Testimony on South Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-44
Author(s):  
Goler T. Butcher

Mr. Chairman, I wish to express appreciation for the invitation to appear before the Committee. It is Congress that must take the lead to end what is essentially a “cover-up” of U.S. policy on southern Africa. The Congress must insist on(1)a frank statement of the facts on the situation in South Africa,(2)an open analysis of U.S. interests in that area,(3)progress towards a therapeutic confrontation, discussion, debate, and analysis of what U.S. policy should be,(4)change with a view towards developing an honest, sensible and rational U.S. policy—consistent with U.S. interests—towards South Africa.

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 111-111

Vice President Mondale has been participating extensively in Africa-related foreign policy matters since taking office in January, 1977. The Vice President works closely with Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young in the development of Africa-related policy recommendations for consideration by the President. The Vice President also participates in meetings with visiting African leaders and monitors political developments in Africa. Finally, at the President’s request, Vice President Mondale met with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to explain the new Administration’s policies toward southern Africa. Information on the Vice President’s staff’s involvement in Africa-related matters was requested but not received.


1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
Deborah Toler

No one is happy with the Reagan Administration’s southern Africa foreign policy strategy known as constructive engagement. Liberals object to the tilt towards South Africa, to the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to the Namibian negotiations; to the resulting moribund state of those negotiations; and to the deemphasis of human rights and development issues in favor of increased emphasis on military and security issues. Conservatives object to economic assistance packages for African socialist and self-styled states; to the declining U.S. support of Jonas Savimbi’s ostensibly pro-Western UNITA forces in Angola; to Administration efforts to improve relations between the United States and the Marxist states of Angola and Mozambique; and to the Administration’s apparent willingness to accept a SWAPO (i.e., communist guerrilla) outcome in Namibia.


Worldview ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 18 (11) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Ross K. Baker

In a time when idiocies such as the domino theory comprise a substantial part of American foreign policy one has to look hard for evidence that authentic national interest is anywhere being invoked as a rationale for external relations. That the Republic of South Africa seems to be a world power demonstrating innovation in diplomacy and putting shibboleths in their rightful place says something about the genera] bankruptcy of Western statecraft. While Ford and Kissinger flail about seeking justifications for American failures and misalliances, a moldy, outcast regime in Pretoria has embarked upon a path of diplomatic initiative which has effectively breached the wall of isolation that has surrounded it for two decades. The motives of the regime of John Vorster may be sinister and base, but there appears to be a far more sophisticated perception of long-term interests in Pretoria than in Washington.


2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 569-586
Author(s):  
Peya Mushelenga

This article discusses aspects of Namibia’s foreign policy principles and how they impact on the values of democracy, and issue of peace and security in the region. The article will focus on the attainment of peace in Angola, democratisation of South Africa, and security situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar and Lesotho. The main question of this article is: To what extent has Namibia realised the objectives encapsulated in her foreign policy principles of striving for international peace and security and promote the values of democracy in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region? The assumption is that though relatively a newly established state, Namibia has made her contribution towards democracy, peace and security in the Southern Africa region and the world at large.


1987 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-54
Author(s):  
Owen Ellison Kahn

This Article Assesses the impact of the Cuban military on strategic, diplomatic and political relationships in southern Africa. It does not deal with why Cuba and its Soviet benefactor have interested themselves in the region, nor does it discuss Soviet influence on Cuban foreign policy. The aspects covered here include: (1) how Cuba and Angola fit into the complex pattern of regional relations in southern Africa; (2) an outline of the region's main territorial actors and guerrilla movements, along with a brief history of Cuban involvement in the area; (3) the response of South Africa to this foreign spoiler of its regional hegemony, (4) regional cooperation in southern Africa insofar as it is a response to South Africa's militancy in the face of international communism as represented in the region by Cuba; and (5) Cuba's effect upon the economy and polity of Angola and Mozambique.


Author(s):  
Alois Mlambo

This article traces the relations between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia/Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from the end of the 19th century until the present with respect to politics; economic, military, ideological, and cultural activities; as well as foreign policy. The conflicted relationship between the two countries went through varying periods of close cooperation and also of tension, especially given the difference in power between the much larger and more economically prosperous South Africa and the smaller society and economy of Southern Rhodesia. Other important factors include the dominant influence of the Afrikaners in South Africa, from the creation of the Union in 1910 onward, and the apprehension felt by a predominantly English-speaking white population of Rhodesia, which arose from a fear of being swallowed up by Afrikaner-dominated South Africa. During the Zimbabwean liberation struggle from the early 1960s onward, South Africa gave military support to Rhodesia, at least in the early part of the conflict; it changed its policy in the mid-1970s and began to advocate for negotiations between Rhodesia’s warring parties. Between Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 and the democratic transition in South Africa in 1994, relations between the two countries were fraught with tensions because the Zimbabwean government persistently condemned the apartheid regime and hosted representatives of South African anti-apartheid movements, although Zimbabwe was careful not to allow these movements to launch military attacks on South Africa from its soil, for fear of reprisals. On its part, the South African government conducted a sabotage campaign against its northern neighbor and exerted economic pressure on it. Despite all these tensions, however, South Africa remained Zimbabwe’s major trading partner throughout this period. The tension between the countries lessened when Nelson Mandela became president in 1994, but new tensions arose because of Mandela and Robert Mugabe’s rivalry over the leadership of Southern Africa. On coming to power in 1999, Thabo Mbeki tried to diffuse tensions by adopting a different style of foreign policy that, in Zimbabwe’s case, was known as “quiet diplomacy”—a policy that came under much criticism from Western countries and some sectors in Southern Africa. Mbeki’s successors continued this diplomatic policy toward Zimbabwe, even following a militarily assisted political transition in November 2017, which saw the overthrow of Mugabe and his replacement by Emerson Munangangwa.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel N. Mlambo ◽  
◽  
Toyin Cotties Adetiba

This article addresses the question of what drives the character and orientation of South Africa’s foreign policy post the apartheid era. The shift from apartheid to democracy in 1994 brought with it a new paradigm shift in both South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. This was also driven by the need to redress the destabilization policies of the apartheid regime. The demise of apartheid in 1994 brought with it immense jubilation both continentally and abroad and South Africa was now for the first time in years reintegrated into the global economy. By undertaking this enquiry, the study attempts to draw a nuanced evaluation of South Africa’s foreign policy, particularly in Southern Africa since its transition to democracy in 1994.


1990 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Kempton

During the last few years, Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking has stimulated a number of dramatic and largely unexpected shifts in Soviet foreign policy. In Southern Africa, its effects have been both immediate and quite profound. The two most publicised changes have been Moscow's growing support for negotiations as a method of resolving the region's conflicts, and the related reduction of its commitments to the régimes in Angola and Mozambique. In fact, there is evidence that the Kremlin has been putting pressure on both its allies to engage in a process of ‘national reconciliation’ with the armed movements trying to overthrow them. At the rhetorical level, at least, there has also been a marked decline in Moscow's enthusiasm for revolutionary upheavals in Southern Africa.


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