Constitutional Reform of the Judicial Branch: Symbolic vs. Operational Considerations

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Russell
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
National Institutions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Interesting Possibility

abstractIf the next stage of constitutional renewal is to be the strengthening of national institutions, consideration should be given to the judicial branch of government as well as to the Senate and House of Commons. In assessing reforms in this area it is important to distinguish the symbolic from operational consequences. First priority should be given to constitutional entrenchment of the Supreme Court. Although the significance of such an amendment is largely symbolic, it is needed to remove uncertainties created by references to the Supreme Court in the Constitution Act, 1982. A general guarantee of judicial independence should be abandoned as a misguided exercise in constitutional symbolism. From both a symbolic and operational perspective, reform of section 96 of the original constitution holds out the most interesting possibility of establishing the constitutional basis for a truly national judiciary.

Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 705-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
PILAR DOMINGO
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Political System ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Rule ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

This article examines the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the Mexican political system. The judiciary provided an important source of regime legitimation, as it allowed for the consolidation of a state of legality and a claim to constitutional rule of law, at least in discourse. However, the judiciary was in effect politically subordinated to the logic of dominant party rule through both specific constitutional reforms since 1917 that weakened the possibility of judicial independence and a politics of institutional and political co-optation. The constitutional reform of 1994 has significantly altered the nature of the relationship between the executive and the Supreme Court.

Judicialization of Judicial Appointments?

2018 ◽  
pp. 208-218
Author(s):  
Chintan Chandrachud
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Supreme Court Of India ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Increasing Trend ◽  
Lay Members ◽  
The Uk

This essay discusses United Kingdom’s transition to the commission model of judicial appointments, with the advent of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 (CRA). The essay expounds that the commission model in the UK provides for a sustained participation of ‘lay’ members, who are expected to be representatives of the civil society. The author aligns with the view that the fragmentation of the appointments process amongst various actors is an exercise towards appointing a more diverse judiciary, and in no way impinging upon judicial independence. This essay analyses how the Supreme Court of India in the NJAC Case interpreted the appointments process ushered in by the UK CRA. This essay critiques the Indian Supreme Court’s reading of the CRA, and how the Court’s conclusion that the appointments processes in the UK shows an increasing trend toward judicialization may either be incorrect, or highly reductionist.

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 854-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Theoretical Discussion ◽  
Hybrid Regimes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comprehensive Intervention ◽  
The Government

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy-making role.

Comparative Law in the NJAC Judgment

2018 ◽  
pp. 197-207
Author(s):  
Suhrith Parthasarathy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
International Experience ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
The Supreme Court

This essay is an overview of the use of comparative law in the NJAC Case, and offers a critique of the Supreme Court’s analysis of comparative law in judicial appointments. The essay argues that the Supreme Court adopted an isolationist approach by shunning international experience from fifteen countries cited before it by the Union of India to drive home the point that executive presence in judicial appointments does not, by itself, impinge upon judicial independence. The author contests the Supreme Court’s cursory dismissal of relevant international experience on the ground that India, with its peculiar set of circumstances cannot replicate the experiences of other nations in judicial appointments. The author argues that this is self-serving and the judgment would have been better served by a surer grasp of comparative law and its rationales.

Custom in Public Law

1986 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 450-500
Author(s):  
Shimon Shetreet
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Historical Document ◽  
Area Of Interest ◽  
The Supreme Court

This article is based on a study on custom in public law conducted some years ago due to the welcome initiative of Prof. G. Tedeschi. Like many others, I too responded to his irresistible powers of persuasion, to conduct a study on custom in a field close to my area of interest, public law. I owe many thanks to Prof. Tedeschi, for by virtue of this study I have acquired significant perspectives for the analysis of public law.During the course of my work on another study (on judicial independence, conducted for the Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel), I discovered an historical document pertaining to Prof. Tedeschi, in whose honour this issue of the Israel Law Review appears. The document concerns an offer, addressed to Prof. Tedeschi in 1953, to be appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals Nuevos enfoques de la independencia judicial. Dos puntas de iceberg en la reforma de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial: la comisión permanente del CGPJ y el gabinete técnico del Tribunal Supremo

2016 ◽  
pp. 375
Author(s):  
Rosa María Fernández Riveira
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Council ◽  
The Political ◽  
Permanent Commission ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Made In

