Delusion proneness and ‘jumping to conclusions’: relative and absolute effects

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1253-1262 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. van der Leer ◽  
B. Hartig ◽  
M. Goldmanis ◽  
R. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Relative Effect ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Reasoning Task ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Jumping To Conclusions ◽  
Absolute Sense ◽  
Decision Points ◽  
Relative Comparisons

Background.That delusional and delusion-prone individuals ‘jump to conclusions’ is one of the most robust and important findings in the literature on delusions. However, although the notion of ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) implies gathering insufficient evidence and reaching premature decisions, previous studies have not investigated whether the evidence gathering of delusion-prone individuals is, in fact, suboptimal. The standard JTC effect is a relative effect but using relative comparisons to substantiate absolute claims is problematic. In this study we investigated whether delusion-prone participants jump to conclusions in both a relative and an absolute sense.Method.Healthy participants (n = 112) completed an incentivized probabilistic reasoning task in which correct decisions were rewarded and additional information could be requested for a small price. This combination of rewards and costs generated optimal decision points. Participants also completed measures of delusion proneness, intelligence and risk aversion.Results.Replicating the standard relative finding, we found that delusion proneness significantly predicted task decisions, such that the more delusion prone the participants were, the earlier they decided. This finding was robust when accounting for the effects of risk aversion and intelligence. Importantly, high-delusion-prone participants also decided in advance of an objective rational optimum, gathering fewer data than would have maximized their expected payoff. Surprisingly, we found that even low-delusion-prone participants jumped to conclusions in this absolute sense.Conclusions.Our findings support and clarify the claim that delusion formation is associated with a tendency to ‘jump to conclusions’. In short, most people jump to conclusions, but more delusion-prone individuals ‘jump further’.

Jumping to conclusions and persecutory delusions

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 457-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Startup ◽  
Daniel Freeman ◽  
Philippa A. Garety
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Data Gathering ◽  
Reasoning Task ◽  
Persecutory Delusions ◽  
Jumping To Conclusions

AbstractIt is unknown whether a ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) data-gathering bias is apparent in specific delusion sub-types. A group with persecutory delusions is compared with a sample of non-clinical controls on a probabilistic reasoning task. Results suggest JTC is apparent in individuals with the persecutory sub-type of delusions.

scholarly journals Jumping to Conclusions Is Associated with Paranoia but Not General Suspiciousness: A Comparison of Two Versions of the Probabilistic Reasoning Paradigm

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Moritz ◽  
Niels Van Quaquebeke ◽  
Tania M. Lincoln
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Data Gathering ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Decision Threshold ◽  
Reasoning Task ◽  
Jumping To Conclusions ◽  
Probability Estimates

Theoretical models ascribe jumping to conclusions (JTCs) a prominent role in the pathogenesis of paranoia. While many earlier studies corroborated this account, some newer investigations have found no or only small associations of the JTC bias with paranoid symptoms. The present study examined whether these inconsistencies in part reflect methodological differences across studies. The study was built upon the psychometric high-risk paradigm. A total of 1899 subjects from the general population took part in an online survey and were administered the Paranoia Checklist as well as one of two different variants of the probabilistic reasoning task: one variant with a traditional instruction (a) and one novel variant that combines probability estimates with decision judgments (b). Factor analysis of the Paranoia Checklist yielded an unspecific suspiciousness factor and a psychotic paranoia factor. The latter was significantly associated with scores indicating hasty decision making. Subjects scoring two standard deviations above the mean of the Paranoia Checklist showed an abnormal data-gathering style relative to subjects with normal scores. Findings suggest that the so-called decision threshold parameter is more sensitive than the conventional JTC index. For future research the specific contents of paranoid beliefs deserve more consideration in the investigation of decision making in schizophrenia as JTC seems to be associated with core psychosis-prone features of paranoia only.

scholarly journals Glutamatergic Contribution to Probabilistic Reasoning and Jumping to Conclusions in Schizophrenia: A Double-Blind, Randomized Experimental Trial

