Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-511
Author(s):  
Mélisande Genat

Literature on tribes in Iraq is scant and often falls prey to simplistic binary approaches to state-society relations. Scholars of legal pluralism provide tools to conceptualize interrelations between adjacent normative fields. Several legal specialists have talked about “a thin form of cooperation” between tribal “private orders” and the Iraqi state. By the same token, many scholars presuppose that the capacity of the tribes and the state to mediate and settle feuds covary in opposite directions and are correlated with the strength of state institutions (tribes step in to fill a vacuum during times of state weakness). However, careful examination of Iraqi penal legislation and its implementation in tribal areas invalidates this stereotypical paradigm. Already in her seminal 1973 article, Sally Moore drew the attention of scholars of legal pluralism to the idea that legal orders should be approached as partially discrete, overlapping social fields. The various arenas intersect and create meaning for each other.

Author(s):  
H. Patrick Glenn

Most of the legal theory of the last four centuries, in the Western world, has been state-centred. It has justified the existence of states, facilitated their expansion, conceptualized their sources and structures, sought to resolve their conflicts, and developed their law. The state has even been taken, in much of this writing, as the exclusive source of law. There are indications, however, that this theoretical preoccupation with state structures, state institutions, and state laws may now be in decline. This would be a significant development, a historical shift in emphasis in the conceptualization of Western law. It would not, however, mean the end of states or of state law, but rather their contextualization. States and state law would exist in a larger field of normativity. This would entail recognition of a wider range of sources of law and a wider range of relations between laws and between peoples. To attempt to understand these processes, and the extent of their progression, this article examines what we know, or think we know, of the relations between law and the state, before turning to current efforts to develop a transnational concept of law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Croce

This article claims that H.L.A. Hart’s theory may be regarded as a sound vindication of what today is known as legal pluralism. In short, Hart’s practice theory of norms attests to the fact that state law is only one system of rules among many others, and that it does not exhibit any distinctive feature that may distinguish it from those others. I will depict this as an inadvertent but extremely valuable outcome of the practice theory. Indeed, Hart’s battle against the claimed connection between law and coercion and his firm conviction that legal normativity should be understood in light of the broader phenomenon of social normativity make his practice theory of rules a sound and fertile vindication of legal pluralism as atheoretical approachto legal phenomena. As a result, even though Hart was a legal centralist and a legal monist, his theorizing ends up dismantling the identity between thegeneral phenomenon of lawand thelaw of the state. I will proceed as follows: I will first look at the contentious issue of the relation between law and coercion by examining how two prominent legal scholars, Hans Kelsen and E. Adamson Hoebel, came to the conclusion that the distinguishing mark of law is coercion (sec. 1). This analysis will be instrumental in demonstrating that Hart failed to grasp the relevance and salience of the relation between law and coercion, and in particular, the peculiar role Kelsen and Hoebel attributed to the latter (sec. 2). I will argue that Hart’s discomfort with the emphasis on the notion of coercion was due not to the nature of this notion as such, but to the distortive effect its overemphasis had exerted on positivist legal theorizing. I will claim that Hart’s most insidious adversaries were two (at the time prominent) philosophical and jurisprudential streams, namely, behaviourism and emotivism (sec. 3). I will go on to say that Hart’s arguments against these adversaries are well addressed but inadequate, and will try to reinforce them by drawing on a Wittgensteinian view of practices (sec. 4). I will conclude by showing that the consistent outcome of a “reinforced” practice theory is a highly pluralist view of law (sec. 5).


2005 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Gordon R. Woodman

The perceptions afforded by the study of legal pluralism assist an understanding of the full scope and the social and moral significance of alternative dispute resolution. The latter term includes all modes and forms of dispute resolution within the legal order of the state other than the usual forms of adjudication by the ordinary courts. These modes may be classified in relatively wide and fluid categories as other forms of adjudication, and arbitration, mediation and negotiation. However, alternative dispute resolution also includes instances of all these processes which are not established, adopted, or made effective by the state. The study of legal pluralism throughout the world shows that almost everywhere are many such instances, generated within many semi-autonomous social fields other than the state, and falling into all the listed categories. The study of legal pluralism further suggests that the different dispute settlement processes are likely to be associated with different bodies of legal norms. There is evidence that to some extent alternative state processes employ different bodies of laws. The evidence also shows that non-state processes employ bodies of norms which always differ, and may differ widely from those of state law. While legal centralism denies these norms the name of "laws", there seems no good reason not to classify such rules and principles, which order relations within social fields other than the state, as "customary law", or by some similar term. Alternative dispure resolution processes have been lauded as enhancing the effectiveness of the law, providing wider access to justice or law. However, if the argument presented here is correct, it is not sufficient to represent them as implementing "the law". Rather each implements a different variety of law. The social functions of these different laws of different dispute resolution processes, both state and non-state, vary, and so need investigation in each particular case. Whether any law is to be approved as affecting power relations in the society concerned is similarly a matter for investigation. While it has been suggested that alternative dispute resolution processes can confer on the weak and underprivileged an opportunity to assert their interests, it has been argued against such a view that they may provide opportunities for the already powerful to increase their powers, free of the restraining influence of regular state courts. On the other hand, state processes may at certain historical moments be manipulated by the weak to their advantage. Non-state processes may, also in special circumstances, empower collectively the members of the social fields in which they operate.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Campbell McLachlan

