scholarly journals Islam, Fatwa dan Negara: Meretas Pluralisme Hukum Perceraian di Aceh

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-248
Author(s):  
Muhazir Muhazir
Keyword(s):  
Current Practice ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
State Law ◽  
Divorce Law ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Power Base ◽  
Religious Courts

The pluralism of divorce in Aceh has had an impact on the current practice of divorce. Fatwa, Jurisprudence, and the State also color the pluralism of divorce law, each of which has a normative and sociological power base. The Aceh MPU's fatwa tends to legitimize divorce regulated in fiqh books while the State has a different view of divorce law. This paper is a doctrinal study with a legal pluralism approach. This article argues that in substance there is a significant difference between the divorce provisions in the fatwa, fiqh, and state law. Fatwa and fiqh share the same view that divorce without witnesses and taking place outside the court is still valid, as well as triple talaq, whether pronounced cumulatively or separately, is still subject to triple talaq, this provision is different from divorce law which is regulated by the state and practiced in religious courts.

Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-511
Author(s):  
Mélisande Genat
Keyword(s):  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
State Law ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Social Fields ◽  
Tribal Areas

Literature on tribes in Iraq is scant and often falls prey to simplistic binary approaches to state-society relations. Scholars of legal pluralism provide tools to conceptualize interrelations between adjacent normative fields. Several legal specialists have talked about “a thin form of cooperation” between tribal “private orders” and the Iraqi state. By the same token, many scholars presuppose that the capacity of the tribes and the state to mediate and settle feuds covary in opposite directions and are correlated with the strength of state institutions (tribes step in to fill a vacuum during times of state weakness). However, careful examination of Iraqi penal legislation and its implementation in tribal areas invalidates this stereotypical paradigm. Already in her seminal 1973 article, Sally Moore drew the attention of scholars of legal pluralism to the idea that legal orders should be approached as partially discrete, overlapping social fields. The various arenas intersect and create meaning for each other.

A Practice Theory of Legal Pluralism: Hart’s (inadvertent) defence of the indistinctiveness of law

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Croce
Keyword(s):  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Practice Theory ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
State Law ◽  
General Phenomenon ◽  
Contentious Issue ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
Legal Normativity

This article claims that H.L.A. Hart’s theory may be regarded as a sound vindication of what today is known as legal pluralism. In short, Hart’s practice theory of norms attests to the fact that state law is only one system of rules among many others, and that it does not exhibit any distinctive feature that may distinguish it from those others. I will depict this as an inadvertent but extremely valuable outcome of the practice theory. Indeed, Hart’s battle against the claimed connection between law and coercion and his firm conviction that legal normativity should be understood in light of the broader phenomenon of social normativity make his practice theory of rules a sound and fertile vindication of legal pluralism as atheoretical approachto legal phenomena. As a result, even though Hart was a legal centralist and a legal monist, his theorizing ends up dismantling the identity between thegeneral phenomenon of lawand thelaw of the state. I will proceed as follows: I will first look at the contentious issue of the relation between law and coercion by examining how two prominent legal scholars, Hans Kelsen and E. Adamson Hoebel, came to the conclusion that the distinguishing mark of law is coercion (sec. 1). This analysis will be instrumental in demonstrating that Hart failed to grasp the relevance and salience of the relation between law and coercion, and in particular, the peculiar role Kelsen and Hoebel attributed to the latter (sec. 2). I will argue that Hart’s discomfort with the emphasis on the notion of coercion was due not to the nature of this notion as such, but to the distortive effect its overemphasis had exerted on positivist legal theorizing. I will claim that Hart’s most insidious adversaries were two (at the time prominent) philosophical and jurisprudential streams, namely, behaviourism and emotivism (sec. 3). I will go on to say that Hart’s arguments against these adversaries are well addressed but inadequate, and will try to reinforce them by drawing on a Wittgensteinian view of practices (sec. 4). I will conclude by showing that the consistent outcome of a “reinforced” practice theory is a highly pluralist view of law (sec. 5).

scholarly journals State Recognition of Customary Law in the South Pacific

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Campbell McLachlan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Group Identity ◽  
South Pacific ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
Colonial Period ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
State Law ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Fresh Impetus

