An Optimal World Portfolio on the Eve of World War I: Was There a Bias to Investing in the New World Rather Than in Europe?

2013 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 498-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Edlinger ◽  
Maxime Merli ◽  
Antoine Parent
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
New World ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Economic Rationality ◽  
World War ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Optimal World ◽  
Investment Portfolios ◽  
Paris Bourse

The geographical distributions of French and British foreign investment portfolios differ markedly before World War I. Did French portfolios favor European investments just as British portfolios favored “New World” assets? Should economic rationality have encouraged investors to invest widely in the “New World” rather than in Europe? Combining Modern Portfolio Theory and a new data set comprising assets listed on the Paris and London Stock Exchanges, we show that investing in the “New World” did not yield higher returns than investing in Europe. The “European preference” of the Paris Bourse and, by extension, of French investors was not inefficient.

Two post-war paths: Popular violence in the Bohemian lands and in Austria in the aftermath of World War I

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 759-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ota Konrád
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Political Culture ◽  
New World ◽  
Collective Identities ◽  
World War ◽  
Habsburg Monarchy ◽  
Successor State ◽  
Post War ◽  
Forms Of Violence ◽  
Wartime Experience

The study explores the phenomenon of popular violence in the first months and years after the end of World War I on the basis of a comparison between the Bohemian lands, forming the central part of the newly established Czechoslovakia, and Austria, as another successor state to the former Habsburg monarchy. Aside from the continuities, new forms of violence increasingly emerged in the first years after the end of the war, and also the “language” of violence was transformed. While in Czechoslovakia, the framework within which people were learning to understand the new world was shaped by the national and republican discourse oriented to the future, in Austria the collective identities and mentalities were being formed along the lines of particular party political blocks. In both cases, the nationalization and politicization of violence respectively contributed to the emergence of new forms of popular violence; but at the same time they could also be used for its de-escalation, necessary for the re-integration of society disrupted by the wartime experience. However, even if both countries went out from the war on different paths, the violence stayed part of their political culture and it could be mobilized again.

Quite Like Ourselves

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Archer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
Military Training ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Social Experiments ◽  
American Interest ◽  
English Speaking

In the United States, there was substantial opposition to entering World War I, and yet conscription was introduced more quickly than in any other English-speaking country. In Australia, opposition to entry was minimal, but opposition to conscription was so great that its introduction was blocked. The period before US entry into the war also saw an unusual surge of American interest in Australian social experiments—including experiments with Compulsory Industrial Arbitration and Compulsory Military Training—which reached a peak in the wake of a unique Australian referendum on conscription. This essay examines the extent of this surge of transnational interest, the reason for it, and its possible effects, before considering why the outcome of the conflict over conscription was so different in these two similar historically liberal New World societies.

Boom, Echo, and Splinter

2019 ◽  
pp. 146-168
Author(s):  
Mark Healey
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
Buenos Aires ◽  
Population Expansion ◽  
Active Citizenship ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Labor Politics ◽  
European Immigrants

Buenos Aires began the twentieth century as a prosperous port drawing European immigrants to serve a booming export economy. It expanded outward from its core of urban power and prosperity through suburbanization, early on segregating slaughterhouse zones from sites of recreation for the comfortable. Mid-century industrialization drew workers to the peripheries—which became zones of labor politics and bases for active citizenship and Peronist power. Peronist economic and political power sustained an unequally shared prosperity past World War I. Then de-industrialization in times of population expansion accompanied by military dictatorship (1976-1983) and a new suburbanization to protect the wealthy brought the polarizing mix wealth and marginality, formality and informality faced earlier in other New World cities. Re-democratization failed to bring more shared prosperity—or an escape from repeated cycles of promise and crisis.