This thesis examines the recognition by the state of the customary law of indigenous peoples by reference to a comparative study of Commonwealth South Pacific Jurisdictions. It aims both to Illuminate the process of recognition as a contribution to the comparative theory of legal pluralism and to describe distinctive elements of the experience with recognition In the Pacific.<br><br>The Pacific case shares many of the features of the Introduction of Western law into non-Western societies generally, but the absence of complex plural legal systems during the colonial period and the contemporary vitality of traditionalism have required a reworking of the policy basis and techniques for recognition.<br><br>This task is approached from four propositions. 'The persistent fact of pluralism' envisages recognition as informed by an acknowledgement that legal pluralism exists and persists as a factual phenomenon, regardless of the extent of accommodation afforded to custom in the state legal system. The nature of this phenomenon and the options open to the state are explored in Chapter 'Legal pluralism and legal theory'. 'A legacy of colonial misconceptions' argues that the dominant paradigm for recognition is colonial and therefore requires critical re-examination. Chapter 11 'The colonial experience and the idea of customary law' discusses the status de jure of customary law in the Pacific during the colonial period and evaluates the impact of colonialism on custom and approaches to its recognition.<br><br>Independence and the reassertion of the indigenous identity of Pacific peoples has created a fresh impetus for recognition. 'The implications of a reassertion of autochthonous values' are explored in three chapters on contemporary reforms: Chapter III, 'custom as a source of underlying law' on the general incorporation of custom; Chapter V, 'Disputes: custom as process' on local-level 'customary courts'; and Chapter VI on 'Land: custom as title'. <br><br>Finally, the fourth proposition, 'justice and group identity', sees recognition as justified by the requirements of justice in relation to Indigenous groups within the nation state. Chapter IV, 'Human rights and cultural relativism', evaluates the scope for group Identity within a framework of non-discrimination and the protection of individuals' human rights.<br><br>The thesis concludes by contrasting the changing ideological role of custom with the realities of recognition and by contrasting recognition by the incorporation of custom into state law with recognition by the adjustment of state law to acknowledge the separate sphere of custom.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-182
Author(s):  
Seán Patrick Donlan

A broad assortment of contemporary approaches to legal and normative complexity have challenged state law’s claim of dominance and exclusivity. In Ubiquitous law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (2009), Emmanuel Melissaris similarly seeks to ground the ‘legal’ in what he calls ‘shared normative commitments’. As with much ‘legal pluralism’, his focus on normativity rejects long-established conventional concepts of law. Indeed, for Melissaris, state law may not even properly qualify as ‘law’. But understood as a descriptive theory of normativity, the dynamic legal-normative web he outlines has much to recommend it. It is certainly superior to the continuing narrow concentration of jurisprudes on state law and law-like regimes. Less convincing is Melissaris’ prescriptive suggestion, with ‘critical legal pluralists’, that illustrating the degree to which legal-normative reform occurs beyond the state and its laws promises liberation. Shared normative commitments do not necessarily result in popular control as existing social structures and power relationships remain. We may be ensnared rather than emancipated. On the whole, however, Melissaris has made a sophisticated and substantial contribution to our understanding of legal and normative plurality. His book deserves to be widely read.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Campbell McLachlan

This thesis examines the recognition by the state of the customary law of indigenous peoples by reference to a comparative study of Commonwealth South Pacific Jurisdictions. It aims both to Illuminate the process of recognition as a contribution to the comparative theory of legal pluralism and to describe distinctive elements of the experience with recognition In the Pacific.<br><br>The Pacific case shares many of the features of the Introduction of Western law into non-Western societies generally, but the absence of complex plural legal systems during the colonial period and the contemporary vitality of traditionalism have required a reworking of the policy basis and techniques for recognition.<br><br>This task is approached from four propositions. 'The persistent fact of pluralism' envisages recognition as informed by an acknowledgement that legal pluralism exists and persists as a factual phenomenon, regardless of the extent of accommodation afforded to custom in the state legal system. The nature of this phenomenon and the options open to the state are explored in Chapter 'Legal pluralism and legal theory'. 'A legacy of colonial misconceptions' argues that the dominant paradigm for recognition is colonial and therefore requires critical re-examination. Chapter 11 'The colonial experience and the idea of customary law' discusses the status de jure of customary law in the Pacific during the colonial period and evaluates the impact of colonialism on custom and approaches to its recognition.<br><br>Independence and the reassertion of the indigenous identity of Pacific peoples has created a fresh impetus for recognition. 'The implications of a reassertion of autochthonous values' are explored in three chapters on contemporary reforms: Chapter III, 'custom as a source of underlying law' on the general incorporation of custom; Chapter V, 'Disputes: custom as process' on local-level 'customary courts'; and Chapter VI on 'Land: custom as title'. <br><br>Finally, the fourth proposition, 'justice and group identity', sees recognition as justified by the requirements of justice in relation to Indigenous groups within the nation state. Chapter IV, 'Human rights and cultural relativism', evaluates the scope for group Identity within a framework of non-discrimination and the protection of individuals' human rights.<br><br>The thesis concludes by contrasting the changing ideological role of custom with the realities of recognition and by contrasting recognition by the incorporation of custom into state law with recognition by the adjustment of state law to acknowledge the separate sphere of custom.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-285
Author(s):  
Mohammed S Wattad

