Plotinus, mysticism, and mediation

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT ARP

The Plotinian scholar, John Bussanich, has noted that the issue of classifying mystical union with the One consists in deciding between either theistic union or monistic identity. For advocates of theistic union, during mystical union the soul retains its identity and can be distinguished from the One; for advocates of monistic identity, during the union the soul loses its identity and becomes absorbed into the One. Both camps, however, believe that noetic activity is transcended in the union. In contradistinction to the theistic union and monistic identity views, I argue for what I call a mediated union position in Plotinus's doctrines whereby the noetic part of the soul – understood as a multi-faceted cognitive capacity – is not transcended in union with the One.When the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself like this since he has become single and simple.Plotinus Ennead, VI.9.10.9–11

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.


Author(s):  
Judson B. Murray

Confucian mysticism is a subfield in academic areas of study including Chinese thought, Chinese religions, Confucian studies, and comparative mysticism. Important topics examined in this subfield include, first, a view of the human self that is fundamentally relational, both in an interpersonal sense and because Confucians presuppose various correlations and an integration between, on the one hand, the matter–energy, capacities, processes, and activities comprising the self and, on the other, the elements, forces, patterns, and processes of the world it inhabits. One paradigmatic way Confucians conceptualize the interrelation between the self and the cosmos is their idea and ideal of the “unity of Heaven and humanity.” The Confucian mystical self, provided failings such as unbalanced emotions, selfish desires, and self-centeredness are effectively curtailed, contributes vitally to, because of its profound reverence for life, the generative and life-sustaining process of change that pervades and animates the cosmos. Second, practitioners use various techniques of religious praxis in combination to form multifaceted training regimens aimed at self-cultivation and self-transformation. Examples include a form of meditation called “quiet-sitting,” rituals, textual study, “investigating things,” self-examination and self-monitoring, filial piety, and “reverent attentiveness.” Third, training in these practices can achieve the different mystical aims, experiences, and transformations they seek, all of which relate to the overarching ideal of the unity of Heaven and humanity. These objectives, broadly speaking, include self-understanding, accurately grasping the “principles” of things and affairs, effortless moral virtuosity, “forming one body with all things” (and other types of Confucian mystical union), and exemplifying “sincerity.” Accomplishing them collapses the conventional divide separating several specious dichotomies, such as thought and action, self and other, humankind and nature, internal and external, the subjective and the objective, and moral ought and is. Fourth, the influence that precedent and tradition exert in Confucianism has prompted scholars to devote attention both to notable continuities and to intriguing innovations in comparing ancient mystical ideas, practices, experiences, and aims to later expressions and elaborations of them. At present, much of the scholarship on Confucian mysticism contributes to efforts attempting to provide rich and nuanced analyses of the tradition’s core doctrines, practices, experiences, and ethical and religious aims, by viewing these subjects through the lens of Confucianism’s mystical and spiritual dimensions. Less scholarly attention has been devoted to identifying and explicating the possible contributions that studying Confucian mysticism can make to the scholarship on theories of mysticism and comparative mysticism. Scholars of mysticism have not yet availed themselves of the wealth of data, the possible additional perspectives on contested issues, and the new trajectories for future research that Confucianism offers to these fields. Also, few studies employ the definitions, categories, and theories that have been developed in the contemporary study of mysticism as a methodology for studying Confucian mysticism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Montemayor

Consciousness research has a cognitive-diversity problem. Any view that holds that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attention precedes conscious awareness confronts the difficulty that the theoretical categorization of attention is as diverse as the categorization of intelligent cognition, but consciousness is typically referred to as a single and unified capacity. On the one hand, we have a multiplicity of kinds of attention. On the other hand, we use a monolithic “phenomenal” notion of consciousness to define the dependency of consciousness on all these diverse kinds of attention. Since attention is defined in terms of a diverse variety of functions, a lot more needs to be said with respect to the claim that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attentional processing precedes conscious awareness. Is this dependency based on the diverse cognitive functions of attention? If so, why conceive of consciousness as a single informationally unified cognitive capacity? What does the multiplicity of kinds of attention entail for consciousness research? This is the “diversity problem.” This article argues that consciousness should be also considered as a diverse set of capacities, based on the diversity of attention. While we have the intuition that consciousness is a unified perspective, the article shows that consistency demands this diverse approach. Since research on attention distinguishes a wide range of functions and levels of cognitive processing, the dependency of consciousness on attention entails diverse conscious capacities and diverse types of awareness beyond the distinctions between being awake, dreaming, and being minimally conscious.