WORLD WAR I AND THE PARADOX OF WILSONIANISM

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Lloyd E. Ambrosius
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
New World Order ◽  
World War ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
The World ◽  
The Individual

One hundred years ago, on April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the First World War. Four days earlier, in his war message to Congress, he gave his rationale for declaring war against Imperial Germany and for creating a new world order. He now viewed German submarine attacks against neutral as well as belligerent shipping as a threat to the whole world, not just the United States. “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind,” he claimed. “It is a war against all nations.” He now believed that Germany had violated the moral standards that “citizens of civilized states” should uphold. The president explained: “We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.” He focused on protecting democracy against the German regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II. “A steadfast concert for peace,” he said, “can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” Wilson called on Congress to vote for war not just because Imperial Germany had sunk three American ships, but for the larger purpose of a new world order. He affirmed: “We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundation of political liberty.”

6. War, politics, and ideas

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Pick
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
New World ◽  
World Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
New World Order ◽  
World War ◽  
Anti Semitism ◽  
Nuclear Exchange

‘War, politics, and ideas’ outlines Freud’s later ideas and refers to the political circumstances prevailing between 1914 and 1945. Early analysts endured the rise of anti-Semitism in Vienna, shrill nationalism and militarism, and the devastation of World War I. This was followed by a terrible flu epidemic, years of economic crisis, the rise of fascism, the breakdown of peace, Hitler’s seizure of power, and ever-intensifying racial persecution. A new world order emerged after 1945, swiftly shadowed by the prospect of an all-annihilating nuclear exchange. Psychoanalysis was profoundly affected by the century in which it developed, and in turn provided a language that many people thought useful to think about politics and society in the ‘age of extremes’.

Mortgages for machinery: credit and industrial investment in pre-World War I Brazil

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo S. Cortes ◽  
Renato L. Marcondes ◽  
Maria Dolores M. Diaz
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
World War ◽  
Mortgage Loans ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
Mortgage Credit ◽  
The City ◽  
Industrial Investment

How could a primitive credit market finance the early industrialisation of an underdeveloped economy? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of mortgage loans raised by industrial firms in the city of São Paulo during the period 1866-1914. These mortgages were debt obligations collateralised by land, improvements, machinery and equipment. We argue that the mortgage credit market was a key source of funding for early industrial investments in Brazil. We find that industries were mainly funded by non-banking and domestic agents. The empirical evidence suggests that mortgages were an important proxy for industrial investment.

Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars

2009 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Lyall ◽  
Isaiah Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
World War I ◽  
Paired Comparison ◽  
External Support ◽  
Information Collection ◽  
Rough Terrain ◽  
Partial Support ◽  
World War ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Rewards And Punishment

AbstractDuring the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800–2005) and a paired comparison of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq (2003–2004). We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.

scholarly journals Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913

2009 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dincecco
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Structural Break ◽  
World War ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
Political Transformations ◽  
Panel Regressions ◽  
Structural Break Tests ◽  
Public Revenues

Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Richard H. Immerman ◽  
Jeffrey A. Engel
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
World Order ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
New World Order ◽  
World War ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
Global Problems ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
War Aims

This section introduces readers to Woodrow Wilson and the magnitude of the global problems he faced as World War I raged—eventually with formal American participation—with no clear end in sight. More than a statement of war aims, Wilson’s Fourteen Points were a full-throated call for a new world order, one capable of surmounting the inherent problems that had plagued society and international affairs for generations. So profound were Wilson’s words and so great his legacy that historians no longer ask whether subsequent presidents were or were not Wilsonian in their foreign policies and worldviews. We ask how Wilsonian were they? The introduction also previews the fourteen solutions humbly offered in Wilson’s honor for our own times.

The Barco Concession in Colombian-American Relations, 1926-1932

1976 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Randall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
World War I ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
State Department ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Hoover Administration ◽  
Nationalist Sentiment

The debate over the granting of petroleum concessions to foreign enterprise was one of the most significant areas of contact between the United States and Colombia after World War I. The official United States response to the plight of American interests involved in the development of the Barco concession exemplifies the nature of United States Latin American policy in the transition from the Coolidge to the Hoover administration. State Department actions in the Barco instance underline the growing awareness in American circles of the need to fashion a policy which would protect American enterprise as well as the principle of foreign investment against nationalist sentiment in Latin America.

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