Article 4 of the Nation State Law (NSL), entitled ‘Languages’, stipulates that Hebrew is the language of the state (Article 4(a)); the Arabic language has a special status in the state and regulating the use of Arabic in or by state institutions will be set in law (Article 4(b)); and this clause does not harm the status given to the Arabic language before the law came into effect (Article 4(c), the ‘validity of laws’ clause). The question is whether, how, and to what extent these provisions hinder the present legal status of the Arabic language in Israel. The legal status of Arabic had never been determined decisively before enactment of the NSL. The High Court of Israel has always been divided on this matter, particularly between judges who perceived Arabic as an official language and judges who deemed it solely as having been granted its acknowledged ‘special legal status’. Furthermore, the judges who perceived Arabic as an official language of the state were also in dispute among themselves as to the meaning, the scope and the consequences of such recognition. Considering these circumstances, my view is that the NSL perpetuates the legal status of Arabic as prescribed in the laws and case law that already existed, and that the validity of laws clause, coupled with the special status granted to Arabic in a basic law, suggests that the door is still open for the Court to further endorse the legal status of Arabic in Israel.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Jamin

<p align="center"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><em>It is empirical fact in Indonesia not only has written  law which imposed by state power ( state law). Beside written law there is also unwritten law  which often called the non state law. Political of law to  uniting as one political unity and enforce the legal sentralism has disregarded the  fact of legal pluralism ( the political of ignorance). Political of law  of the Judicial Power Code  which imposed during the time does not clearly arrange the state recognation to unwritten law, even unwritten law is recognnized, but still very sumir and floating. Although  Code No. 48/2009 about Judicial Power adopt the politics of legal pluralism and recognizes the existence unwritten law, but it is still sham (weak legal pluralism), causing that in fact predominate the state law still happened and unwritten law only becoming complement to state law. Political forwards legal pluralism in   Judicial Power Code ideally is not made conditional. The   political legal  pluralism of Judicial Power Code must to adopt strong legal pluralism,  so can accommodate pluralism in society.</em></p><p><em>Key Words</em><em> : </em><em>Legal Pluralism</em><em>, </em><em>Judicial Power</em><em>, </em><em>Unwritten Law</em><em>.</em></p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-248
Author(s):  
Muhazir Muhazir

The pluralism of divorce in Aceh has had an impact on the current practice of divorce. Fatwa, Jurisprudence, and the State also color the pluralism of divorce law, each of which has a normative and sociological power base. The Aceh MPU's fatwa tends to legitimize divorce regulated in fiqh books while the State has a different view of divorce law. This paper is a doctrinal study with a legal pluralism approach. This article argues that in substance there is a significant difference between the divorce provisions in the fatwa, fiqh, and state law. Fatwa and fiqh share the same view that divorce without witnesses and taking place outside the court is still valid, as well as triple talaq, whether pronounced cumulatively or separately, is still subject to triple talaq, this provision is different from divorce law which is regulated by the state and practiced in religious courts.


Author(s):  
Mona Ali Duaij ◽  
Ahlam Ahmed Issa

All the Iraqi state institutions and civil society organizations should develop a deliberate systematic policy to eliminate terrorism contracted with all parts of the economic, social, civil and political institutions and important question how to eliminate Daash to a terrorist organization hostile and if he country to eliminate the causes of crime and punish criminals and not to justify any type of crime of any kind, because if we stayed in the curriculum of justifying legitimate crime will deepen our continued terrorism, but give it legitimacy formula must also dry up the sources of terrorism media and private channels and newspapers that have abused the Holy Prophet Muhammad (p) and all kinds of any of their source (a sheei or a Sunni or Christians or Sabians) as well as from the religious aspect is not only the media but a meeting there must be cooperation of both parts of the state facilities and most importantly limiting arms possession only state you can not eliminate terrorism and violence, and we see people carrying arms without the name of the state and remains somewhat carefree is sincerity honesty and patriotism the most important motivation for the elimination of violence and terrorism and cooperation between parts of the Iraqi people and not be driven by a regional or global international schemes want to kill nations and kill our bodies of Sunnis, sheei , Christians, Sabean and Yazidi and others.


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