Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Hypatia ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Wright
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

Moral justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
The Way

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.

Self-Love and Self-Respect

Dialogue ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-544
Author(s):  
Jan Narveson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Straw Men ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Egoism, the subject of this book, is of unending interest to moral philosophers. Campbell reasonably compares it to scepticism in epistemology: just as it is a touchstone of a good epistemological theory that it should show us why scepticism is unsatisfactory, so it is often taken to be a touchstone of a good moral theory that it shows us what is wrong with egoism. The parallel is imperfect in an interesting way, though; for while scarcely anyone in epistemology ends up rejecting the “touchstone” and outrightly advocating scepticism, this does happen in moral philosophy with egoism. In attempting to expose the deficiencies of egoism, we are not tilting against windmills, nor pushing over straw men. And I think it clear that inquiries such as this could have very real implications for practice as well; in this, as in many things, I concur fully with the author.

scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

Nietzsche

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The Other ◽  
Baruch Spinoza ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Genealogy Of Morals ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's moral philosophy, first by explaining what makes him different from most of the other moral philosophers such as David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, the Greeks, and Baruch Spinoza. It then considers Nietzsche's notion of good and evil by addressing three questions: How do we find out what sort of creatures men are? How do we decide what sort of creature man ought to be? Is it possible for man to transform himself into that sort of creature. It also discusses the problem faced by Nietzsche in his attempts to assess human nature, namely: what is to count as health in the spiritual dimension, when is a soul diseased, what is mens sana. Finally, it analyzes the main arguments put forward by Nietzsche in his two books Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals.

scholarly journals La Ética Aristotélica en Castilla: las bibliotecas universitarias medievales y prerrenacentistas = The Aristotelian Ethics in Castile: The Medieval and Pre-Renaissance University Libraries

2018 ◽  
pp. 221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Díez Yáñez
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Iberian Peninsula ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
University Libraries ◽  
Late Medieval ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The University ◽  
Península Ibérica

Todavía en demasiadas ocasiones se ha dejado de lado el panorama hispánico en el contexto europeo. Por eso presento aquí un estudio de los ejemplares aristotélicos conservados en las bibliotecas catedralicias y universitarias del reino de Castilla.  La revisión de los inventarios y catálogos de manuscritos e incunables proporciona un análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo del fondo aristotélico. El objetivo es proporcionar un corpus de los antecedentes necesarios para una mejor comprensión y estudio de la recepción de la moral aristotélica en la Castilla tardomedieval y renacentista.La cultura cortesana se sirve de la moral de Aristóteles para construir y difundir un discurso a favor de la monarquía. Una de las vías de acceso más importantes al texto aristotélico es la universitaria. A partir de ahí, resultarán especialmente interesantes las adaptaciones y transmisiones de la Ética en los contextos aristocráticos.La transmisión del texto de la Ética aristotélica en Castilla responde a factores europeos y a características propias del contexto hispánico. De esta manera, se podrán perfilar las peculiaridades del aristotelismo en la península ibérica, a la vez que completar el recorrido del aristotelismo en Europa. All too often, the Hispanic case in history has been neglected in European-wide studies. For this reason, we will study the works of Aristotle held in cathedral and university libraries in the kingdom of Castile. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the manuscripts and incunabula of Aristotelian writings by way of the inventories of Castilian universities will be undertaken in order to create a corpus of existing works and determine the reception of Aristotelian moral philosophy in late-medieval and Renaissance Castile.Courtly culture adopted Aristotelian moral theory to construct and transmit a discourse in favour of monarchy. The university is one of the most important centres where one could get access to Aristotelian texts. From this basis, we will study the adaptation and transmission of Aristotle’s Ethics in an aristocratic context.The transmission of the text of Aristotle’s Ethics in Castile responds to European factors as well as to characteristics derived from the particular Hispanic context. This study enhances our understanding of the characteristics of Aristotelianism in the Iberian Peninsula, and allows us to complete the wider picture in Europe.

Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory

Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Demandingness ◽  
Moral Demands

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

scholarly journals What Can Philosophers Learn from Psychopathy?

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi L. Maibom
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Secondary Psychopathy

Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.

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