Securitization and Insider Trading

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 649-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Ryan ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker ◽  
Ying Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Business Model ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Insider Information ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Crisis Period

ABSTRACT Securitizations are complex and opaque transactions. We hypothesize that bank insiders trade on private information about banks': (1) securitization-related recourse risks, (2) not-yet-reported current-quarter securitization income, and (3) securitization-based business model sustainability. We provide evidence that proxies for each of these types of insider information are positively associated with insider trading. Specifically, we find that net insider sales in the 2001Q2–2007Q2 pre-financial crisis quarters predict not-yet-reported non-performing securitized loans and securitization income for those quarters, and that net insider sales during 2006Q4 predict write-downs of securitization-related assets during the 2007Q3–2008Q4 crisis period. We find that net insider sales are more negatively associated with banks' subsequent stock returns in their securitization quarters than in other quarters. In supplemental analysis, we show that the above findings are driven by trades by banks' CEOs and CFOs, and that insiders avoid larger stock price losses through 10b5-1 plan sales than through non-plan sales. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.

scholarly journals After-Hours Block Trading, Short Sales, And Information Leakage: Evidence From Korea

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taehoon Lee ◽  
Sang-gyung Jun
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Sales Volume ◽  
Short Sales ◽  
After Hours ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the impact of insider trading in after-hours block market on stock price and short sales volume, before and after the trading becomes public information. During pre-announcement period, positive (negative) abnormal stock return is generated when insiders buy (sell) their shares but does not when quasi-insiders trade, implying that stock price reflects long-lived private information of corporate governance structure. The impact is most prominent when ownership shares are transferred to (from) corporate insiders. In contrast, short sales volume generally does not depend on the identity of block holders. Short sales volume has a negative correlation with abnormal stock return only during the transaction date, indicating that a short-sale decision of tippees is based on their sole expectation on instantaneous stock returns. We also find evidence that insiders select the timing of their trades with respect to maximizing their realized profits or minimizing their purchasing costs. 

Analysts' Information Acquisition and Stock Price Synchronicity: A Regulatory Perspective from China

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Jiang ◽  
Donghua Zhou ◽  
Joseph H. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
Private Information Acquisition

SYNOPSIS Against the backdrop of the Chinese Directive 40 (China's Reg FD) issued in 2007 as an attempt to curb insider trading and to level the information playing field, this study investigates whether analysts' private information acquisition influences the extent to which firm-specific information is impounded into stock prices, i.e., stock price synchronicity, and how the restrictions on selective disclosures imposed by Directive 40 have shaped the relationship between analyst information acquisition and synchronicity. Using a pre-Directive 40 sample, we show that synchronicity is negatively related to analysts' private information acquisition, which provides support for the “information advantage” argument of analysts' information production. However, the ability of analysts' private information acquisition in improving firm-specific information incorporated into stock price is mitigated post-Directive 40 due to a restriction on selective disclosures and/or private communication. Moreover, we find that this regulatory impact varies for firms being followed by affiliated analysts versus non-affiliated analysts. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; G17; G18.

Do Managers Disclose or Withhold Bad News? Evidence from Short Interest

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
G. Mujtaba Mian ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
General Tendency ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Conflicting Evidence ◽  
Short Interest

ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. We tackle this challenge by constructing a proxy for managers' private bad news (residual short interest) and then perform a series of tests to validate this proxy. Using management earnings guidance and 8-K filings as measures of voluntary disclosure, we find a negative relation between bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency is tempered when firms are exposed to higher litigation risk, and it is strengthened when managers have greater incentives to support the stock price. Based on a novel approach to identifying the presence of bad news, our study adds to the debate on whether managers tend to withhold or release bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

scholarly journals Mispricing of Book-Tax Differences and the Trading Behavior of Short Sellers and Insiders

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 511-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina S. Chi ◽  
Morton Pincus ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Large Set ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Earnings Growth ◽  
The Public ◽  
Short Sellers ◽  
Abnormal Stock Returns

ABSTRACT We find evidence that investors misprice information contained in book-tax differences (BTDs), measured as the ratio of taxable income to book income, TI/BI. Low TI/BI predicts worse earnings growth and abnormal stock returns than high TI/BI. We find that short sellers and insiders arbitrage BTD mispricing, but the arbitrage is imperfect because of constraints on short selling and insider trading. Under SFAS No. 109 the predictability is stronger for TEMP/BI, the temporary component of TI/BI, which reflects greater managerial discretion. The results are incremental to a large set of known accruals-based anomaly predictors. We suggest that a sunshine policy of disclosing a reconciliation of book and taxable incomes can reduce mispricing of BTDs and improve capital market resource allocation. Data Availability: Data are obtained from the public sources as indicated in the text.

