Is It Impossible to Be Moral?

Dialogue ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Michael J. Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Properties

AbstractRecent work in moral theory includes an intriguing new argument that the vagueness of moral properties, together with two well-known and well-received metaethical principles, entails the incredible conclusion that it is impossible to be moral. I show that the argument equivocates between “it is true that A and B are morally indistinguishable” and “it is not false that A and B are morally indistinguishable.” As expected the argument is interesting but unsound. It is therefore not impossible to be moral.

scholarly journals Ideal and nonideal moral theory for disaster bioethics

Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dónal O’Mathúna
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Right ◽  
Practical Implications

AbstractMoral theory has generally focused on resolving ethical dilemmas by identifying ethically sound options. Whether the focus is on consequences, duties, principles or virtues, ethical cases are often approached in ways that assume morally sound solutions can be found and followed. Such ‘ideal morality’ assumes that moral goodness is always possible, leaving people confident they have done the right thing. Such an approach becomes inadequate in disaster settings where any good solution is often difficult to see. This paper examines recent work on nonideal moral theory as a useful model for disaster bioethics. This approach views moral dilemmas as situations where no choice is ideal and every option involves some element of unavoidable wrongdoing. Rather than straining for ideal answers, this approach acknowledges that sometimes the lesser of two evils is the best that can be done. Such situations inevitably lead to feelings of regret or guilt, commonly encountered in discussions of disaster bioethics. This paper explores the practical implications of nonideal approaches for disaster responders working in tragic situations.

The future of utilitarianism

2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-166
Author(s):  
Tim Mulgan
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Climate Change Impact ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Current Work ◽  
Ethical Challenges ◽  
Future People ◽  
Change Impact ◽  
Change Climate ◽  
Practical Implications

My recent work has focused on the demands of utilitarianism, and our obligations to future people. In my current work, I draw on that earlier work, and ask how utilitarians might deal with the ethical challenges of climate change. Climate change has obvious practical implications. It will kill millions of people, wipe out thousands of species, and so on. My question in this paper is much narrower. How might climate change impact on moral theory — and especially on the debate between utilitarians and their non-utilitarian rivals?

Reid on the first principles of morals

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. 102-121
Author(s):  
Terence Cuneo
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Thought

What role do the first principles of morals play in Reid's moral theory? Reid has an official line regarding their role, which identifies these principles as foundational propositions that evidentially ground other moral propositions. I claim that, by Reid's own lights, this line of thought is mistaken. There is, however, another line of thought in Reid, one which identifies the first principles of morals as constitutive of moral thought. I explore this interpretation, arguing that it is a fruitful way of understanding much of what Reid wants to say about the role of moral first principles and drawing some connections between it and recent work on moral nonnaturalism.

scholarly journals Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Cline
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Explanations ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Cornell Realism ◽  
In Virtue Of

Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most persuasive moral explanations are those that employ thick concepts. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, then the most plausible explanations on offer cannot support Cornell realism. Moral explanations employing thin concepts, however, are too flimsy to support the view. Unless proponents can develop a compelling story about thick concepts or thin explanations, Cornell realism is in trouble.

Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-319
Author(s):  
Preston J. Werner
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Open Question ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

Abstract: Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call the Counterfactual Strengthening Test. Along the way I consider and reject a few other possible constraints on perceptual awareness. I defend the view that moral perception is restricted to the perception of evaluative and pro tanto deontic properties. I conclude with a few gestures toward what this limitation on moral perception may mean for broader moral epistemology.

Aims, Abstracts, and Why ‘Beyond Duty’?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Practical Ethics ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

Since the publication of my last book, Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations (OUP, 2012), I have continued to write essays and reviews on fundamental issues in Kantian moral theory as well as practical ethics, but in this recent work I focus on different problems and develop new themes in these areas. For example, I explain some fundamental Kantian concepts, such as autonomy and dignity, and also address potentially influential objections from Rüdiger Bittner and Michael Rosen. Clarifying and revising earlier work, I articulate an understanding of ...

Using and Refusing

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-329
Author(s):  
Jim Gerrie ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Differences Of Opinion ◽  
Life Sustaining Treatment ◽  
Killing And Letting Die ◽  
Letting Die ◽  
James Rachels

James Rachels has argued on Utilitarian grounds that since removing life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide both aim at the very same end,hastening death to limit suffering, there are no morally significant moral distinctions between them. Others have argued for maintaining this distinction based on various forms of deontological and rights-based ethical theories that maintain that all acts of killing are inherently wrong. I argue that the enduring controversy over physician-assisted suicide might not be caused by such fundamental differences of opinion about moral theory, such as that which exists between Utilitarianism and Deontology, so much as by a commonly held misunderstanding of technology. In particular, the conclusion that there are no relevant ethical distinctions between killing and letting die can only be drawn by a Utilitarian, such as Rachels, by ignoring the recent work of philosophers of technology on the non-neutrality thesis.

scholarly journals Putting hell first: cruelty, historicism, and the missing moral theory of damnation

2016 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
John Perry
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Theological Ethics ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Third ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Moral Theories

AbstractRecent work on the morality of hell spans the various subdisciplines of theology, with the ironic exception of theological ethics. An adequate defence of hell requires a positive account of how God's eternally tormenting some humans is beautiful, just and worthy of worship. This suggests a short-term and long-term task. The short-term task, which this article pursues, tests whether an adequate moral theory is available by evaluating three possible candidates, the third of which is the most interesting, as it offers a historicist defence of hell: we believe hell is cruel only because of aversions to cruel and unusual punishment that emerged in modernity. Nonetheless, all three defences are inadequate, suggesting a longer term goal: we need either better moral theories or better accounts of hell, as well as greater analytic clarity regarding theological statements of the form,I want doctrineyto be true but believe doctrinexis true.

What sentimentalists should say about emotion

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Kurth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Multilevel Structure

Abstract Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.

The Sun as a Magnetic Star

1976 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 457-463
Author(s):  
John M. Wilcox ◽  
Leif Svalgaard
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Rotation Axis ◽  
Polar Field ◽  
Magnetic Star ◽  
Rotational Axis ◽  
Field Variation ◽  
The Sun ◽  
Arbitrary Angle ◽  
Solar Magnetism ◽  
Oblique Rotator

SummaryThe sun as a magnetic star is described on the basis of recent work on solar magnetism. Observations at an arbitrary angle to the rotation axis would show a 22-year polar field variation and a 25-day equatorial sector variation. The sector variation would be similar to an oblique rotator with an angle of 90° between the magnetic and rotational axis.

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