The legal supremacy of legislative initiatives in judicial proceedings: The Israeli lesson

Author(s):  
Bell E Yosef

Abstract This article reveals an evolving judicial doctrine, in which the Supreme Court of Israel postpones, removes, dismisses, or even dismisses in limine petitions, due to the mere existence of legislative initiative with respect to the petition’s issue. The article analyzes the way the Court uses the doctrine, and offers a normative analysis of this phenomenon. The main argument is that the judicial use of the doctrine leads to deprivation of the petitioners’ rights, gives (too) much power to the state legal counsels, leans on uncertain and unforeseeable situations, and damages the fundamental principle of the rule of law. On the other hand, the judicial use of the doctrine promotes and enhances constitutional dialogue, as well as preserving judicial resources (and judicial legitimacy in particular) and the professionality of the legislation. Henceforth, the article also introduces an effort to balance between the doctrine different consequences, by presenting a set of criteria for a more reasoned, coherent, and analytical use of that doctrine.

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-710
Author(s):  
Denis Bourque

Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights specifies that every person has the right to equality before the law. The purpose of this article is to analyse, on the one hand, the meaning that the judges of the Supreme Court have given to this concept of equality before the law and, on the other hand, the way in which they have applied this aforementioned principle of Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Four judgements are the subject of Mr. Bourque's study. He concerns himself with the Drybones, Lavell, Burnshine and Canard judgements. In the course of analysing these cases, Mr. Bourque brings out the shilly-shallying of the judges in connection with their concept of equality before the law. In spite of this beating about the bush two concepts emerge at the level of the judges of the Supreme Court, namely an equalitarian concept of equality before the law, and a concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law. According to Mr. Bourque, the analysis of these four judgements shows that it is the concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law, which represents, the position of the Supreme Court, at the present time.


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-388
Author(s):  
T.R.S. Allan

R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 813 is a case of real constitutional interest and importance. The division of opinion within the Supreme Court reflects divergent conceptions of fundamental principle. While all the Justices affirmed the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, they understood them differently, resulting in disagreement about their correct reconciliation on the facts of the case. The majority of Justices achieved a real integration of these basic principles in a manner that the dissentients’ superficially more straightforward approach did not.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.


Author(s):  
Molly Joeck

Abstract This article examines the state of Canadian refugee law since the decision of the Supreme Court in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2014] 3 SCR 431. Drawing upon an analysis of a set of decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the administrative tribunal tasked with refugee status determination in Canada, the article seeks to determine whether administrative decision makers are heeding the guidance of Febles when excluding asylum seekers from refugee protection on the basis of serious criminality pursuant to article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In doing so, it examines the controversy around article 1F(b) since its inception across various jurisdictions and amongst academic commentators, situating Febles within that controversy in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clearly set out the purpose underlying article 1F(b) is in step with a longstanding tendency to understand the provision as serving a gatekeeping function, that prevents criminalized non-citizens from obtaining membership in our society. It argues that by omitting to set out a clear and principled standard by which asylum seekers can be excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(b), the Supreme Court failed to live up to a thick understanding of the rule of law. It concludes by calling for a reassertion of the rule of law into exclusion decision making, both nationally and internationally, in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the international refugee law regime is maintained.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-713
Author(s):  
Jacquelene Mwangi

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.


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