained between December 2016 and May 2017, this article seeks to fill this gap by taking into account party status, issue salience and a group’s resources as explanatory variables. It shows that mainstream parties are the primary targets of interest groups, that groups dealing with salient issues are more likely to contact political parties and that the groups with most resources interact with a larger number of parties.

scholarly journals Interest Groups in Multi-Level Contexts: European Integration as Cross-Cutting Issue in Party-Interest Group Contacts

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joost Berkhout ◽  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Patrick Statsch
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
European Policy ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
European Public ◽  
Multi Level

Policy-specific actor-constellations consisting of party- and group-representatives commonly drive the effective establishment of new policy programmes or changes in existing policies. In the EU multi-level system, the creation of such constellations is complicated because it practically requires consensus on two dimensions: the European public policy at stake and the issue of European integration. This means that, for interest groups with interests in particular policy domains, and with limited interest in the actual issue of European integration, non-Eurosceptic parties must be their main ally in their policy battles. We hypothesise that interest groups with relevant European domain-specific interests will ally with non-Eurosceptic parties, whereas interest groups whose interests are hardly affected by the European policy process will have party-political allies across the full range of positions on European integration. We assess this argument on the basis of an elite-survey of interest group leaders and study group-party dyads in several European countries (i.e., Belgium, Lithuania, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia) in a large number of policy domains. Our dependent variable is the group-party dyad and the main independent variables are the European policy interests of the group and the level of Euroscepticism of the party. We broadly find support for our hypotheses. The findings of our study speak to the debate concerning the implications of the politicisation of European integration and, more specifically, the way in which party-political polarisation of Europe may divide domestic interest group systems and potentially drive group and party systems apart.

scholarly journals Conceptualizing and measuring party-interest group relationships

2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882094939 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elin Haugsgjerd Allern ◽  
Simon Otjes ◽  
Thomas Poguntke ◽  
Vibeke Wøien Hansen ◽  
Sabine Saurugger ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Resource Sharing ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Scaling Analysis ◽  
Group Relationships ◽  
Organizational Ties ◽  
Party Group

Relationships between political parties and interest groups form structures that enable and constrain political action. Yet there is a lack of consensus on what ‘party-group relationships’ means. We propose a conceptualization focusing on ties as means for structured interaction, which is different from sharing or transfer of resources and ideological kinship. Our conceptual discussion suggests that organizational ties form a single yet hierarchical scale of strength: groups that have many formal ties with particular parties would also have weaker ties with these parties, but not vice versa. To validate our conceptual map, we furthermore check whether the distinction between organizational ties, resource sharing/provision and ideological kinship holds empirically. We explore our expectations by means of novel interest group survey data from seven mature democracies. The results of our scaling analysis provide support for our predictions and have multiple implications for future research on the causes and effects of party-group relationships.

The Power of the Party: Conflict Expansion and the Agenda Diversity of Interest Groups

2019 ◽  
pp. 106591291986714 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Fagan ◽  
Zachary A. McGee ◽  
Herschel F. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Related Activity ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Political Conflicts ◽  
Policy Conflicts ◽  
Policy Content ◽  
Conflict Expansion

To what extent do political parties have an effect on the policy-related activity of interest groups? Drawing from ideas of conflict expansion and the structure of extended party networks, we argue that political parties are able to pull interest groups into more policy conflicts than they otherwise would be involved in. We posit that parties are able to draw interest groups to be active outside of established issue niches. We suggest that several mechanisms—shared partisan electoral incentives, reciprocity, identification with the means, and cue-taking behavior—lead groups to participate in more diverse political conflicts. By linking data on interest group bill positions and the policy content of legislation, we generate a novel measure of 158 interest groups’ alignment with political parties. We find that the more an interest group is ideologically aligned with a political party, the more diverse their issue agenda becomes.

Setting the Party Agenda: Interest Groups, Voters and Issue Attention

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 979-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Information Campaign ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Issue Attention ◽  
Group Mobilization ◽  
Policy Agendas

Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties’ policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate.

scholarly journals When do political parties prioritize labour? Issue attention between party competition and interest group power

2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881987560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Otjes ◽  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Election Manifestos ◽  
Issue Attention ◽  
Project Data

This article analyses the conditions under which political parties spend attention to labour issues. This article compares the dominant partisan perspective, which proposes that attention to issues is shaped by party competition, to an interest group perspective, which proposes that strong interest groups, in particular when their power is institutionalized in corporatist systems, can force parties to spend attention to their issue. We use the Comparative Agenda Project data set of election manifestos to examine these patterns in seven West-European countries and corroborate our findings in the Comparative Manifesto Project data set for 25 countries. The evidence supports the interest group perspective over the partisan perspective. This shows that the study of party attention to issues should not isolate party competition from the influence of other political actors.

Interest Group and Political Party Influence on Growth in State Spending and Debt

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas T. Holyoke ◽  
Jeff Cummins
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
State Government ◽  
The Political ◽  
Business Sector ◽  
State Spending ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
State Budgets ◽  
Social Sectors

Does more lobbying by more interest groups, especially groups representing a state’s largest business sector, lead to greater spending and debt? Or does the blame really rest with state lawmakers and their political parties, which compete to attract and retain the allegiance of these powerful organized interests so they can win control of state government? We test this question with data on annual state budgets from 2006 to 2015, the number of interest groups in each state for those years, the size of the constituencies in different economic and social sectors these groups potentially represent, and the degree of competition between the political parties. Our results reveal that while there is a positive interest group effect on spending, the effect becomes negative as parties compete more for control of the state. As the gatekeepers, lawmakers and their parties, more than interest groups, are ultimately responsible for a state’s fiscal condition.

The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan By Adam D. Sheingate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 279p. $45.00.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 248-249
Author(s):  
Grace Skogstad
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Objective ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Princeton University ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Institutional Relationships

This is a helpful addition to the growing body of historical institutionalist literature that demonstrates the influence of macro- and sectoral-level institutions on policymaking. The central arguments, examined here with regard to agricultural policy, are two. First, institutional relationships among state and nonstate actors may facilitate one policy objective but impede other policy goals. Neither novel nor inconsistent with the literature, this proposition is advanced through elaboration of how various interrelationships between political parties and interest groups shape governments' policy capabilities. Second, Sheingate argues that the American institutional framework of dispersed authority and pluralism does not necessarily render governments incapable or subject to interest group capture. In advancing this proposition, he seeks to put paid to popular depictions of American agrarian politics as constituting iron triangles and all-powerful farm groups.

scholarly journals When do political parties listen to interest groups?

2022 ◽  
pp. 135406882110628
Author(s):  
Maiken Røed
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Group Information ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Source Of Information ◽  
Interest Group Influence ◽  
Issue Emphasis

This paper examines when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. Interest group information can help parties bolster their positions, and by taking their input into account, parties show that they are responsive to the groups’ interests which can increase their appeal to their constituents. Listening to interest groups can, however, also repel voters who disagree with the groups’ positions. This paper argues that party and issue-level characteristics affect whether the benefits of listening to interest groups exceed the costs. Examining more than 25,000 party-interest group observations on 88 Norwegian policy proposals and using a text reuse approach to measure interest group influence, the findings indicate that public salience, party issue emphasis, interest group coalitions, and government status affect parties’ propensity to listen. This implies that interest groups can be a pertinent source of information for parties under certain circumstances which affects the link between voters and parties.

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