This thesis examines the recognition by the state of the customary law of indigenous peoples by reference to a comparative study of Commonwealth South Pacific Jurisdictions. It aims both to Illuminate the process of recognition as a contribution to the comparative theory of legal pluralism and to describe distinctive elements of the experience with recognition In the Pacific.<br><br>The Pacific case shares many of the features of the Introduction of Western law into non-Western societies generally, but the absence of complex plural legal systems during the colonial period and the contemporary vitality of traditionalism have required a reworking of the policy basis and techniques for recognition.<br><br>This task is approached from four propositions. 'The persistent fact of pluralism' envisages recognition as informed by an acknowledgement that legal pluralism exists and persists as a factual phenomenon, regardless of the extent of accommodation afforded to custom in the state legal system. The nature of this phenomenon and the options open to the state are explored in Chapter 'Legal pluralism and legal theory'. 'A legacy of colonial misconceptions' argues that the dominant paradigm for recognition is colonial and therefore requires critical re-examination. Chapter 11 'The colonial experience and the idea of customary law' discusses the status de jure of customary law in the Pacific during the colonial period and evaluates the impact of colonialism on custom and approaches to its recognition.<br><br>Independence and the reassertion of the indigenous identity of Pacific peoples has created a fresh impetus for recognition. 'The implications of a reassertion of autochthonous values' are explored in three chapters on contemporary reforms: Chapter III, 'custom as a source of underlying law' on the general incorporation of custom; Chapter V, 'Disputes: custom as process' on local-level 'customary courts'; and Chapter VI on 'Land: custom as title'. <br><br>Finally, the fourth proposition, 'justice and group identity', sees recognition as justified by the requirements of justice in relation to Indigenous groups within the nation state. Chapter IV, 'Human rights and cultural relativism', evaluates the scope for group Identity within a framework of non-discrimination and the protection of individuals' human rights.<br><br>The thesis concludes by contrasting the changing ideological role of custom with the realities of recognition and by contrasting recognition by the incorporation of custom into state law with recognition by the adjustment of state law to acknowledge the separate sphere of custom.

scholarly journals Kompetensi Peradilan Agama Menangani Perkara Cerai Gugat dalam Tinjauan Fikih Islam

Al-Mizan ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-224
Author(s):  
A. Zamakhsyari Baharuddin ◽  
Rifqi Qowiyul Iman
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
State Institution ◽  
The State ◽  
State Law ◽  
Religious Institution ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Islamic Jurisprudence ◽  
Data Source ◽  
Religious Courts

This study aims to highlight the review of Islamic jurisprudence regarding the competence of religious courts in handling judicial divorce as a reflection of the view that judges' actions to terminate the marriage relationship are unjustifiable and the only divorce institution is divorce which is husband's prerogative. The method applied is descriptive-analytic research method with the main data source is library research. The results of this study indicate that the Religious Court is not only a state institution, but also a religious institution as recorded in the Islamic literature, and a judge with the authority to pronounce divorce is actually playing the role of amar makruf nahi mungkar, therefor his authority is not only legally valid in the state law, but also has its own legitimacy regulated in Islamic jurisprudence.

scholarly journals At-Tafrîq Al-Qadhâ’i And The Religious Courts’ Authority In Deciding A Divorce

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
A. Zamakhsyari Baharuddin ◽  
Rifqi Qowiyul Iman
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
The State ◽  
State Law ◽  
Analytic Methods ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Religious Courts

AbstractOne of the reasons for the broken marriage is a talaq as a husband's prerogative right. However, in some conditions the talaq is not done by the husband even though the marriage relationship has lost its essence and has gone bad. It is called at-tafrîq al-qadhâ'i which is a way out for the husband's arbitrariness that the Judge is given the authority to terminate the marriage relationship even without the husband’s willingness. This research used a library research method. This research was normative juridical law research and it was analyzed using descriptive-analytic methods. From this research it was found that the Judiciary was authorized to break the rope of marriage through at-tafriq al-qadha’i under certain circumstances to protect the wives’ rights. The authority was not only legally valid in the state law but also had its legitimacy regulated in fiqh.Keywords: tafriq, authority, divorce, judge, the religious courtAbstrakDiantara sebab terputusnya tali pernikahan adalah dikarenakan talak yang merupakan hak prerogatif suami. Namun dalam beberapa kondisi, ternyata talak tidak kunjung dijatuhkan oleh suami meski hubungan pernikahan telah hilang kemaslahatannya bahkan membawa kepada kemudharatan. At-tafrîq al-qadhâ’i yang merupakan jalan keluar dari kesewenangan suami dimana Hakim diberi kewenangan untuk memutuskan hubungan pernikahan tersebut meski tanpa adanya kerelaan dari pihak suami. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian pustaka (library research). Sedangkan bila dilihat dari sifatnya, penelitian ini termasuk penelitian hukum yuridis normatif yang dianalisis dengan menggunakan metode deskriptif analitik. Dari penelitian ini dapat dinyatakan bahwa Peradilan berwenang untuk memutus tali pernikahan melalui at-tafriq al-qadha’i dalam keadaan tertentu dalam rangka melindungi hak-hak istri. Bahwa kewenangan tersebut selain sah secara hukum negara ia juga memiliki legitimasinya sendiri yang diatur dalam fikih.Kata kunci: tafriq, kewenangan, perceraian, hakim, pengadilan agama 

Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (2009) (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009) [ISBN 978-0-7546-2542-1] [Ubiquitous Law]. All page references in parenthesis are to this book.

