THE RULE OF LAW, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY, AND A MINISTERIAL VETO OVER JUDICIAL DECISIONS

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-388
Author(s):  
T.R.S. Allan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Straightforward Approach

R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 813 is a case of real constitutional interest and importance. The division of opinion within the Supreme Court reflects divergent conceptions of fundamental principle. While all the Justices affirmed the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, they understood them differently, resulting in disagreement about their correct reconciliation on the facts of the case. The majority of Justices achieved a real integration of these basic principles in a manner that the dissentients’ superficially more straightforward approach did not.

The legal supremacy of legislative initiatives in judicial proceedings: The Israeli lesson

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bell E Yosef
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Proceedings ◽  
Legislative Initiative ◽  
Mere Existence

Abstract This article reveals an evolving judicial doctrine, in which the Supreme Court of Israel postpones, removes, dismisses, or even dismisses in limine petitions, due to the mere existence of legislative initiative with respect to the petition’s issue. The article analyzes the way the Court uses the doctrine, and offers a normative analysis of this phenomenon. The main argument is that the judicial use of the doctrine leads to deprivation of the petitioners’ rights, gives (too) much power to the state legal counsels, leans on uncertain and unforeseeable situations, and damages the fundamental principle of the rule of law. On the other hand, the judicial use of the doctrine promotes and enhances constitutional dialogue, as well as preserving judicial resources (and judicial legitimacy in particular) and the professionality of the legislation. Henceforth, the article also introduces an effort to balance between the doctrine different consequences, by presenting a set of criteria for a more reasoned, coherent, and analytical use of that doctrine.

scholarly journals LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: REFLECTIONS ON EVANS v ATTORNEY GENERAL

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.R.S. Allan
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Correct Reading ◽  
The Difference

AbstractThe difference of judicial opinion in the Supreme Court in Evans provokes reflection on fundamental constitutional principles, such as parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A statute that on its face seems to permit a government minister to override a judicial decision of which he disapproves inevitably raises acute concern; the correct reading of the statute depends on the most persuasive integration of basic principles, placing the text within its wider constitutional context. The Justices deployed distinctions between law, fact, and public interest in rather different ways, reflecting their divergent interpretative approaches. The role of constitutional convention is also of particular interest – central to the legal issues arising, on one view, but largely irrelevant on another. At the root of these disagreements lie contrasting conceptions of law and adjudication.

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Independent Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Harsh Criticism

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.

The oath of a judge – oath of office and judicial symbol

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-92
Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Symbolic Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Conscious Choice ◽  
Justice Process ◽  
The Moment ◽  
First Time

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.

Canadian Exclusion Jurisprudence post-Febles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Joeck
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Refugee Protection ◽  
Refugee Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
International Refugee Law

Abstract This article examines the state of Canadian refugee law since the decision of the Supreme Court in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2014] 3 SCR 431. Drawing upon an analysis of a set of decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the administrative tribunal tasked with refugee status determination in Canada, the article seeks to determine whether administrative decision makers are heeding the guidance of Febles when excluding asylum seekers from refugee protection on the basis of serious criminality pursuant to article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In doing so, it examines the controversy around article 1F(b) since its inception across various jurisdictions and amongst academic commentators, situating Febles within that controversy in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clearly set out the purpose underlying article 1F(b) is in step with a longstanding tendency to understand the provision as serving a gatekeeping function, that prevents criminalized non-citizens from obtaining membership in our society. It argues that by omitting to set out a clear and principled standard by which asylum seekers can be excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(b), the Supreme Court failed to live up to a thick understanding of the rule of law. It concludes by calling for a reassertion of the rule of law into exclusion decision making, both nationally and internationally, in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the international refugee law regime is maintained.

scholarly journals KEPASTIAN HUKUM MENGENAI PERBEDAAN ANTARA PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG DAN PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI TERKAIT PENCALONAN PERSEORANGAN PESERTA PEMILU ANGGOTA DPD

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Law And Justice

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Undermining Parliamentary Sovereignty and Federalism

Federalism-E ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65
Author(s):  
Joshua Nahmias
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Political Environment ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Purse ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Core Concepts

This article explores the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its role in altering two core concepts of Canadian democracy: parliamentary sovereignty and federalism. The author argues that the Charter has undermined these concepts through the empowerment of Canada's judiciary, namely the Supreme Court of Canada. The article explores ways in which the powers of parliament have been superseded by the courts, specifically through the establishment of "charter proofing," parliament's loss of power over the "public purse," and the erosion of the provinces' policy autonomy. Ultimately, the article seeks to demonstrate that the Charter has "legalized" Canadian politics to the extent that the judiciary unwieldy an unacceptable amount of power in Canada's political environment. Cases explored in the essay include Morgentaler v. the Queen (1988), Schachter v. Canada (1992), and Attorney-General of Québec v. Association of Québec Protestant School Boards (1984).

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