Este trabajo estudia dos reformas concretas de la Ley orgánica del Poder Judicial que se producen en octubre de 2015: la Comisión Permanente, como órgano del Consejo que ve incrementado su número de vocales, sus competencias y que situado bajo la dirección del Presidente del Consejo ha ido creciendo en relevancia; y el Gabinete Técnico del Tribunal Supremo, que se regula también como órgano al servicio del Tribunal pero bajo la obediencia y dirección del Presidente. Un órgano que asume unas competencias muy importantes en un momento en el que se reforma la vieja casación pasando a ser un recurso determinado por el «interés casacional objetivo». Estos dos cambios, como puntas de iceberg, son el aviso de nuevos enfoques sobre planteamientos clásicos acerca de la independencia judicial tales como: las relaciones existentes entre el Consejo General del Poder judicial y el Tribunal Supremo, la presencia del elemento político en el corazón de la independencia judicial, la enorme relevancia de un proceso de selección de nuestros jueces justo, plural y confiable y la necesidad de articular mecanismos de responsabilidad judicial institucional e individual.This paper analyses two reforms about Organic Law of Judiciary which have been made in October 2015: the Permanent Commission as part of Council body that it has seen increasing its competences and it works under careful supervision of the President of the General Council of the Judiciary. It has suffered an augmentation of members on its composition and it has got more relevance as important voice in the General Council and, on the other hand, the Technical office of the Supreme Court, which has been redesigned with new competences working under Instructions of President. And all these changes are been implemented at the same time that it has been adopted the new cassation appeal. Both reforms as iceberg’s tips are performing important reflections about classical principles for example: different manners to understand the judicial independence, the political element within judicial independence, the relevance of appointment judicial processes and of course the accountability discourse as essential part within the judicial independence.

scholarly journals Elected Judges Lead to Less Partial Judges

Federalism-E ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Good Government ◽  
Head Of Government ◽  
Inappropriate Relationships

Canada’s government structure has long used the idea of Peace, Order, and Good government to justify the selection and subsequent terms of long political majorities and appointed justices.  This paper will be addressing the research question: should the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada be elected to increase Canadian democratic values or should they remain appointed?  Currently the Supreme Court of Canada is selected by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister.   In answering this research question this paper will weigh to the pros and cons of both the current judiciary system and a judiciary section based on elections in order to prove that Supreme Court of Canada justices should stay appointed. A crucial factor in the selection of supreme court judges is the idea of judicial independence. Justices are not elected in order to ensure that there is no partisanship or inappropriate relationships between the judiciary and the legislature. It is argued that this is null and void as a result of the fact that the judges are effectively chosen by the head of government.  In the Canadian system, there lies an important balance between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; this balance of power relies heavily on the Supreme Court being a non-partisan last check on any bills that reach it from the House. This is contrasted by the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has last say on a plethora of issues that affect the lives of all Canadians and Canada is a constitutional monarchy, meaning that the power is always supposed to be derived from the people. Any power of government in Canada must trace its power back to the people for it to be considered legitimate.  After a compare and contrast of the effect that electing the Supreme Court of Canada will have on the judicial independence and the federal balance of power it is hypothesised that the Supreme Court of Canada should continue as an appointed body.

scholarly journals La Cour suprême et le rapatriement de la constitution : la victoire du compromis sur la rigueur

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 619-648
Author(s):  
Nicole Duplé
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Distribution Of Powers

On September the 28th 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada made public its opinion as to the constitutionaly of the Federal government's plan to repatriate and amend the B.N.A. Act. Modifications affecting provincial powers require, according to convention, the existance of which is recognized by six of the Judges, a certain degree of provincial consensus. The federal projet, contested by eight of the ten provinces, was therefore considered unconstitutional by a majority of the Judges. The Court mentioned furthermore that the federal plan, should it become law, would impinge upon the distribution of powers set forth in the B.N.A. Act. Seven of the nine Judges so deciding declared, on the other hand, that the Senat and House of Commons' resolution pertaining to the plan of repatriation and amendement was perfectly legal and that the British Parliament was, in law, the only authorized body to bring about the changes sought by said plan.

scholarly journals Defining Judicial Independence and Accountability Post Political Transition

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 294
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political System ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Political Transition ◽  
The Political ◽  
New Order ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Judicial Corruption ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Configuration

Indonesian constitutional reform after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, has closed dark memories in the past. This article decides that the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There are some problems that remain, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through different ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what "is" and what "ought", among others. First, by changing political configuration that tends to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. In this context, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, and (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that that may reduce constitutional guarantee. However, there are many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political transition and conceptualize its order to strengthen rule of law in Indonesia

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