The Comeback Kid: Donald Trump on Election Day in 2016

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth C. McKee ◽  
Daniel A. Smith ◽  
M. V. (Trey) Hood

ABSTRACTThe surprise outcome of the 2016 presidential election continues to raise more questions as experts grapple with the evidence for why most prognosticators considered a Hillary Clinton victory almost certain. This article uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data to show that a primary explanation for why the election of Donald Trump was difficult to predict is that the bulk of his support did not materialize until Election Day, in the battleground states that he had to carry to win the Electoral College.

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-159
Author(s):  
Nicole Smith Dahmen

Applying person perception theory, this research uses quantitative content analysis to analyze 1,183 newspaper photographs of the two leading candidates from the 2016 presidential election. Study findings show that there were statistically significant differences in the photographic presentations of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the 2016 election, with Clinton pictured more favorably than Trump.


Author(s):  
Robert M. Alexander

This chapter examines the 2016 election through the lens of the Electoral College. The election represents the sixth time the popular vote winner did not win the Electoral College vote. It also represents the most faithless votes cast for president in any presidential election, and it is the second time in the past three elections that a state split its electoral vote between presidential candidates. Particular attention is devoted to the so-called Hamilton elector movement that aimed to have electors select an alternative candidate to Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. A survey of the 2016 Electoral College reveals that a record number of electors considered voting contrary to expectations, and most all electors were lobbied to do so. Electoral College lobbyists consisted of citizens throughout the country and members of the body itself. Reservations over elector discretion draws attention to the differences between the original Electoral College and the evolved body.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316802098744
Author(s):  
Kirby Goidel ◽  
Nicholas T. Davis ◽  
Spencer Goidel

In this paper, we utilize a module from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study to explore how individual perceptions of media bias changed over the course of the 2016 presidential campaign. While previous literature has documented the role of partisan affiliation in perceptions of bias, we know considerably less about how these perceptions change during a presidential election. Consistent with existing theories of attitude change, perceptions of bias polarize with strong Democrats moving toward believing the media were biased against Hillary Clinton (and in favor of Donald Trump) and independent-leaning Republicans moving toward believing the media were biased against Donald Trump. At the end of the 2016 election, more individuals believed the media were biased against their side. These effects were moderated by how much attention individuals paid to the campaign.


Gaining Voice ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 97-122
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Clark ◽  
Ray Block

A healthy representative democracy requires that citizens be politically involved, and it is especially important to consider the political involvement of groups that are marginalized, such as African Americans. Building on the political empowerment hypothesis, the chapter argues that an increased black seat share and black representation ratio should be associated with increased black political involvement. Using 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data, the chapter describes how in states with an increased black seat share in the legislature blacks are more likely to be highly interested in politics and are more likely to vote. In states with a higher black representation ratio, blacks are more inclined to persuade others to vote. Black representation in the US House does not increase black political involvement, despite being the focus of many scholarly works of political empowerment.


Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

The 2016 election is, at a minimum, problematic from a Jeffersonian perspective, like 1992, and may have been another systemic malfunction, like 2000. Donald Trump received 107 of his 304 electoral votes in states where he won less than 50 percent of the popular vote—failing to achieve the kind of compound majority-of-majorities consistent with the Jeffersonian vision of how the system should work. 2016 illustrates the system’s inability to handle third-party and independent candidates, like Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, an inability caused by the addition of plurality winner-take-all in the Jacksonian era. It is unknowable whether Trump or Hillary Clinton would have won runoffs in the three pivotal Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. But if Clinton had won runoffs there (and in the states where she was only a plurality winner), then she would have won the Electoral College with an appropriately Jeffersonian majority-of-majorities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-160
Author(s):  
Jan Zilinsky ◽  
Cristian Vaccari ◽  
Jonathan Nagler ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker

Michael Jordan supposedly justified his decision to stay out of politics by noting that Republicans buy sneakers too. In the social media era, the name of the game for celebrities is engagement with fans. So why then do celebrities risk talking about politics on social media, which is likely to antagonize a portion of their fan base? With this question in mind, we analyze approximately 220,000 tweets from 83 celebrities who chose to endorse a presidential candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign to assess whether there is a cost—defined in terms of engagement on Twitter—for celebrities who discuss presidential candidates. We also examine whether celebrities behave similarly to other campaign surrogates in being more likely to take on the “attack dog” role by going negative more often than going positive. More specifically, we document how often celebrities of distinct political preferences tweet about Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton, and we show that followers of opinionated celebrities do not withhold engagement when entertainers become politically mobilized and do indeed often go negative. Interestingly, in some cases political content from celebrities actually turns out to be more popular than typical lifestyle tweets.


Author(s):  
Kate Manne

This final chapter applies the analysis of misogyny to the 2016 presidential election, in which Hillary Clinton was defeated by Donald Trump, despite the latter being vastly underqualified and temperamentally and morally unsuited to the position. There was also a great deal of misogyny directed toward Clinton not only by Trump and others on the right but also from left-wing sources. It is argued that much of this misogyny and even the outcome were to some extent predictable, on the basis of evidence of misogynistic biases against women who compete for male-dominated leadership positions. Research in social psychology shows that, when a woman cannot be judged less competent than her male counterpart in such contexts, many people will hold that, although they are equally competent, she is less likable than he is. Women are just as likely as men to reject high-achieving women in this manner, due to ego-protective mechanisms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (7) ◽  
pp. 856-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela S. Shockley-Zalabak ◽  
Sherwyn P. Morreale ◽  
Carmen Stavrositu

This study explored voters’ perceptions of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump regarding their general trust in the two 2016 presidential candidates, voters’ demographics, five underlying drivers of trust, and important campaign issues. The study also examined how perceptions of trust on issues were evidenced in the popular vote and in key swing states and the Electoral College. The study used two online census-representative surveys to examine registered voters’ perceptions: one survey of 1,500 respondents conducted immediately before the first presidential debate (September 7-15, 2016) and a second survey of a different sample of 1,500 immediately after the third debate (October 20-31), 2016. Analysis of the results confirmed relatively low-trust levels for both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and an electorate divided demographically about their trust in the two candidates. The five trust drivers yielded statistically significant differences between the candidates. Clinton was evaluated as more competent, concerned, and reliable, and a person with whom participants identified. With the second survey, Trump statistically surpassed Clinton for openness and honesty. Regarding the three issues of most importance in the campaign, Clinton and Trump had equivalent trust evaluations for dealing with the U.S. economy/jobs, but Trump was more trusted regarding terrorism/national security and Clinton was more trusted regarding health care. The overall trust evaluations for Clinton, coupled with intentions to vote, contribute to understanding Clinton’s popular vote victory. However, the importance of terrorism/national security in swing states and Trump’s trust advantage on that issue contributes to understanding the Electoral College vote by comparison with the popular vote.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick A. Stewart ◽  
Elena Svetieva

The 2016 United States presidential election was exceptional for many reasons; most notably the extreme division between supporters of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. In an election that turned more upon the character traits of the candidates than their policy positions, there is reason to believe that the non-verbal performances of the candidates influenced attitudes toward the candidates. Two studies, before Election Day, experimentally tested the influence of Trump’s micro-expressions of fear during his Republican National Convention nomination acceptance speech on how viewers evaluated his key leadership traits of competence and trustworthiness. Results from Study 1, conducted 3 weeks prior to the election, indicated generally positive effects of Trump’s fear micro-expressions on his trait evaluations, particularly when viewers were first exposed to his opponent, Clinton. In contrast, Study 2, conducted 4 days before Election Day, suggests participants had at that point largely established their trait perceptions and were unaffected by the micro-expressions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document