Intuition in Christian Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
1949 ◽  
Vol 24 (89) ◽  
pp. 118-132
Author(s):  
G. C. Stead

The object of this paper is to examine the concept of intuition and to determine what part, if any, it should play in Christian philosophy. It is a complex inquiry, and I shall have to save space by a certain economy of purely historical detail, and also, if you will allow me, by by-passing the vexed question of Revelation and Natural Theology. It seems to me that whatever the issue of this debate may prove to be, it will not prevent philosophers from plying their trade; and whether they, or some of them, are to be dignified with the title of Natural Theologians is a problem they can leave to others. The only remaining question is, whether it is lawful for a Christian minister to engage in philosophy. As philosophy is not an openly scandalous pursuit, and there is no canon against it, I take the answer to be “Yes.” I would have you regard this paper as an essay in philosophy and allow me to investigate certain aspects of human knowledge, and the light they throw on man's knowledge of God, without presupposing a self-revelation of God to man. Without presupposing, but also without excluding it; revelation cannot be a primary datum for the philosopher, but it may well turn out to be his only ultimately satisfactory conclusion.Adopting this standpoint, we shall inevitably be traversing that current of thought which reached England about fifty years ago and which, with its eddies and counter-currents, is still a moving force: I mean the insistence on religious experience, and more particularly the analysis of religious experience by the methods of psychology. In practice this method tended to concentrate on the experiences of the individual, and to disregard the far richer store of experience which lay crystallized in historic documents and liturgies—except in so far as these acted as a stimulus to individual piety.

Pro Ecclesia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 106385122110172
Author(s):  
Steven J. Duby

In this article, I respond to each of the three authors who have engaged my book God in Himself. Regarding Gray Sutanto’s response, I offer comments on his effort to integrate Schleiermacher and Calvin on the human “feeling of dependence” and the sensus divinitatis and to draw upon the insights of Bonaventure to frame our natural knowledge of God. Regarding Scott Swain’s response, I seek to build on his thoughts about the necessary use of metaphysical concepts by considering some additional biblical material and by clarifying the way in which metaphysical concepts might be treated as developments of ordinary, common human knowledge of reality. Finally, regarding Dolf te Velde’s response, I seek to clarify further why I think Scotus and Aquinas may not be too far apart on the nature of theological predication and why I think Aquinas’ view of analogy and divine simplicity is still sufficient for confirming the veracity of Christian speech about God.


Author(s):  
David VanDrunen

This chapter considers key themes from Thomas Aquinas’ view of the natural knowledge of God, or natural theology, from the opening of his Summa theologiae. It is written from the perspective of Reformed theology, which has traditionally supported natural theology of a certain kind, despite its recent reputation as an opponent of natural theology. According to Thomas, natural theology is insufficient for salvation and is inevitably laden with errors apart from the help of supernatural revelation. But human reason, operating properly, can demonstrate the existence and certain attributes of God from the natural order, and this natural knowledge constitutes preambles to the articles of the Christian faith. The chapter thus engages in a critically sympathetic analysis of these themes and suggests how a contemporary reception of Thomas might appropriate them effectively.


Author(s):  
Eliezer Geisler

This chapter is focused on the ways and processes by which we measure human knowledge at both the individual and organizational levels. “How” we measure knowledge is strongly related to the notion of “what” we measure, described in the previous chapter. The nature of knowledge that can be measured is the externalized or explicit knowledge shared and diffused among individuals and their organizations. We recognize the existence of KANEs as the clustering of sensorial input, but we are unable at this point to adequately measure them. We have the capability to measure sensorial activities and the locations in the brain of excitations and activities that signify cognition and emotions, but we are still unable to measure knowledge at the fundamental level of clustering of sensorial inputs.1


Author(s):  
David Gillis

This introductory chapter provides a background of Maimonides and his code of Jewish law, the Mishneh torah. Maimonides applied the highest literary art to the highest of tasks: to bequeath, as philosopher-statesman, a law that would regulate the life of the individual and of society and move people closer to the knowledge of God. The result of that art is a book to be read and experienced, not just consulted. The central feature of Mishneh torah as a work of art is the casting of the commandments of the law in the form of the cosmos. The microcosmic form suggests, in the first place, that studying Mishneh torah, like the study of the universe, can be a way to the knowledge and love of God. On the plane of ideas, this form embodies the relationship between the ‘small thing’ and the ‘great thing’, between halakhah, on the one hand, and physics and metaphysics on the other. It depicts philosophy as the matrix of halakhah, reflecting the view of the relationship between philosophy and religion in the Islamic philosophers.


1985 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 153-176
Author(s):  
John J. McDermott

The popular mind is deep and means a thousand times more than it knows.It is fitting that the Royal Institute of Philosophy series on American philosophy include a session on the thought of Josiah Royce, for his most formidable philosophical work, The World and the Individual, was a result of his Gifford lectures in the not too distant city of Aberdeen in 1899 and 1900. The invitation to offer the Gifford lectures was somewhat happenstance, for it was extended originally to William James, who pleaded, as he often did in his convenient neurasthenic way, to postpone for a year on behalf of his unsettled nerves. James repaired himself to the Swiss home of Theodore Flournoy, with its treasure of books in religion and psychology, so as to write his Gifford lectures, now famous as The Varieties of Religious Experience. In so doing, however, James was able to solicit an invitation for Royce to occupy the year of his postponement. Royce accepted with alacrity, although this generosity of James displeased his wife Alice, who ranted, ‘Royce!! He will not refuse, but over he will go with his Infinite under his arm, and he will not even do honour to William's recommendation.’ Alice was partially correct in that Royce, indeed, did carry the Infinite across the ocean to the home of his intellectual forebears, although on that occasion as on many others, he acknowledged the support of his personal and philosophical mentor, colleague and friend, William James.


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 878-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar Schachter

Philip Jessup’s life was richly varied. Scholar, practitioner, teacher, administrator, diplomat, judge, prolific writer—he moved from role to role, displaying in each his abundant gifts of character and intellect. Every new job, each fresh subject was a challenge met with zest and high spirits. As a scholar, he was drawn to the issues of the day. He never hesitated to take sides when he felt he had good grounds to do so. In his classes and writings, he was as concerned with practical action as with new ideas. Endowed with a commanding presence, a remarkably resonant voice and a talent for lucid and lively expression, Jessup had no difficulty in getting the attention of an audience. He used concepts sparingly, but effectively, and he avoided windy rhetoric. On the whole, he favored narrative exposition, particularly highlighting the aims and predicaments of the individual actors. People, it seems clear, were more real to him than the abstractions of law or political theory. He was a stickler for thorough and detailed research, as his judicial opinions and books show. Concrete, unique facts were important to him; he had to get them right. Historical detail and revealing quotations were used by him with telling effect.


Philosophy ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 33 (124) ◽  
pp. 56-56
Author(s):  
Constance I. Smith

In his interesting discussion of Mr. C. B. Martin's Mind article “A Religious Way of Knowing,” Mr. W. D. Glasgow (PHILOSOPHY, July i957);“Knowledge of God”), agrees with Martin that emotions and feelings are part of what we call an aesthetic experience, and also that emotions and feelings are part of what we call a religious experience. “In this sense, at any rate,” Glasgow writes, “there is an analogy between aesthetic experience and religious experience. But...” he goes on, “are aesthetic statements more than statements about emotions and feelings? Are statements about religious experience anything more than statements about emotions and feelings? A person could accept the analogy and yet maintain that for him aesthetic judgments have an objective reference. In this case the analogy confirms rather than destroys the existential claim of the theologian.”


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