scholarly journals The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court,and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism

1991 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. O'Brien
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Republican Government ◽  
Republican Liberty ◽  
Republican Theory

The so-called Madisonian dilemma has dominated recent debates over the role of the Supreme Court and suggested a “majoritarian paradigm” for constitutional interpretation. But a reexamination of James Madison's unique contributions to republican theory indicates that the “Madisonian dilemma” is in many ways misleading and unfaithful to his political vision. Madison, argues the author in Section I, worked a conceptual change in republican theory. Madison did so because he was convinced that republican liberty (and government) was primarily threatened by popular majorities and legislative majoritarianism in Congress and the states. For that reason, Madison advanced his well-known “naturalist” argument for republicanism and, on that basis, argued for buttressing the political architecture of republican government with “auxiliary precautions” for securing republican liberty. From Madison's reconstruction of republicanism, Section II moves to his conversion to the project of amending the Constitution with a declaration of rights and the basis he laid for the Supreme Court's role in defending republican government and liberty. Finally, Section III takes up Madison's view of the role of the Supreme Court and his articulation of a novel theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism.

The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Independent Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Harsh Criticism

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.

scholarly journals The Return of Federalism and Constitutional Politics: Analyzing the Role of the Supreme Court as an Arbiter in Contemporary Political Society

Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Marjun Parcasio
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Past ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Death Experience

Since the ascendancy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the centrepiece of a new constitutional order in Canada, there has been a distinctive decline of federal discourse in the courts and within the political sphere. Traditional cases pertaining to the division of powers at the Supreme Court have been eclipsed by the novelty of rights jurisprudence that has consumed the court in the past three decades1. Moreover, constitutional issues have been considered an anathema since the failure of the negotiations at Meech Lake and Charlottetown, exacerbated by the near-death experience for federalism in the 1995 referendum in Québec. In recent years, however, the changing nature of Canada’s political dynamics has signalled a return of federalism and constitutional politics [...]

Whither Campaign Finance Jurisprudence?

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-138
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
The Political ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Political Policy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
And Behavior

Chapter 7 offers a discussion of the main results and a consideration of the political, policy, and jurisprudential implications of the study. It deliberates what happens in instances like this—when the Supreme Court fosters the construction of an entire edifice of laws and regulations that limit a fundamental right (free speech) based on an erroneous set of assumptions about political opinion and behavior. The role of social science in court decisions—particularly in the context of informing behavioral assumptions—is emphasized, along with a particular call for social scientists to investigate further the Buckley Court’s model.

Part III The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Political Branches, 10 Judicial–Executive Relations in Nigeria’s Constitutional Development: Clear Patterns or Confusing Signals?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guobadia Ameze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter examines the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in Nigeria. It sketches the history of assertions of judicial power by Nigerian courts, including the 1966 action by the Supreme Court to assert the continued validity of the 1963 constitution in the face of a military coup. It considers the role of the National Judicial Council in appointing and disciplining judges, an important issue in many systems. It recounts the saga surrounding President of the Court of Appeal Justice Salami, which raises the troubling prospect of the Chief Justice ‘packing’ the Council and possibly colluding with the executive to pursue political goals and discusses the issue of disputes over the appointment of state chief justices, who are appointed by governors on the Council’s recommendation. It also offers the Nigerian perspective on control over judicial budgets and administration, before concluding with a review of some significant cases.

scholarly journals WŁADZA TRZECIA „NEUTRALNA”

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Andrzej Sylwestrzak
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Financial Control ◽  
Proper Functioning ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Law

THIRD POWER: NEUTRAL ONESummary The issues discussed in the article cover six areas: a/ law-based state and the division of power, b/ division of power in the doctrine, c/ division of power in Polish constitutionalism, d/ normative classification of constitutional authority, e/ the political power, opposition power and neutral power, f/ concluding remarks. The aim of the article is to present the arguments for “neutral power” as the creative factor indispensable in the proper functioning of the law-based state. Within Montesquieu tripartite classification, “neutral power” entailes the nessesity to restracture juridical power so thet it will include financial control, constitutional bank control as well as ombudsmen. Accepting the division into ruling power and opposition power, “neutral power” (including the judiciary and the ombudsmen) indicates the kind of power Montesquieu advocated, trough in its more prominent role of the mediator between the powers. “Neutral power”, described in these terms, ought to be independent of the remaining powers through the system of internal elections to all the posts, performer by the Supreme Court representatives. Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Ombudsman or the Cheef of Governmenmt Inspectorate ought to be elected by the Supreme Court Judges.

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