2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (9) ◽  
pp. 687-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Strube ◽  
Louise Marshall ◽  
Graziella Quattrocchi ◽  
Simon Little ◽  
Camelia Lucia Cimpianu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Experimental Trial ◽  
Jumping To Conclusions

scholarly journals Developing Empirical Decision Points to Improve the Timing of Adaptive Digital Health Physical Activity Interventions in Youth: Survival Analysis (Preprint)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Ortega ◽  
Christopher C Cushing
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Digital Health ◽  
Vigorous Physical Activity ◽  
Sports Participation ◽  
Time Of Day ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Intervention Delivery ◽  
Physical Activity Interventions ◽  
Decision Points ◽  
Main Effects

BACKGROUND Current digital health interventions primarily use interventionist-defined rules to guide the timing of intervention delivery. As new temporally dense data sets become available, it is possible to make decisions about the intervention timing empirically. OBJECTIVE This study aimed to explore the timing of physical activity among youth to inform decision points (eg, timing of support) for future digital physical activity interventions. METHODS This study comprised 113 adolescents aged between 13 and 18 years (mean age 14.64, SD 1.48 years) who wore an accelerometer for 20 days. Multilevel survival analyses were used to estimate the most likely time of day (via odds ratios and hazard probabilities) when adolescents accumulated their average physical activity. The interacting effects of physical activity timing and moderating variables were calculated by entering predictors, such as gender, sports participation, and school day, into the model as main effects and tested for interactions with the time of day to determine conditional main effects of these predictors. RESULTS On average, the likelihood that a participant would accumulate a typical amount of moderate-to-vigorous physical activity increased and peaked between 6 PM and 8 PM before decreasing sharply after 9 PM. Hazard and survival probabilities suggest that optimal decision points for digital physical activity programs could occur between 5 PM and 8 PM. CONCLUSIONS Overall, the findings of this study support the idea that the timing of physical activity can be empirically identified and that these markers may be useful as intervention triggers.

scholarly journals Cognitive Imprecision and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mel Win Khaw ◽  
Ziang Li ◽  
Michael Woodford
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Numerical Cognition ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Perceptual Bias ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Model Risk ◽  
Perceptual Judgments ◽  
Optimal Decision Rule ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization

Abstract Observed choices between risky lotteries are difficult to reconcile with expected utility maximization, both because subjects appear to be too risk averse with regard to small gambles for this to be explained by diminishing marginal utility of wealth, as stressed by Rabin (2000), and because subjects’ responses involve a random element. We propose a unified explanation for both anomalies, similar to the explanation given for related phenomena in the case of perceptual judgments: they result from judgments based on imprecise (and noisy) mental representations of the decision situation. In this model, risk aversion results from a sort of perceptual bias—but one that represents an optimal decision rule, given the limitations of the mental representation of the situation. We propose a quantitative model of the noisy mental representation of simple lotteries, based on other evidence regarding numerical cognition, and test its ability to explain the choice frequencies that we observe in a laboratory experiment.

scholarly journals Jumping To Conclusions, General Intelligence, And Psychosis Liability: Findings From The Multi-Centre EU-GEI Case-Control Study

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giada Tripoli ◽  
Diego Quattrone ◽  
Laura Ferraro ◽  
Charlotte Gayer-Anderson ◽  
Victoria Rodriguez ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Population Based ◽  
Case Control ◽  
Risk Scores ◽  
Polygenic Risk Score ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Polygenic Risk ◽  
Jumping To Conclusions ◽  
Beads Task