The effects of liquidity trading on insider trade timing when an underlying option is present

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 1250-1270
Author(s):  
Han Ching Huang ◽  
Pei-Shan Tung
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Trading Volume ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Trading Activity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Announcements ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the underlying option impacts an insider’s propensity to purchase and sell before corporate announcements, the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements, and the insider’s profitability around corporate announcements. Design/methodology/approach The authors test whether the timing information and option have impacted on the tendency of insider trade, the percentage of all shares traded by insiders in the post-announcement to pre-announcement periods and the average cumulative abnormal stock returns during the pre-announcement period. Findings Insiders’ propensity to trade before announcements is higher for stocks without options listed than for stocks with traded options. This result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. The proportion of insiders’ trade volume after announcements relative to before announcements in stocks that have not options listed is higher than those in stocks with traded options. The positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of corporate announcements is stronger in stocks without traded options than in stocks with options listed. Insider trades prior to unscheduled announcement are more profitable than those before scheduled ones. Research limitations/implications The paper examines whether there is a difference between the effects of optioned stock and non-optioned stock. Roll et al. (2010) use the relative trading volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) to proxy for informed options trading activity. Future research could explore the impact of O/S. Moreover, the authors examine how insiders with private information use such information to trade in their own firms. Mehta et al. (2017) argue that insiders also use private information to facilitate trading (shadow trading) in linked firms, such as supply chain partners or competitors. Therefore, future research could consider the impact of shadow trading. Social implications Since the insider’s propensity to buy before announcements in stocks without options listed is larger than in stocks with traded options and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones, the efforts of regulators should focus on monitoring insider trading in stocks without options listed prior to unscheduled announcements. Originality/value First, Lei and Wang (2014) find that the increasing pattern of insider’s propensity to trade before unscheduled announcements is larger than that before scheduled announcements. The authors document the underlying option has impacted the insider’s propensity to purchase and sell, and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. Second, related studies show insider’s trading activity has shifted from periods before corporate announcements to periods after corporate announcements to decrease litigation risk. This paper find the underlying option has influenced the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements when the illegal insider trade-related penalties increase.

Downside Risk Analysis of Returns Financial Institutions of Pakistan

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Rashid ◽  
Aniqa Mehmood
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Significant Risk ◽  
Capital Budgeting ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Rate Of Returns ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This study empirically tested the standard CAPM and DR-CAPM to examine the cross-sectional variation in stock returns of financial institutions listed at PSE over the period 2002-2016. The analysis is also performed for three sub-periods: pre-financial crisis period (2002-2005), during- financial crisis period (2006-2009), and post-financial crisis period (2010-2016). The empirical analysis is carried out following the two-pass regression analysis of Fama & Macbeth (1973). The results of the study suggest that the standard CAPM is not suitable for calculating the risk and required rate of returns for Pakistani financial institutions. To examine the validity of DR- CAPM, we estimate the downside beta developed by Bawa and Linderberg (1977), Fishburn (1977), Harlow and Row (1989), and Estrada (2002). Out of these models, the DR-CAPM of Fishburn (1977) appeared to be more appropriate for calculating required rate of returns. The DR-CAPM of Harlow and Row (1989) also provides evidence of a positive and statistically significant risk-return relationship in most of the examined sub-periods. However, the results for Estrada (2002) are inconclusive at best, suggesting that the downside beta of Estrada (2002) is an inefficient measure of risk. The results help investors in identifying an appropriate and suitable measure of risk for financial institutions of Pakistan, which, in turn, enables the investors to design an efficient and well-diversified portfolio. The results are also of great significance to managers of financial institutions as they help them in making capital budgeting decisions and calculating the cost of equities.

scholarly journals Informative content of insider purchases: evidence from the financial crisis

