Do Short Sellers Trade on Private Information or False Information?

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 997-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amiyatosh Purnanandam ◽  
H. Nejat Seyhun

We investigate whether short sellers contribute toward the informational efficiency of market prices by trading on their private information or destabilize market prices by trading on rumors and false information. We find that short-selling activities are considerably informative about future stock returns when there is a higher likelihood of private information in stocks, as measured by insider-trading activities. Short sellers also bring considerable additional information to the market that is not fully captured by contemporaneous insider trading. Overall, these results suggest that on average, short sellers bring informational efficiency to market prices rather than destabilize them.

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 511-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina S. Chi ◽  
Morton Pincus ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh

ABSTRACT We find evidence that investors misprice information contained in book-tax differences (BTDs), measured as the ratio of taxable income to book income, TI/BI. Low TI/BI predicts worse earnings growth and abnormal stock returns than high TI/BI. We find that short sellers and insiders arbitrage BTD mispricing, but the arbitrage is imperfect because of constraints on short selling and insider trading. Under SFAS No. 109 the predictability is stronger for TEMP/BI, the temporary component of TI/BI, which reflects greater managerial discretion. The results are incremental to a large set of known accruals-based anomaly predictors. We suggest that a sunshine policy of disclosing a reconciliation of book and taxable incomes can reduce mispricing of BTDs and improve capital market resource allocation. Data Availability: Data are obtained from the public sources as indicated in the text.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence Hendershott ◽  
Roman Kozhan ◽  
Vikas Raman

We show short selling in corporate bonds forecasts future bond returns. Short selling predicts bond returns where private information is more likely, in high-yield bonds, particularly after Lehman Brothers’ collapse of 2008. Short selling predicts returns following both high and low past bond returns. This, together with short selling increasing following past buying order imbalances, suggests short sellers trade against price pressures as well as trade on information. Short selling predicts bond returns both in the individual bonds that are shorted and in other bonds by the same issuer. Past stock returns and short selling in stocks predict bond returns but do not eliminate bond short selling predicting bond returns. Bond short selling does not predict the issuer’s stock returns. These results show bond short sellers contribute to efficient bond prices and that short sellers’ information flows from stocks to bonds but not from bonds to stocks.


2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taehoon Lee ◽  
Sang-gyung Jun

We investigate the impact of insider trading in after-hours block market on stock price and short sales volume, before and after the trading becomes public information. During pre-announcement period, positive (negative) abnormal stock return is generated when insiders buy (sell) their shares but does not when quasi-insiders trade, implying that stock price reflects long-lived private information of corporate governance structure. The impact is most prominent when ownership shares are transferred to (from) corporate insiders. In contrast, short sales volume generally does not depend on the identity of block holders. Short sales volume has a negative correlation with abnormal stock return only during the transaction date, indicating that a short-sale decision of tippees is based on their sole expectation on instantaneous stock returns. We also find evidence that insiders select the timing of their trades with respect to maximizing their realized profits or minimizing their purchasing costs. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 1250-1270
Author(s):  
Han Ching Huang ◽  
Pei-Shan Tung