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-182
Author(s):  
Seán Patrick Donlan
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
Substantial Contribution ◽  
Power Relationships ◽  
State Law ◽  
Descriptive Theory ◽  
In Parenthesis ◽  
Popular Control

A broad assortment of contemporary approaches to legal and normative complexity have challenged state law’s claim of dominance and exclusivity. In Ubiquitous law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (2009), Emmanuel Melissaris similarly seeks to ground the ‘legal’ in what he calls ‘shared normative commitments’. As with much ‘legal pluralism’, his focus on normativity rejects long-established conventional concepts of law. Indeed, for Melissaris, state law may not even properly qualify as ‘law’. But understood as a descriptive theory of normativity, the dynamic legal-normative web he outlines has much to recommend it. It is certainly superior to the continuing narrow concentration of jurisprudes on state law and law-like regimes. Less convincing is Melissaris’ prescriptive suggestion, with ‘critical legal pluralists’, that illustrating the degree to which legal-normative reform occurs beyond the state and its laws promises liberation. Shared normative commitments do not necessarily result in popular control as existing social structures and power relationships remain. We may be ensnared rather than emancipated. On the whole, however, Melissaris has made a sophisticated and substantial contribution to our understanding of legal and normative plurality. His book deserves to be widely read.

State Legal Pluralism and Religious Courts

2020 ◽  
pp. 878-900
Author(s):  
Jaclyn L. Neo
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
Single System ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Social Logic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Religious Courts ◽  
Legal Centralism

In a seminal 1986 article, John Griffiths argues that state legal pluralism, as opposed to state/nonstate legal pluralism, is “weak” legal pluralism. State legal pluralism refers to the coexistence of and interaction of distinctive legal systems which are nonetheless administered by the state; that is, the coexistence of state-state laws or official-official laws. It is juxtaposed against “strong” legal pluralism, which involves the coexistence within a social group of legal orders which do not belong to a single “system.” It has been argued that state legal pluralism is “weak” because it ultimately adheres to the basic ideology of legal centralism. This suggests that state legal pluralism is ultimately controlled by the dynamics of unification and subordination. This chapter suggests that the reality may be far more complex. While institutions such as religious courts operate within the context of state legal pluralism and could indeed be co-opted into the state system, once they are formalized as state bodies, they attain normative and institutional resources to operate according to norms that are not always and not exhaustively derived from state law. Furthermore, empirically speaking, even where conceived as functioning within a setup of legal uniformity under the state, religious courts can retain and even develop their own social logic, such that the relationship between the two forums becomes more fluid and contingent. Accordingly, there is good reason to examine and theorize state legal pluralism more deeply. This chapter uses the context of plurinational courts, involving religious and nonreligious courts, to show how institutions within state legal pluralism are able to resist the legal centralist impetus of monism, statism, and positivism. Indeed, it is argued that, contrary to what is sometimes assumed, such state religious courts can and do operate “semi-autonomously.” Lastly, having provided a (hopefully) credible defense for stronger engagement with state legal pluralism, the chapter examines two jurisdictional schemes to manage jurisdictional overlap.

scholarly journals JUDGE’S DISCRETION IN ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: INDONESIAN RELIGIOUS COURTS EXPERIENCE

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Muhamad Isna Wahyudi
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Family Law ◽  
The State ◽  
State Law ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
Muslim Countries ◽  
The Law ◽  
Religious Courts ◽  
Joint Property

