African Literary Comment on Dictators: Wole Soyinka's Plays and Nuruddin Farah's Novels

1988 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-177
Author(s):  
Josef Gugler

African intellectuals grapple with political problems well before social scientists are prepared to address them. The abuse of political power constitutes one such problem: a number of African countries have suffered under dictatorships over the last 25 years, but scholars have had very little to say about their experiences to this day.1 Wole Soyinka, however, the foremost African playwright, presented a satire on the régime of Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana, 1957–66) in its later years in Kongi's Harvest (London, Ibadan, and Nairobi, 1967), a play performed already in 1965. And Camara Laye indicted the régime of Sékou Touré (Guinea, 1958–84) in his novel Dramouss (Paris, 1966)

Author(s):  
Martin Odei Ajei

This chapter discusses the contributions of Kwame Nkrumah, Kwasi Wiredu, William. E. Abraham, and Kwame Gyekye to the corpus of African philosophy. It elaborates their normative perspectives on three themes: the relevance of tradition to modernity, the appropriate form of democracy as means of legitimating political power in Africa, and the relative status of person and community; it also reflects on the significance of these themes in postcolonial African social and political philosophical discourse. The chapter then points out points of convergence and divergence among these individuals and how they relate with Western philosophical perspectives and argues that their work configures a coherent discourse that justifies joining them in a tradition of Ghanaian political philosophy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-25
Author(s):  
Natalia Telepneva

On 24 February 1966, Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a coup d’état. The coup rekindled a debate within the Soviet bloc about the prospects of socialism in Africa and about the appropriateness of certain policies. Soviet officials concluded that they would have to focus on establishing close relations with the armies and internal security forces of African countries. This article explores how Nkrumah's loyalists in exile and their sympathizers in Ghana attempted to launch a leftwing counter-coup in Accra in 1968 and the involvement of Warsaw Pact countries—notably the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—in those events. The article sheds new light on “Operation ALEX,” a botched attempt by the Czechoslovak intelligence service to support Nkrumah loyalists in their plans for a countercoup. The article reexamines the late 1960s as an important period for the militarization of the Cold War in Africa and highlights the crucial role that African politicians themselves played in this process.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184
Author(s):  
Neera Chandhoke ◽  
Ayi Kwei Armah

African countries seem to be constantly groping for the distinctive political paradigm as evinced by the fact that forms of political order have followed each other in rapid succession—the multi-party state, the one party syndrome, the charismatic presidency, the military coup d'etat and in some cases, like that of Nigeria and for a short while in Ghana, a return to civilian rule. The future of the African continent is thus viewed with deep rooted pessimism by political analysts, economists and literary writers. They prophesy in symphony that African countries are catapaulting down the path of political unrest—economic disorder, suspension of human rights, a breakdown of law and order—towards instability and general anomie. In the words of the noted author Chinuah Achebe, in Africa “things fall apart.”1 Dennis Austen using the title of this book for his article, writes that since their inception African states have been in a state of flux moving with regularity in and out of misfortune: The treachery of political life has been very real: armed coups, civil wars, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their public life (as in Tanzania).2 The keynote of the criticisms made in this vein3 is the absence of stability and the consequent destabilization, disorganization and anarchy. However, all evidence in the African countries points to the centralization of power and authority which can lead to a kind of stability—i.e. if stability is the only end of government and politics. The post-colonial state in Africa has created strong centralized administrations to weld the various social groups in common structures. The striking feature of post-independence politics to Markovitz, is not the lack of stability, but “indeed from any long range historical perspective the rapidity with which stability has been achieved…. The military coup d'etats and civil wars, appearence of anarchy notwithstanding, have furthered this process of consolidation.”4 The modern African state is one which is increasingly dominated by a powerful public sector, an overpowering bureaucracy and increasing militarization.5 The highly centralized nature of the African state is almost a throwback to the early colonial state. The colonial state was based on patterns of domination, its very raison d'etre was domination. The colonial institutional form consequently was aimed at establishing hegemony over the subject population, together with its essential militarised character and the system of irresistable power and force associated with it. In the Belgian case, the state was known as “Bula Matari” (the crusher of rocks).6 The pre-independence state forms have persisted. The observations of De Tocqueville are brought to mind. To De Tocqueville the 1789 Revolution did not bring an end to the ideas and order of the old regime in France. Springing from the chaos created by the revolution was a powerful institutional framework. Never since the fall of the Roman Empire, he commented, had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution, or, rather grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet paradoxically they were infinitely more powerful.7 In Africa the heritage of colonial politics, namely power-politics, has been taken up by the post-colonial state. The colonial tradition has led to a scheme of affairs in African states where a premium has been placed on the holding and consolidation of political power. Politics has been construed strictly as a “struggle for rulership.”8 Political power is seen as a means of controlling the socio-economic structures of society. What becomes important in this context is the identification of the group that wields power. What is the nature and social basis of this ruling elite? As a pre-requisite to this, is the question as to what is the nature of class in Africa, so that the nature of class domination can be comprehended,


