Soviet Security Objectives in Asia

1970 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-478
Author(s):  
Marian P. Kirsch
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
European Security ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Center ◽  
The Status ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
Sphere Of Influence

Three momentous events of the 1960's—the war in Vietnam, the steady worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons—portend a shift in the political center of gravity from Europe to Asia in the last third of this century. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only temporarily ruffled Europe's political terrain, and, while it damaged Moscow's international prestige, it never threatened to'escalate into superpower confrontation on the continent. The United States and its North Adantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, in fact, went out of their way to avoid provoking the Soviet Union; the ritualistic tone of their denunciations of the invasion indicated that, as after Hungary in 1956, the West was resigned to Moscow's freedom of action in its Eastern European “sphere of influence”. Emboldened by the Western response, the Soviet Union reiterated with increased vigor its proposal for a European security conference to freeze the status quo in Europe.

scholarly journals Russia in Nagorno Karabagh Conflict: A Mediator or an Arms Dealer

2018 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 01-17
Author(s):  
Gasparyan Gevorg ◽  
Wang Li
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Mediation Process ◽  
South Caucasus ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Nagorno Karabagh

In the post-Soviet era, the Nagorno Karabagh conflict has been a major source of tension in the South Caucasus. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia, the United States, and France have all been involved in the mediation process between Nagorno Karabagh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan over the resolution of the conflict. Russia, given its historical ties, economic interests, political clout, and military relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, appears to be the most influential and vital moderator in this conflict. This dates back to the outbreak of violence in early 1990s. Russia has tried to help the participants in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict to maintain the status quo, and has provided a framework of dialogue for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has been the main supplier of arms to both sides, which calls into question Russia's motive and goals in its role as a mediator, and its role is subject of much controversy in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict. This paper argues that Russia's role as a mediator is primarily focused on maintaining the status quo, and ensuring the equilibrium of military capabilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in order to discourage any military escalations between the two states. We assert that despite the fact that this strategy has been successful for Russia in maintaining the status quo, a different approach, which moves beyond military balancing, is required in order to reach a long-term solution for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabagh.

scholarly journals L'adaptation à la turbulence : les Etats-Unis face aux transformations de I'OTAN, 1989-1991

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-75
Author(s):  
Philippe Le Prestre
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
European Security ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
External Variables ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Cold War

The end of the Cold War has freed Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union and Western Europe from the United States. This article explores how the Americans have attempted to adapt to these new uncertainties by redefining the threat and by seeking a new political and military identity for NATO. The individual, societal, and external variables that may explain how strategies of adaptation are chosen are then identified. The turbulence of the System, by concentrating decision-making, by giving more weight to budgetary variables, by encouraging neo-isolationist trends, and by favouring local political priorities accentuates an approach of reacting to events and preserving the status quo, an approach which leaves NATO at the mercy of German objectives in Europe without resolving the issue of European security.

The Soviet Union and Nordic Security

1971 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 137-145
Author(s):  
Johan Jörgen Holst
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
European Security ◽  
Oil Drilling ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
System Extension ◽  
Structural Instabilities ◽  
Norwegian Continental Shelf

The author distinguishes between Soviet objectives of system preservation and system extension. Soviet policies vis-à-vis the Nordic area have been conceived primarily in the context of system preservation. Thus the Soviet Union has pursued a policy of no experiments and accepts the status quo as tolerable. The preferred Soviet model is that of a neutralist and fragmented Nordic system. The Soviet naval expansion has resulted in the forward deployment of the Northern and Baltic fleets to the Greenland — Iceland — Faeroe Islands gap. There are several structural instabilities associated with a Soviet naval strategy of forward deployment. It also affects the efficacy and credibility of US reinforcements to Norway. The North European security zone is likely to remain of considerable significance to the management of the Central Balance while oil drilling on the Norwegian continental shelf introduces a new element of uncertainty. In their negotiations with the EC the Nordic states appear to be preserving the regional equilibrium and the Soviet Union has made no serious objections.

Cold War consumption and the marketing of childhood in the Soviet Union and the United States, 1950-1960

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Peacock
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Usa ◽  
History Of ◽  
Global Discourse ◽  
The Cold War

Purpose – This paper aims to explore the relationship between childhood, consumption and the Cold War in 1950s America and the Soviet Union. The author argues that Soviet and American leaders, businessmen, and politicians worked hard to convince parents that buying things for their children offered the easiest way to raise good American and Soviet kids and to do their part in waging the economic battles of the Cold War. The author explores how consumption became a Cold War battleground in the late 1950s and suggests that the history of childhood and Cold War consumption alters the way we understand the conflict itself. Design/Methodology/Approach – Archival research in the USA and the Russian Federation along with close readings of Soviet and American advertisements offer sources for understanding the global discourse of consumption in the 1950s and 1960s. Findings – Leaders, advertisers, and propagandists in the Soviet Union and the USA used the same images in the same ways to sell the ethos of consumption to their populations. They did this to sell the Cold War, to bolster the status quo, and to make profits. Originality/Value – This paper offers a previously unexplored, transnational perspective on the role that consumption and the image of the child played in shaping the Cold War both domestically and abroad.

The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-145
Author(s):  
Coleman Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Korean War ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
Political Economic

After relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke down in 1948, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) devoted a good deal of attention to Yugoslavia. Initially, however, the Truman administration was reluctant to provide extensive security assistance to the regime of Josip Broz Tito, who until 1948 had been a brutal Stalinist. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 changed the situation. The United States developed much closer political, economic, and military ties with Yugoslavia, and the CIA established a formal agreement of cooperation with the Yugoslav Ministry of State Security, especially on intelligence-sharing and covert operations. U.S. officials were particularly concerned about ensuring that Yugoslavia would be able to defend itself, if necessary, against a Soviet invasion.

Crisis

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Persian Gulf ◽  
The United States ◽  
Persian Gulf War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
Foreign Policy Strategies

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.

scholarly journals Science Diplomacy and Soviet-American Academic and Technical Exchanges

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-408
Author(s):  
Olga Krasnyak
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Science Diplomacy ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
American Academic

Summary The 1958 Lacy-Zarubin agreement on cultural, educational and scientific exchanges marked decades of people-to-people exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the Cold War tensions and mutually propagated adversarial images, the exchanges had never been interrupted and remained unbroken until the Soviet Union dissolved. This essay argues that due to the 1958 general agreement and a number of co-operative agreements that had the status of treaties and international acts issued under the authority of the US State Department and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the exchanges could not proceed without diplomatic supervision. This peculiarity puts academic and technical exchanges specifically into the framework of science diplomacy, which is considered a diplomatic tool for implementing a nation state’s foreign policy goals determined by political power.

Remarks by Herbert Scoville

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
Herbert Scoville
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
The Status ◽  
Near Future

In speaking about arms control negotiations in a multipolar world, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not really in a multipolar world right now. But perhaps we are starting toward one, at least as far as nuclear power is concerned. Britain, France, and China possess only relatively small nuclear forces at present but they will grow in time and eventually will have to be taken into consideration at least in arms control negotiations involving nuclear weapons. France and Britain at the present do have a nuclear deterrent force which would deter an attack as far as the Soviets are concerned. The status of the Chinese nuclear force is very much more uncertain. It is possible that they now possess a very limited deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union. Certainly there is no question that at the present time they do not have any means by which they can threaten, even in retaliation, a nuclear attack against the United States. As a consequence, the Chinese do not provide any direct threat to us and we can go ahead and negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union without any real consideration of Chinese participation. One need not conclude from the growing Chinese nuclear power that they must necessarily be brought into the SALT negotiations in the near future.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document