The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.

Author(s):  
Katarzyna Gajda-Roszczynialska ◽  
Krystian Markiewicz

Abstract This article advances the thesis that disciplinary proceedings may constitute a tool for breaking the rule of law in Poland. In 2017, as part of a package of legal changes to the judiciary, a disciplinary system was created in Poland to ensure that judges were subservient to the political will of the authorities. From the beginning, new disciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice (the Prosecutor General) have targeted judges who disagree with unconstitutional changes to the judiciary. Disciplinary proceedings are by no means repressions that affect judges who demand that other authorities respect the rule of law in Poland. The article discusses, on a step by step basis, the practical mechanisms taken by the political authorities to break the rule of law in Poland. Particular attention is paid to the measures which have been taken concerning the judiciary. The article discusses the judgment of the CJEU on 19 November 2019 in combined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 and the implementing resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020 as well as the collapse of the rule of law in Poland from a practical perspective. The analysis of the recent events shows that after the so-called Muzzle Law (A bill amending the Act on the Organization of Ordinary Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary was submitted on 12 December 2019, and then voted on by the parliamentary majority in the lower house of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) on 20 December 2019.) came into force, the application of the resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020 implementing the CJEU judgment in the joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 of 19 November 2019 can be and, in fact, is penalized by further disciplinary proceedings, which constitutes a real threat to the already weakened rule of law. Institutions and, above all, judges who are safeguarding the rule of law are being destroyed.


Author(s):  
Louise Weinberg

This paper argues that the Supreme Court made a serious mistake last term, when, in a case of interstate government tort, it tore up useful options that should be available to each state for the rare cases in which they would be of service. In seeking to insulate a state from liability when its employee intrudes on a sister state’s territory and causes injury there, the Court stripped every state of power, in cases of interstate government tort, to try injuries occurring on its own territory to its own residents—an unprecedented disregard of a state’s acknowledged traditional interests. Indeed, the Court went beyond interstate government tort and seemed to say that the Constitution prohibits litigation against a state in all cases, whether to enforce state or federal law, whether in state or federal courts. It is argued that the Court’s originalist and structural arguments cannot withstand scrutiny. Moreover, the Court’s position, if firmly established, would balk the actual interests even of a state as defendant. The states typically do see a need to meet their tort responsibilities. Real damage has been done, but it is argued that conservative and liberal views on judicial review of government action in time may well converge to put an end to judicial abnegation of the duty to place government at all levels under the rule of law.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-513

I am an English judge speaking in Jerusalem at a lecture to honor the memory of an Englishman who was the first member of the English Jewish Community to be appointed to the House of Lords, now the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. That was 60 years ago in 1951. So this is an important anniversary.This evening, I am seeking to highlight some of the issues that relate to the role of the media and the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law, and the interaction of their relationships in a democratic society that respects the rule of law. My experience is British, but my intention is to address questions that arise in any civilized democracy. The essential principles are unaffected by geography.My overwhelming belief is that the most emphatic feature of the relationship between the judiciary and the media is that the independence of the judiciary and the independence of the media are both fundamental to the continued exercise, and indeed the survival, of the liberties that we sometimes take for granted. I have said before, and I do not apologize for saying it again, these are critical independences, which are linked but separate. As far as I can discover, there never has been, and there is no community in the world in which an independent press flourishes while the judiciary is subservient to the executive or government, or where an independent judiciary is allowed to perform its true constitutional function while, at the same time, the press is fettered by the executive.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 356-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Zamir

Professor David Kretzmer has reviewed the development of administrative law in Israel and reached the conclusion that a revolution has occurred. The revolution manifests itself in the substantial widening of the scope of judicial review over administrative acts. For example, the Supreme Court is now willing to review the legality of parliamentary proceedings. This revolution, in his opinion, reflects a change in the conception of the Court's function in this realm. In the past the Court saw itself as limited to the function of deciding controversies between two opposing parties. Today, it is as if another function has been added, and the Court perceives itself as the guardian of the rule of law. Therefore, it is likely to become actively engaged in protecting the rule of law and to invalidate a governmental decision even absent a controversy in the traditional sense. The Court acts in this manner without explaining the basis or the reason for the role that it has assumed. Thus, the question may well arise whether this revolution is legitimate. On the basis of Professor Kretzmer's comments one may ask if indeed the Court, in the struggle over the rule of law, has taken on a function not its own, and in doing so itself infringed upon the rule of law.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (IV) ◽  
pp. 107-113
Author(s):  
Hina Malik ◽  
Sana Ullah ◽  
Ayaz Ali Shah

Pakistan, since independence, has become a laboratory for constitutional experiments, with the judiciary playing the most controversial role. Under the theory of necessity, the superior judiciary has legalized military takeovers. Although controversial as a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Iftekhar Muhammad Chaudhry was found to be a changed person the moment he took his seat as a Chief Justice of Pakistan. However, the situation was not conducive for any action that went against the will of the military ruler. But the Judge-Bench collaboration supported by the entire civil society initiated a movement to negate and nullify the dictates of a dictator. The movement led by the Black Coats community extended over years, bearing hardships of all kinds. The movement was successful in forcing General Musharraf to uphold the provisions of the constitution and rules of established law. The entire nation emerged victorious in upholding what is called the rule of law.


Author(s):  
Yu. I. Matat

The article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of the interpretation of law, its features, as well as the role in overcoming gaps in the law. Attention is focused and substantiated that the interpretation of legal norms, being a necessary element of the legal regulation mechanism, plays the important role in the process of overcoming gaps in law. So, by means of various methods of interpretation, in particular, formal gaps are overcome, which, in turn, may arise as a result of an unsuccessful presentation of legal norms by the legislator. It is determined that when applying the rule of law by analogy, such a rule in the particular situation should be interpreted not as part of the institution from which it is borrowed, but as part of the institution, the gap in which it is designed to overcome. This is due to the fact that the rule applied by analogy is subject to double influence: on the one hand, it generally retains its original meaning, on the other - partially adapts to the characteristics of the institution in which the gap is overcome through it. The role of official interpretation in the process of application of the law in the conditions of gaps in the legislation is clarified, the role of recommendatory explanations provided by higher courts on the issues of application of the legislation is investigated. In Ukraine, these powers, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges" dated June 02, 2016, are assigned to the Plenum of the Supreme Court, in order to ensure the same application of the rules of law in solving certain categories of cases, generalizes the practice of applying substantive and procedural laws, systematizes and ensures the promulgation legal positions of the Supreme Court, as well as based on the results of the analysis of judicial statistics and generalization of judicial practice, it provides explanations of the recommendatory nature on the application of legislation in solving court cases. It is concluded that the importance of the interpretation of law is primarily to ensure full and accurate disclosure of the functions of legal acts as a source and form of existence of legal norms, other substantive elements of the legal system. The interpretation concretizes the law, which allows law enforcement agencies to ensure the resolution of legal cases in strict accordance with the constitutional principles of legal certainty, legality and the rule of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


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