1999 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-226
Author(s):  
Gábor Győri

One of the most prominent questions in connection with language evolution is whether the human capacity for language can be related to any capacities found in animals. Evolutionary continuity in anatomical structures involved in language is obvious, but in the case of cognitive capacities and behavior it is rather controversial. A correlation has often been implied between quantitative difference and evolutionary continuity on the one hand and qualitative difference and evolutionary discontinuity on the other. Recently these two positions have even incorporated claims of gradualistic and punctuated evolution of language respectively. These suggested correlations can hardly be true because the question of the rate and curve of language evolution is only indirectly connected to the continuity-discontinuity debate. It is highly unlikely that there could be true discontinuity in language evolution due to the lack of any antecedent trait. Rather, seeming missing links can also occur in the case of continuous traits when there is enhanced selection pressure due to rapid or even sudden environmental changes and hence rapid evolutionary change takes place. This is more logical even from an adaptationist point of view than a constant rate evolution. Thus, while elements of the primate communication system, cognitive capacity and social behavior must have served as evolutionary forerunners of language in the form of preadaptations, the rate and curve of language evolution must have depended on the selection pressures driving it.


2001 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 153-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Genesee

Most general theories of language acquisition are based on studies of children who acquire one language. A general theory of language acquisition must ultimately accommodate the facts about children who acquire two languages simultaneously during infancy. This chapter reviews current research in three domains of bilingual acquisition: pragmatic features of bilingual code-mixing, grammatical constraints on child bilingual code-mixing, and bilingual syntactic development. It examines the implications of findings from these domains for our understanding of the limits of the mental faculty to acquire language. Findings indicate that infants possess the requisite neuro-cognitive capacity to differentially represent and use two languages simultaneously from the one-word stage onward, and probably earlier. Detailed analyses of the syntactic organization of bilingual child language indicates, moreover, that it conforms to the target systems and, thus, resembles that of children acquiring the same languages monolingually, for the most part. At the same time, bilingual children acquire the distinctive capacity to coordinate their two languages in grammatically constrained ways and in conformity with the target grammars during online production. In short, current evidence attests to the bilingual capacity of the human mind and refutes earlier conceptualizations which viewed bilingualism and bilingual acquisition as burdensome and potentially disruptive to development.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amer Dardagan

This paper in a simple and transparent way critically examines the rejected belief in science that Bosnian Church and its followers doctrinally and organisationally belonged to the dualist sect of Bogomilism. The research was carried out by a comparative analysis of the basic dualistic postulates of Gnosticism, Manichaeism and Bogomilism on the one hand and the available domestic sources of the Bosnian Church on the other. The importance of the work is reflected in the concise and detailed scientific argumentation that undermines "Bogomil Bosnian Church" myth, while offering a new scientific thesis on the religious and doctrinological affiliation of the "Bosnian faith" and the Bosnian "krs'tjani". In the first part, the paper deals with the problem of extreme and moderate dualism, with a special emphasis on the Neognostic, Neomanichaean and Bogomil communities in medieval Balkans. In the second part, the basic premises of Christian mysticism are given, including the possibility of its philosophical and theological compatibility with the teachings of the Bosnian Church, where for the first time the phenomenon of the name "kr'stjani" is explained in relation to the mystical union ("unio mystica").


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (114) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Bernardo Guadalupe dos Santos Lins Brandão

Esse artigo é uma tentativa de análise da doutrina plotiniana da união mística da alma com o Um. Em primeiro lugar, mostramos que algumas palavras que foram interpretadas pela tradição como descrições da experiência mística, como êxtase e presença são, na verdade, usadas nas Enéadas para expressar algumas idéias metafísicas. Então, estudamos a relação entre a alma e o Intelecto durante a união mística: por que é necessário para a alma alcançar primeiro a união com o Intelecto para se unir ao Um? Depois disso, analisamos algumas imagens importantes: coincidência de centros, parentesco e semelhança. Por fim, tentamos realizar uma interpretação da controversa questão da identidade entre a alma e o Um durante a união mística.Abstract: This paper is an attempt to analyse the Plotinus‘ doctrine of the mystical union of the soul with the One. First, we show that some words that were interpreted by the tradition as descriptions of the mystical experience, like extasys and presence are used in the Enneads to express some metaphysical ideas. Then, we study the relation between soul and Intellect in the mystical union: why it is necessary to the soul achieve first the union with the Intellect to become united to the One? After that, we analyze some important images: coincidence of centers, relashionship and similarity. At last, we try to offer an interpretation to the controversial question about the identity between the soul and the One during the mystical union.


Author(s):  
Olav Hammer

Among the basic elements found in older and more recent religions alike are striking experiences such as visions, out-of-body experiences, and mystical union. On the one hand, such experiences as psychological phenomena. On the other, they are also social facts; something as intangible as a personal experience is somehow transformed into the bedrock of a religious movement. The present chapter argues that the “religious” element of an experience is an effect of the way these experiences are categorized and interpreted. Quite a few people have had striking experiences, far fewer insist that their experiences have any validity for others, and fewer yet manage to convince other people of the supernatural origin and of these experiences and derive authority from them. A new religious movement will derive legitimacy from such experiences if they are presented in a narrative that frames them as “religious,” and if others are willing to accept this narrative.


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