Tension between Islamic legal tradition and the modern nation state’s role in establishing dan reforming law has become the global controversies and conflicts in Muslim countries over the last decades including Indonesia. Since the enactment of Law No.1/1974 on Marriage, then Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam/KHI) under President Instruction No.1/1991, dualism of the validity of marriage has been arising in Indonesian Muslim society. The dualism has led to ambivalence towards law enforcement among judges of religious courts in dealing with the petitions for the legalization of marriage while the Law restricts the petitions to marriages before the enactment of Law No.1/1974. In this case, judges of religious court have deviated from the state law by granting legalization to marriages occurred after the enactment of Law No.1/1974. Such deviation is known as judge’s discretion. Despite judges of religious courts seem to adhere to the Islamic legal tradition than the State law in the case of legalization of marriage; they have deviated from Islamic legal tradition or state law in terms of the fulfillment of divorced wife’s rights, joint property, custody, and inheritance. Their discretion is merely to provide the justice to the litigants when the application the letter of the law is contradictory to justice. In this way, they have also taken a part in reforming the Islamic FamilyLaw.Keywords: judge, discretion, justice.

scholarly journals State Recognition of Customary Law in the South Pacific

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Campbell McLachlan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Group Identity ◽  
South Pacific ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
Colonial Period ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
State Law ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Fresh Impetus

This thesis examines the recognition by the state of the customary law of indigenous peoples by reference to a comparative study of Commonwealth South Pacific Jurisdictions. It aims both to Illuminate the process of recognition as a contribution to the comparative theory of legal pluralism and to describe distinctive elements of the experience with recognition In the Pacific.<br><br>The Pacific case shares many of the features of the Introduction of Western law into non-Western societies generally, but the absence of complex plural legal systems during the colonial period and the contemporary vitality of traditionalism have required a reworking of the policy basis and techniques for recognition.<br><br>This task is approached from four propositions. 'The persistent fact of pluralism' envisages recognition as informed by an acknowledgement that legal pluralism exists and persists as a factual phenomenon, regardless of the extent of accommodation afforded to custom in the state legal system. The nature of this phenomenon and the options open to the state are explored in Chapter 'Legal pluralism and legal theory'. 'A legacy of colonial misconceptions' argues that the dominant paradigm for recognition is colonial and therefore requires critical re-examination. Chapter 11 'The colonial experience and the idea of customary law' discusses the status de jure of customary law in the Pacific during the colonial period and evaluates the impact of colonialism on custom and approaches to its recognition.<br><br>Independence and the reassertion of the indigenous identity of Pacific peoples has created a fresh impetus for recognition. 'The implications of a reassertion of autochthonous values' are explored in three chapters on contemporary reforms: Chapter III, 'custom as a source of underlying law' on the general incorporation of custom; Chapter V, 'Disputes: custom as process' on local-level 'customary courts'; and Chapter VI on 'Land: custom as title'. <br><br>Finally, the fourth proposition, 'justice and group identity', sees recognition as justified by the requirements of justice in relation to Indigenous groups within the nation state. Chapter IV, 'Human rights and cultural relativism', evaluates the scope for group Identity within a framework of non-discrimination and the protection of individuals' human rights.<br><br>The thesis concludes by contrasting the changing ideological role of custom with the realities of recognition and by contrasting recognition by the incorporation of custom into state law with recognition by the adjustment of state law to acknowledge the separate sphere of custom.

scholarly journals POLITIK PLURALISME HUKUM DALAM HUKUM UNDANG-UNDANG KEKUASAAN KEHAKIMAN : KAJIAN TERHADAP PENGAKUAN HUKUM TIDAK TERTULIS DALAM UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 48 TAHUN 2009 TENTANG KEKUASAAN KEHAKIMAN

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Jamin
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The State ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Law ◽  
Political Unity ◽  
Written Law ◽  
Power Code ◽  
Unwritten Law

<p align="center"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><em>It is empirical fact in Indonesia not only has written  law which imposed by state power ( state law). Beside written law there is also unwritten law  which often called the non state law. Political of law to  uniting as one political unity and enforce the legal sentralism has disregarded the  fact of legal pluralism ( the political of ignorance). Political of law  of the Judicial Power Code  which imposed during the time does not clearly arrange the state recognation to unwritten law, even unwritten law is recognnized, but still very sumir and floating. Although  Code No. 48/2009 about Judicial Power adopt the politics of legal pluralism and recognizes the existence unwritten law, but it is still sham (weak legal pluralism), causing that in fact predominate the state law still happened and unwritten law only becoming complement to state law. Political forwards legal pluralism in   Judicial Power Code ideally is not made conditional. The   political legal  pluralism of Judicial Power Code must to adopt strong legal pluralism,  so can accommodate pluralism in society.</em></p><p><em>Key Words</em><em> : </em><em>Legal Pluralism</em><em>, </em><em>Judicial Power</em><em>, </em><em>Unwritten Law</em><em>.</em></p>

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