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aydin Ozkan ◽  
Agnieszka Trzeciakiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of insider trading on subsequent stock returns in the UK, with a specific focus on the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the relation between CEO and CFO stock purchases and returns. Design/methodology/approach – The empirical analysis uses 10,230 purchases executed in 679 UK firms by 1,477 directors during the period from 2000 to 2010. Subsequent market-adjusted stock returns are regressed on a set of firm-specific accounting, market and corporate governance variables as well as the characteristics of CEOs and CFOs. Additionally, the analysis distinguishes between the opportunistic and routine trades. Findings – The findings reveal that the position of the trading director and the nature of their trades are important in determining the impact on returns of insider trades. In particular, CEO purchases are on the whole more informative than CFO purchases and opportunistic purchases. The trades in the post-crisis period have a greater impact on subsequent stock returns. Research limitations/implications – The empirical analysis is limited to the trades made by two executives. Future research should consider inside trades by all directors and distinguish between executive and non-executive directors. Also, a behavioral measure should be developed to test if the financial crisis affected the trading behavior of directors and whether directors use insider trading strategically to signal information to the market. Practical implications – The impact of directors’ dealings on stock returns is not homogeneous. Financial analysts and investors should pay more attention to different types of trades and the identity of trading director. Originality/value – This paper, to the authors’ knowledge, provides the first attempt that combines in the same framework the identity and personal attributes of trading executive directors, firm-level corporate governance features, the nature of purchase transactions and the trading period characteristics. Furthermore the empirical analysis is carried out during a period that also covers the recent global financial crisis period and its immediate aftermath.

scholarly journals Anticipating the financial crisis: evidence from insider trading in banks

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (102) ◽  
pp. 213-267
Author(s):  
Ozlem Akin ◽  
José M Marín ◽  
and José-Luis Peydró
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Real Estate ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Standard Deviation Increase ◽  
The Real Estate ◽  
Real Estate Bubble ◽  
Real Estate Prices

Abstract Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioural reasons (over-optimistic banks neglecting risks) and to conflicts of interest between bank shareholders/managers and debtholders/taxpayers (banks exploiting moral hazard). We test whether US banks’ stock returns in the 2007–8 financial crisis are associated with bank insiders’ sales of their own bank’s shares in the period prior to 2006Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives’ sales of shares predict bank performance during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant for the sales of independent directors and other officers. Moreover, the top-five executives’ impact is stronger for banks with higher exposure to the real estate bubble, where a one standard deviation increase of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. Finally, even though bankers in riskier banks sold more shares (furthering their own interests), they did not change their bank’s policies, for example, by reducing bank-level exposure to real estate. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders knew that their banks were taking excessive risks, which has important implications for theory, public policy and the understanding of crises, as well as a supervisory tool for early warning signals.

scholarly journals Evaluating the Effectiveness of Asset Pricing Model before, during and after Financial Crisis 2008: Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Waqar Ul Hassan ◽  
Zeeshan Hasnain ◽  
Shahbaz Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Pearson Correlation ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Random Effect Model ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Effect Model

The Study aims to explore the strength of arbitrage pricing model (APT) for determining stock returns of Karachi stock exchange (KSE) across three distinct and structured periods; before financial crisis period (2006-07), during financial crisis period (2008) and after financial crisis period (2009-10). The Study adopted descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, linear regression, Random effect model for interpretation and execution of data. 253 financial and non-financial listed companies on KSE for the period of (2006-10) are considered as sample firms. Results of regression analysis indicated that models selected for the present study showed poor performance for measuring KSE returns. Independent variables showed significant behavior for measuring KSE returns in pre-financial crisis period; no statistical relationship for measuring KSE returns in during financial crisis period; insignificant nature for measuring KSE returns the post-financial crisis period. The Study has provided understandings about arbitrage theory applicability and financial crisis - 2008 impacts on KSE. 

scholarly journals An empirical examination of the determinant of the US financial CEOs’ compensation for the post-financial crisis period

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-258
Author(s):  
Eunsup Daniel Shim ◽  
Jooh Lee
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The United States ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
The Us ◽  
Financial Crisis Of 2008

The US financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent Global Financial Crisis were considered by many economists the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a results, Dodd-Frank Act has passed and aims “(1) to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", (2) to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, (3) to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” The enactment of Dodd-Frank Act, in part, intended to significantly influence accountability on executive compensation especially for the financial institutions. This paper empirically investigates the changes in Financial CEOs’ compensation since the Financial Crisis of 2008. Our findings show that in the post- Financial Crisis period financial leverage is significant factor influencing the CEOs’ total compensation. In addition market based performance such as stock price and market-to-book ratio shows significant positive relationship with CEO compensation. This change can be interpreted an attempt to reduce opportunistic behavior of top executives after the financial crisis and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act

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