scholarly journals Examining belief and confidence in schizophrenia

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (11) ◽  
pp. 2327-2338 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. W. Joyce ◽  
B. B. Averbeck ◽  
C. D. Frith ◽  
S. S. Shergill
Keyword(s):  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Cognitive Model ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Random Patterns ◽  
Old Evidence ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Delusional Belief ◽  
Contrary Evidence ◽  
Temporal Difference Methods

BackgroundPeople with psychoses often report fixed, delusional beliefs that are sustained even in the presence of unequivocal contrary evidence. Such delusional beliefs are the result of integrating new and old evidence inappropriately in forming a cognitive model. We propose and test a cognitive model of belief formation using experimental data from an interactive ‘Rock Paper Scissors’ (RPS) game.MethodParticipants (33 controls and 27 people with schizophrenia) played a competitive, time-pressured interactive two-player game (RPS). Participants' behavior was modeled by a generative computational model using leaky integrator and temporal difference methods. This model describes how new and old evidence is integrated to form a playing strategy to beat the opponent and to provide a mechanism for reporting confidence in one's playing strategy to win against the opponent.ResultsPeople with schizophrenia fail to appropriately model their opponent's play despite consistent (rather than random) patterns that can be exploited in the simulated opponent's play. This is manifest as a failure to weigh existing evidence appropriately against new evidence. Furthermore, participants with schizophrenia show a ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias, reporting successful discovery of a winning strategy with insufficient evidence.ConclusionsThe model presented suggests two tentative mechanisms in delusional belief formation: (i) one for modeling patterns in other's behavior, where people with schizophrenia fail to use old evidence appropriately, and (ii) a metacognitive mechanism for ‘confidence’ in such beliefs, where people with schizophrenia overweight recent reward history in deciding on the value of beliefs about the opponent.

Athens and Tenos in the Early Hellenistic Age

1992 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Reger
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Third Century ◽  
The Third ◽  
Greek History ◽  
History Of ◽  
Old Evidence ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Standing Problem

Some recent work on the history of Athens and Tenos in the third century B.c. has brought to light new evidence and new interpretations of old evidence for this notoriously shadowy period of Greek history. Reflection on this material has suggested to me solutions to a few minor puzzles (Sections IA, IB, III), a contribution to a long-standing problem in the history of Athens in the early third century (Section IB), and a new explanation for the entry of Rhodos into the war with Antiokhos (Section II).

The 33rd Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (8) ◽  
pp. 1041-1062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Coltheart
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
High Level ◽  
Delusional Belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a new field of cognitive psychology which seeks to learn more about the normal operation of high-level aspects of cognition such as belief formation, reasoning, decision making, theory of mind, and pragmatics by studying people in whom such processes are abnormal. So far, the high-level cognitive process most widely studied in cognitive neuropsychiatry has been belief formation, investigated by examining people with delusional beliefs. This paper describes some of the forms of delusional belief that have been examined from this perspective and offers a general two-deficit cognitive-neuropsychiatric account of delusional belief.

scholarly journals A Dialogue with the Data: The Bayesian Foundations of Iterative Research in Qualitative Social Science

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tasha Fairfield ◽  
Andrew Charman
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Theory Development ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Bayesian Probability ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Development Data ◽  
Solid Foundation ◽  
Old Evidence ◽  
New Evidence

We advance efforts to explicate and improve inference in qualitative research that iterates between theory development, data collection, and data analysis, rather than proceeding linearly from hypothesizing to testing. We draw on the school of Bayesian “probability as extended logic,” where probabilities represent rational degrees of belief in propositions given limited information, to provide a solid foundation for iterative research that has been lacking in the qualitative methods literature. We argue that mechanisms for distinguishing exploratory from confirmatory stages of analysis that have been suggested in the context of APSA’s DA-RT transparency initiative are unnecessary for qualitative research that is guided by logical Bayesianism, because new evidence has no special status relative to old evidence for testing hypotheses within this inferential framework. Bayesian probability not only fits naturally with how we intuitively move back and forth between theory and data, but also provides a framework for rational reasoning that mitigates confirmation bias and ad-hoc hypothesizing—two common problems associated with iterative research. Moreover, logical Bayesianism facilitates scrutiny of findings by the academic community for signs of sloppy or motivated reasoning. We illustrate these points with an application to recent research on state building.

A sneaking suspicion: The semantics of emotional beliefs and delusions

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 719-720
Author(s):  
Angus W. MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Gradual Development ◽  
Emotional Salience ◽  
Delusional Belief

AbstractThis commentary challenges Rogers & McClelland (R&M) to use their model to account for delusional belief formation and maintenance. The gradual development of delusions and the nature of disconnectivity in Capgras delusions are used to illustrate the role of emotional salience in delusions. It is not clear how this kind of emotional saliency can be represented within the current architecture.