2010 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Krupa

Recent ethnographic work on the state has exposed a crack in one of the founding myths of modern political power. Despite the state's transcendental claim to wielding absolute, exclusive authority within national territory, scholars have shown that in much of the world there are, in fact, “too many actors competing to perform as state,” sites where various power blocs “are acting as the state and producing the same powerful effects” (Aretxaga 2003: 396, 398) Achille Mbembe (2001: 74), writing of the external fiscal controls imposed upon African countries during the late 1980s, has termed this a condition of “fractionated sovereignty”—the dispersal of official state functions among various non-state actors. There is, as Mbembe suggests, “nothing particularly African” about this situation (ibid.). Around the world, the power of various “shadow” organizations like arms dealers and paramilitary groups seems increasingly to depend upon their ability to out-perform the state in many of its definitive functions, from the provision of security and welfare to the collection of taxes and administration of justice (Nugent 1999; Nordstrom 2004; Hansen 2005). These observations present a serious challenge to conventional state theory. They force us to consider whether such conditions of fragmented, competitive statecraft might be better understood not as deviant exceptions to otherwise centralized political systems but, rather, as the way that government is actually experienced in much of the world today.


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 46-49
Author(s):  
Ann Seidman

Crystal ball gazing is hardly the province of social scientists. The best one can do, in attempting to assess the prospects for real economic growth by the year 2000, is to examine the contradictory trends and struggles shaping the political economy of Africa and the world today, and suggest potential alternative outcomes. Even the possibilities are obscure.What is clear is that, despite over ten years of independence for over 40 African countries, the majority of African peoples still confront the overriding problem of poverty. Living on a continent endowed with extensive mineral agricultural resources, they still suffer from among the lowest per capita incomes and the highest mortality rates in the world.


2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-191
Author(s):  
Victor Alumona

AbstractPost colonial African countries, like Nigeria, have been contending, in one form or another, with the problems of nation building. One of these problems in the post independent era is that of forging one nation from a plethora of peoples and cultures brought together under one flag by the erstwhile colonialists. The author argues that even though the various Nigerian political elite usually give the impression that National unity is a sine qua non for the existence of Nigeria as a state and a country, and that every one who must be considered a patriot must be seen to be rooting for it, the real thing, however, is that they emphasize national unity as a leverage for political power. In other words, they see in Unity of the country a topic for generating arguments to support their drive for political power, or to justify their retention of it in spite of the means used to achieve these ends.A careful consideration of the policies of these elite while in government show that they use Unity of Nigeria expediently like the rhetoricians of ancient Greece would do, not out of principles but to serve a contingent purpose. The unity of Nigeria became a source of arguments for power ever before independence because the Northern region feared domination by the Southern region given its many advantages.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-251
Author(s):  
Kerry L. Haynie

AbstractThe emergence of an African American and Latino-dominated coalition with the potential to reconfigure American government and politics at the national, state, and local levels is one of the most noteworthy developments in U.S. politics over the past two decades. Racialized mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement are impediments to this coalition’s political power. Social scientists, legal scholars, and activists have long paid attention to how devices like poll taxes, English competency tests, voter intimidation, racial gerrymandering, and voter identification laws restrict participation and diluted the political influence of racial and ethnic minorities. This essay seeks to direct renewed scholarly attention to racialized mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement as similar devices for suppressing and containing minority group political power.


2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seifudein Adem

In the 1990s Japan changed its prime ministers nine times just in a span of nine years, an extraordinarily high turnover by any standard, and — above all — by Japan’s own. But all the transitions took a characteristically peaceful form. Although fewer changes took place in individual African countries in the same period, the process was invariably less than peaceful and often bloody. Simple observations such as these automatically call to mind a number of questions which, it should be admitted, are easier to ask than to answer. As an African who has studied and lived in Japan for a while, the specific questions I was confronted with included the following. Why does violence mar political change in Africa, but not in Japan? What are the lessons that Africa could draw from Japan’s experience? Formidable questions indeed. Social scientists generally explain change in terms of the nature and the state of political structures and institutions in a given society. In a sense intended neither to dismiss nor belittle the usefulness of this approach, I wish to address the above questions in the eye of a non-specialist primarily from a cultural perspective in order to (a) highlight the less obvious but significant forces which seem to be also at work in Japan, and (b) suggest the lessons Africa could extract from the experience.


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