Self-Love and Self-Respect

Dialogue ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-544
Author(s):  
Jan Narveson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Straw Men ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Egoism, the subject of this book, is of unending interest to moral philosophers. Campbell reasonably compares it to scepticism in epistemology: just as it is a touchstone of a good epistemological theory that it should show us why scepticism is unsatisfactory, so it is often taken to be a touchstone of a good moral theory that it shows us what is wrong with egoism. The parallel is imperfect in an interesting way, though; for while scarcely anyone in epistemology ends up rejecting the “touchstone” and outrightly advocating scepticism, this does happen in moral philosophy with egoism. In attempting to expose the deficiencies of egoism, we are not tilting against windmills, nor pushing over straw men. And I think it clear that inquiries such as this could have very real implications for practice as well; in this, as in many things, I concur fully with the author.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Hypatia ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Wright
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Alternative Understanding

This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.

Moral justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
The Way

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.

The Concept of Well-Being

1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Standard Of Living ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Subject

The concept of well-being is central to the subject matter of moral philosophy as well as economics. According to some moral theorists (particularly utilitarians) morality is about the maximization of social well-being. According to others, notably John Rawls (1972) we ought to give particular priority to the worst off members in society. Both these and other moral positions, whatever the priority they attach to different members of society in arriving at moral judgements, require an account of well-being or advantage. The concern with well-being is thus of foundational importance in moral philosophy, even if well-being is not thought of as all that matters. Furthermore, those who want to distinguish ‘morality’ from ‘self-interest’ must furnish us with an account of human interests, so that we can distinguish the moral realm from that of self-interest or prudence. The concerns of moral philosophers, here, clearly overlap with those of economists. Economists (particularly in welfare and development economics) are much concerned with questions of how well people are doing, with their ‘standard of living’ or ‘quality of life’. However, there are very different ways of thinking about each of these ideas. Indeed, we need to discriminate between different views of the quality of life and to decide which is the most appropriate for the purposes of moral theory and the normative parts of economics.

Macintyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 125-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dobson
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Feminist Thought ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
Cultural Force

Andrew Wicks recently reflected “On The Practical Relevance of Feminist Thought to Business.” Part of his reflection focussed on my contributions to this subject. In critiquing my work, Wicks notes the similarity between my views on business and those of Alasdair MacIntyre. He goes on to give a brief overview of our position as he sees it. Wicks’s overview, although insightful, is misleading in certain key respects. My purpose in this response, therefore, is to clarify MacIntyre’s views on business. In doing this I will, by default, clarify my own.MacIntyre himself might be surprised by the frequency with which his name appears in the business-ethics discourse. Although, over a period spanning nearly fifty years, he has written prolifically on the subject of ethics, he has only, as far as I am aware, written two brief articles directly addressing the subject of business ethics. Why then should we in business or in business ethics concern ourselves with his views? I think our interest in MacIntyre stems from our interest in virtue ethics, specifically our interest in the applicability of the virtues to business. When it comes to virtue ethics MacIntyre is recognized as an authority, if not the authority. Even his fiercest detractors would, I hope, admit that he has been largely responsible for the resurrection of classical philosophy in the latter half of this century. His book After Virtue, in which he criticizes modernity and praises a classical virtue-based approach to ethics, is undoubtedly one the most influential books on moral philosophy written this century. Indeed, as postmodernism gains steam as a cultural force, its full influence is perhaps yet to be determined. If MacIntyre’s critique of modernity proves correct, then much of business-ethics theory—not to mention moral theory in general—would be discredited. Thus interest in MacIntyre’s thesis, from many quarters, is understandable.

Lessons from Economics

2019 ◽  
pp. 581-606
Author(s):  
John Broome
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Mathematical Analysis ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Population Ethics ◽  
Mathematical Skills ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Economics offers several lessons that moral philosophers can beneficially learn. They are useful for topics in moral philosophy that are inherently quantitative. This chapter gives some examples. Some of these quantitative topics also fall within the subject matter of economics, and economists have made useful, substantive discoveries about them. Ignoring these discoveries hampers the progress of philosophy. This chapter illustrates this sort of failure, using the philosophy of equality as an example. The methods rather than the substance of economics provide other lessons for moral philosophy. Economics routinely employs mathematical analysis, which is also demanded by some quantitative topics in moral philosophy. Often in moral philosophy, questions arise over how quantity and quality can be balanced against each other, when quality can vary continuously. Philosophers have sometimes made mistakes about these questions because they lack the necessary mathematical skills. This chapter describes an example that arises in population ethics and elsewhere. This chapter also condemns one bad practice that philosophers are picking up from economists: the practice of using the word “utility” to refer to well-being.

Self and Selves

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph C.S. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Synthetic A Priori

Kant is committed to the reality of a subject self, outside time but active in forming experience. Timeless activity is problematic, but that can be dealt with. But he holds that the subject of experience is not an object of experience, so nothing can be known about it; this raises a problem about the status of his own theory. But he ought to allow that we can know of its existence and activity, as preconditions of experience: the Critique allows that synthetic a priori truths can be known in this way. However, its identity conditions remain unknowable. Kant’s unity of apperception shares much with Locke’s continuity of consciousness, but does not determine the identity of a thing. Personal identity is bodily identity. Only Kant’s moral philosophy justifies recognizing other selves; it could warrant ascribing a similar status to animals.

scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

scholarly journals A Crítica da razão prática e o estoicismo

DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valério Rohden
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Precise Determination ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
The Subject

No presente trabalho será demonstrada a estreita, embora discreta, relação da filosofia moral de Kant com a ética antiga, especialmente com o estoicismo de Cícero. O tema será explicitado mediante uma aproximação entre as obras da Crítica da razão prática e Sobre os fins (De finibus), respectivamente de cada um desses autores. Será destacada a crítica de Kant à identificação entre virtude e felicidade e sua reformulação sintética no conceito de “sumo bem”. Na conclusão se torna claro que a realização moral da razão, reivindicada por Cícero, encontra na reformulação de Kant sua determinação mais precisa. The crises of practical reason and stoicism Abstract The present paper shows the close albeit subtle relation of Kant’s moral philosophy to ancient ethics, especially Cicero’s Stoicism. The subject is made explicit by means of a rapprochement between the Critique of practical reason and De finibus, so as to be highlight Kant’s criticism of the classical identifying of virtue and happiness and his synthetical recasting of the concept of the supreme good. The essay concludes by making clear that the moral actualization of reason, reclaimed by Cicero, finds in Kant’s reformulation its most precise determination.

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