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the underlying option impacts an insider’s propensity to purchase and sell before corporate announcements, the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements, and the insider’s profitability around corporate announcements. Design/methodology/approach The authors test whether the timing information and option have impacted on the tendency of insider trade, the percentage of all shares traded by insiders in the post-announcement to pre-announcement periods and the average cumulative abnormal stock returns during the pre-announcement period. Findings Insiders’ propensity to trade before announcements is higher for stocks without options listed than for stocks with traded options. This result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. The proportion of insiders’ trade volume after announcements relative to before announcements in stocks that have not options listed is higher than those in stocks with traded options. The positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of corporate announcements is stronger in stocks without traded options than in stocks with options listed. Insider trades prior to unscheduled announcement are more profitable than those before scheduled ones. Research limitations/implications The paper examines whether there is a difference between the effects of optioned stock and non-optioned stock. Roll et al. (2010) use the relative trading volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) to proxy for informed options trading activity. Future research could explore the impact of O/S. Moreover, the authors examine how insiders with private information use such information to trade in their own firms. Mehta et al. (2017) argue that insiders also use private information to facilitate trading (shadow trading) in linked firms, such as supply chain partners or competitors. Therefore, future research could consider the impact of shadow trading. Social implications Since the insider’s propensity to buy before announcements in stocks without options listed is larger than in stocks with traded options and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones, the efforts of regulators should focus on monitoring insider trading in stocks without options listed prior to unscheduled announcements. Originality/value First, Lei and Wang (2014) find that the increasing pattern of insider’s propensity to trade before unscheduled announcements is larger than that before scheduled announcements. The authors document the underlying option has impacted the insider’s propensity to purchase and sell, and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. Second, related studies show insider’s trading activity has shifted from periods before corporate announcements to periods after corporate announcements to decrease litigation risk. This paper find the underlying option has influenced the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements when the illegal insider trade-related penalties increase.


Author(s):  
Dagmar Linnertová ◽  
Oleg Deev

The aim of this paper is to investigate the causality between stock returns and insider open market transactions. The Dumitrescu-Hurlin (2012) heterogeneous approach to panel Granger causality is chosen to examine the relationship. The investigation is conducted on the 30 most traded German blue chips during the period of 2006–2014. The strong causality is revealed in the one-month period. Thus, stock returns may be used to predict future insider trading activity. The strong causality between stock returns and future insider buying and selling transactions is further confirmed with three out of four employed insider trading indices. The fact of the legal insider trade (either buy or sell) is more important than its volume. The reverse relationship is weak and valid only for longer time horizon of twelve months. Our results indicate that insider traders do not degrade the market efficiency in the long run.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 354-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Gao ◽  
Qingzhong Ma ◽  
David Ng

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether corporate insiders extract information from activity of outsiders, specifically the short sellers. Design/methodology/approach Using portfolio approach and Fama-MacBeth regressions, this study examines the relation between short interest and subsequent insider trading activities. Findings The following results are reported. First, there is a strong inverse relation between short selling and subsequent insider trading, which is partially due to common private information and same target firm characteristics. Second, insiders extract information from shorts. This information extraction effect is more pronounced for firms whose insiders have stronger incentives to extract shorts information (insider purchases, higher short sale constraints, and better information environments). Third, during the September 2008 shorting ban, the information extraction affect disappeared among the large banned firms, whose shorting activities were distorted. Research limitations/implications The findings contradict the of-cited accusations corporate executives hold against short sellers. Instead, corporate insiders appear to trade in the same direction as suggested by shorting activities. Practical implications Among the vocal critics of short sellers are corporate insiders, who allege that short sellers beat down their stock prices. Many corporations even engage in stock repurchases to show confidence that the stock will perform well going forward despite the short sellers’ actions. This paper’s analysis on their personal portfolios suggests the other way around. Originality/value By focusing on how corporate insider trading is related to shorts information, this paper sheds new light on whether corporate decisions convey the true information the corporate insiders possess.


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 649-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Ryan ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker ◽  
Ying Zhou

ABSTRACT Securitizations are complex and opaque transactions. We hypothesize that bank insiders trade on private information about banks': (1) securitization-related recourse risks, (2) not-yet-reported current-quarter securitization income, and (3) securitization-based business model sustainability. We provide evidence that proxies for each of these types of insider information are positively associated with insider trading. Specifically, we find that net insider sales in the 2001Q2–2007Q2 pre-financial crisis quarters predict not-yet-reported non-performing securitized loans and securitization income for those quarters, and that net insider sales during 2006Q4 predict write-downs of securitization-related assets during the 2007Q3–2008Q4 crisis period. We find that net insider sales are more negatively associated with banks' subsequent stock returns in their securitization quarters than in other quarters. In supplemental analysis, we show that the above findings are driven by trades by banks' CEOs and CFOs, and that insiders avoid larger stock price losses through 10b5-1 plan sales than through non-plan sales. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document