AbstractBackgroundThe “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias is associated with both psychosis and general cognition but their relationship is unclear. In this study, we set out to clarify the relationship between the JTC bias, IQ, psychosis and polygenic liability to schizophrenia and IQ.Methods817 FEP patients and 1294 population-based controls completed assessments of general intelligence (IQ), and JTC (assessed by the number of beads drawn on the probabilistic reasoning “beads” task) and provided blood or saliva samples from which we extracted DNA and computed polygenic risk scores for IQ and schizophrenia.ResultsThe estimated proportion of the total effect of case/control differences on JTC mediated by IQ was 79%. Schizophrenia Polygenic Risk Score (SZ PRS) was non-significantly associated with a higher number of beads drawn (B= 0.47, 95% CI −0.21 to 1.16, p=0.17); whereas IQ PRS (B=0.51, 95% CI 0.25 to 0.76, p<0.001) significantly predicted the number of beads drawn, and was thus associated with reduced JTC bias. The JTC was more strongly associated with higher level of psychotic-like experiences (PLE) in controls, including after controlling for IQ (B= −1.7, 95% CI −2.8 to −0.5, p=0.006), but did not relate to delusions in patients.Conclusionsthe JTC reasoning bias in psychosis is not a specific cognitive deficit but is rather a manifestation or consequence, of general cognitive impairment. Whereas, in the general population, the JTC bias is related to psychotic-like experiences, independent of IQ. The work has potential to inform interventions targeting cognitive biases in early psychosis.

scholarly journals Jumping to conclusions at first onset of psychosis predicts longer admissions, more compulsory admissions and police involvement over the next 4 years: the GAP study

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (13) ◽  
pp. 2256-2266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Rodriguez ◽  
Olesya Ajnakina ◽  
Simona A. Stilo ◽  
Valeria Mondelli ◽  
Tiago Reis Marques ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Research Centre ◽  
First Episode ◽  
Symptom Dimensions ◽  
Jumping To Conclusions ◽  
Syndrome Scale ◽  
First Onset ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Beads Task

AbstractBackgroundJumping to conclusions (JTC), which is the proneness to require less information before forming beliefs or making a decision, has been related to formation and maintenance of delusions. Using data from the National Institute of Health Research Biomedical Research Centre Genetics and Psychosis (GAP) case–control study of first-episode psychosis (FEP), we set out to test whether the presence of JTC would predict poor clinical outcome at 4 years.MethodsOne-hundred and twenty-three FEP patients were assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) and the probabilistic reasoning ‘Beads’ Task at the time of recruitment. The sample was split into two groups based on the presence of JTC bias. Follow-up data over an average of 4 years were obtained concerning clinical course and outcomes (remission, intervention of police, use of involuntary treatment – the Mental Health Act (MHA) – and inpatient days).ResultsFEP who presented JTC at baseline were more likely during the follow-up period to be detained under the MHA [adjusted OR 15.62, 95% confidence interval (CI) 2.92–83.54, p = 0.001], require intervention by the police (adjusted OR 14.95, 95% CI 2.68–83.34, p = 0.002) and have longer admissions (adjusted IRR = 5.03, 95% CI 1.91–13.24, p = 0.001). These associations were not accounted for by socio-demographic variables, IQ and symptom dimensions.ConclusionsJTC in FEP is associated with poorer outcome as indicated and defined by more compulsion police intervention and longer periods of admission. Our findings raise the question of whether the implementation of specific interventions to reduce JTC, such as Metacognition Training, may be a useful addition in early psychosis intervention programmes.

scholarly journals Comparing NWS PoP Forecasts to Third-Party Providers

2011 ◽  
Vol 139 (10) ◽  
pp. 3304-3321 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Eric Bickel ◽  
Eric Floehr ◽  
Seong Dae Kim
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Time Data ◽  
National Weather Service ◽  
Absolute Sense ◽  
Probability Of Precipitation ◽  
Relative Comparisons ◽  
Weather Service

Abstract In this paper, the authors verify probability of precipitation (PoP) forecasts provided by the National Weather Service (NWS), The Weather Channel (TWC), and CustomWeather (CW). The n-day-ahead forecasts, where n ranges from 1 to 3 for the NWS, from 1 to 9 for TWC, and from 1 to 14 for CW, are analyzed. The dataset includes almost 13 million PoP forecasts, or about 500 000 PoPs per provider per day of lead time. Data were collected over a 2-yr period (1 November 2008–31 October 2010) at 734 observation stations across the contiguous United States. In addition to verifying these PoP forecasts in an absolute sense, relative comparisons are made between the providers. It is found that, in most cases, TWC does not add skill to NWS forecasts. Perhaps most interestingly, it is also found that CW does have the ability to forecast PoPs at a resolution of 0.01.

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