Moral justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
The Way

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.

Thinking about Cases

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 44-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelly Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Original Case ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Specific Part ◽  
The Way

Anyone who reflects on the way we go about arguing for or against moral claims is likely to be struck by the central importance we give to thinking about cases. Intuitive reactions to cases—real or imagined—are carefully noted, and then appealed to as providing reason to accept (or reject) various claims. When trying on a general moral theory for size, for example, we typically get a feel for its overall plausibility by considering its implications in a range of cases. Similarly, when we try to refine the statement of a principle meant to cover a fairly specific part of morality, we guide ourselves by testing the various possible revisions against a carefully constructed set of cases (often differing only in rather subtle ways). And when arguing against a claim, we take ourselves to have shown something significant if we can find an intuitively compelling counterexample, and such counterexamples almost always take the form of a description of one or another case where the implications of the claim in question seem implausible. Even when we find ourselves faced with a case where we have no immediate and clear reaction, or where we have such a reaction, but others don't share it and we need to persuade them, in what is probably the most common way of trying to make progress we consider various analogies and disanalogies; that is to say, we appeal to still other cases, and by seeing what we want to say there, we discover (or confirm) what it is plausible to say in the original case. In these and other ways, then, the appeal to cases plays a central and ubiquitous role in our moral thinking.

Nietzsche

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The Other ◽  
Baruch Spinoza ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Genealogy Of Morals ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's moral philosophy, first by explaining what makes him different from most of the other moral philosophers such as David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, the Greeks, and Baruch Spinoza. It then considers Nietzsche's notion of good and evil by addressing three questions: How do we find out what sort of creatures men are? How do we decide what sort of creature man ought to be? Is it possible for man to transform himself into that sort of creature. It also discusses the problem faced by Nietzsche in his attempts to assess human nature, namely: what is to count as health in the spiritual dimension, when is a soul diseased, what is mens sana. Finally, it analyzes the main arguments put forward by Nietzsche in his two books Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl W. Spurgin
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Way

Abstract:In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Hypatia ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Wright
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.

Moral Progress for Evolved Rational Creatures

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-238
Author(s):  
William J. FitzPatrick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Adaptive Plasticity ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Naturalistic Account ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Way

Abstract Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have developed a rich ‘biocultural theory’ of the nature and causes of moral progress (and regress) for human beings conceived as evolved rational creatures with a nature characterized by ‘adaptive plasticity’. They characterize their theory as a thoroughly naturalistic account of moral progress, while bracketing various questions in moral theory and metaethics in favor of focusing on a certain range of more scientifically tractable questions under some stipulated moral and metaethical assumptions. While I am very much in agreement with the substance of their project, I wish to query and raise some difficulties for the way it is framed, particularly in connection with the claim of naturalism. While their project is clearly naturalistic in certain senses, it is far from clear that it is so in others that are of particular interest in moral philosophy, and these issues need to be more carefully sorted out. For everything that has been argued in the book, the theory on offer may be only a naturalistic component of a larger theory that must ultimately be non-naturalistic in order to deliver the robust sort of account that is desired. Indeed, there are significant metaethical reasons for believing this to be the case. Moreover, if it turns out that some of the assumptions upon which their theory relies require a non-naturalist metaethics (positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts) then even the part of the theory that might have seemed most obviously naturalistic, i.e., the explanation of how changes in moral belief and behavior have come about, may actually require some appeal to non-naturalistic elements in the end.

1. Doing Political Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr ◽  
Andrew Walton
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter provides an overview of how to do political philosophy. It identifies some of the main aims of the discipline, showing that one can make progress with the subject by studying arguments about the justifiability of various public policies. Political philosophers are mostly concerned with exploring the moral claims of an argument, and the relationship between an argument’s claims and its conclusion. It is here that the discipline connects to other parts of philosophy, particularly moral philosophy and logic. This chapter discusses two tools in the practice of political philosophy. One of these involves arranging arguments in clear and organized terms, and the other involves the use of examples and thought experiments in the analysis of moral claims. The chapter then discusses how to employ these tools in the service of a political argument.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Kutz
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Social World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Crime And Punishment ◽  
Critical Engagement ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Way

Based on two case studies, one of accusation of incest in the Trobriand Islands, the other of suspicion of theft in the Bronx, the prologue questions the foundational relationship between crime and punishment. Fassin’s approach to the social world—not as it ought to be but as it actually is—opens the way to a critical engagement with moral philosophy and legal theory. It is all the more necessary since contemporary societies are going through an unprecedented punitive moment.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Theory Of Human Nature ◽  
Libertarian Free Will ◽  
The Way

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....

scholarly journals AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE EYES OF THE WEST

Phronimon ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Etieyibo
Keyword(s):  
African Americans ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cultural Imperialism ◽  
African Philosophy ◽  
The West ◽  
Black Folk ◽  
Souls Of Black Folk ◽  
The Way

In this paper I unpack some nuanced aspects of cultural imperialism against the backdrop of Du Bois’s analysis in The souls of black folk, dealing with the confrontation of African Americans or blacks by the other (the West). My aim is to gesture towards how certain ways of doing African philosophy can be considered culturally imperialistic. I seek to illustrate one culturally imperialistic way of doing African philosophy by discussing Thaddeus Metz’s brilliant presentation of Ubuntu as an African moral theory. My motivation is to suggest along the way that his version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory seems to me a paradigmatic case of one such way

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