From Koguryǒ to T’amna

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-235
Author(s):  
Alexander Vovin
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Old Evidence ◽  
New Evidence

This article recapitulates some old evidence for the Japonic linguistic substratum in Silla and Paekche in and for the lack of thereof in Koguryǒ. It also introduces some new evidence for the same linguistic distribution. The new evidence for Koguryǒ comes mainly from words recorded in Chinese dynastic histories and from additional Korean loanwords identified in Manchu, the new evidence for Paekche from Liang shu, while the new evidence for Silla is based on the analysis of Silla placenames recorded in the Samguk sagi, which are traditionally considered to be opaque. The present article identifies a number of them as Japonic. Finally, I present the Japonic etymology for the former name of Chejudo island, T’amna.

scholarly journals Random-Player Maker-Breaker games

10.37236/5032 ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Krivelevich ◽  
Gal Kronenberg
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Matching ◽  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Hamilton Cycle ◽  
The Other ◽  
Natural Question ◽  
Vertex Connectivity ◽  
Asymptotic Values ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Matching Game ◽  
As If

In a $(1:b)$ Maker-Breaker game, one of the central questions is to find the maximal value of $b$ that allows Maker to win the game (that is, the critical bias $b^*$). Erdős conjectured that the critical bias for many Maker-Breaker games played on the edge set of $K_n$ is the same as if both players claim edges randomly. Indeed, in many Maker-Breaker games, "Erdős Paradigm" turned out to be true. Therefore, the next natural question to ask is the (typical) value of the critical bias for Maker-Breaker games where only one player claims edges randomly. A random-player Maker-Breaker game is a two-player game, played the same as an ordinary (biased) Maker-Breaker game, except that one player plays according to his best strategy and claims one element in each round, while the other plays randomly and claims $b$ (or $m$) elements. In fact, for every (ordinary) Maker-Breaker game, there are two different random-player versions; the $(1:b)$ random-Breaker game and the $(m:1)$ random-Maker game. We analyze the random-player version of several classical Maker-Breaker games such as the Hamilton cycle game, the perfect-matching game and the $k$-vertex-connectivity game (played on the edge set of $K_n$). For each of these games we find or estimate the asymptotic values of the bias (either $b$ or $m$) that allow each player to typically win the game. In fact, we provide the "smart" player with an explicit winning strategy for the corresponding value of the bias.

scholarly journals Game List Colouring of Graphs

10.37236/944 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Borowiecki ◽  
E. Sidorowicz ◽  
Zs. Tuza
Keyword(s):  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Choice Number

We consider the two-player game defined as follows. Let $(G,L)$ be a graph $G$ with a list assignment $L$ on its vertices. The two players, Alice and Bob, play alternately on $G$, Alice having the first move. Alice's goal is to provide an $L$-colouring of $G$ and Bob's goal is to prevent her from doing so. A move consists in choosing an uncoloured vertex $v$ and assigning it a colour from the set $L(v)$. Adjacent vertices of the same colour must not occur. This game will be called game list colouring. The game choice number of $G$, denoted by ch$_g(G)$, is defined as the least $k$ such that Alice has a winning strategy for any $k$-list assignment of $G$. We characterize the class of graphs with ch$_g(G)\le 2$ and determine the game choice number for some classes of graphs.

The Binary Bias: A Systematic Distortion in the Integration of Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (11) ◽  
pp. 1846-1858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Fisher ◽  
Frank C. Keil
Keyword(s):  
Information Integration ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Continuous Data ◽  
Statistical Features ◽  
Statistical Estimates ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Public Policy Decisions ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
New Framework

One of the mind’s most fundamental tasks is interpreting incoming data and weighing the value of new evidence. Across a wide variety of contexts, we show that when summarizing evidence, people exhibit a binary bias: a tendency to impose categorical distinctions on continuous data. Evidence is compressed into discrete bins, and the difference between categories forms the summary judgment. The binary bias distorts belief formation—such that when people aggregate conflicting scientific reports, they attend to valence and inaccurately weight the extremity of the evidence. The same effect occurs when people interpret popular forms of data visualization, and it cannot be explained by other statistical features of the stimuli. This effect is not confined to explicit statistical estimates; it also influences how people use data to make health, financial, and public-policy decisions. These studies ( N = 1,851) support a new framework for understanding information integration across a wide variety of contexts.

scholarly journals On the power of lookahead in single-player PuyoPuyo

ICGA Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yasuhiko Takenaga ◽  
Sho Kikuchi ◽  
Hushan Quan
Keyword(s):  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Constant Height ◽  
Winning Strategies ◽  
Player Game

PuyoPuyo is one of the Tetris-type games, which is dealt with as a single-player game in this paper. The player has a winning strategy if the player can keep playing the game infinitely on a gameboard of a constant height. In this paper, we consider how lookahead of input pieces affects the existence of winning strategies in PuyoPuyo, and show conditions that the player cannot win even with lookahead. First, we show the number of colors sufficient to make the player lose on the gameboard of width w when the number of lookahead pieces is m. Next, we show that ten and twenty-six colors are sufficient to make the player lose on the gameboards of width two and three, respectively, no matter how large the number of lookahead pieces is.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document