scholarly journals Chaotic itinerancy is a key to mental diversity

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 586-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ichiro Tsuda
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Physical Basis ◽  
Dynamical Approach ◽  
Connectionist Approach

Kampis proposes the study of chaotic itinerancy, pointing out its significance in domains of cognitive science and philosophy. He has discovered in the concept of chaotic itinerancy the possibility for a new dynamical approach that elucidates mental states with a physical basis. This approach may therefore provide the means to go beyond the connectionist approach. In accordance with his theory, I here highlight three issues regarding chaotic itinerancy: transitory dynamics, diversity, and self-modifying system.

Did a Little Birdie Really Tell Odin? Applying Theory of Mind to Old Norse Religion

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 280-308
Author(s):  
Declan Taggart
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Old Norse ◽  
Viking Age ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Theory ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa.

Framing the debate between computational and dynamical approaches to cognitive science

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 630-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall D. Beer
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Careful Study ◽  
Dynamical Approach

van Gelder argues that computational and dynamical systems are mathematically distinct kinds of systems. Although there are real experimental and theoretical differences between adopting a computational or dynamical perspective on cognition, and the dynamical approach has much to recommend it, the debate cannot be framed this rigorously. Instead, what is needed is careful study of concrete models to improve our intuitions.

scholarly journals Is cognition computational or dynamical?

2015 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Scientific Models ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Dynamical Approach ◽  
The Relationship

The rise of the dynamical approach in cognitive science set in motion a philosophical debate about the nature of cognition, that is, the debate about whether cognitive processes are dynamical or computational. In this article we are dealing with the question about the relationship between computationalism and dynamicism, and their possible ontological implications. More precisely, we are dealing with the already offered answers to this question and evaluate them in accordance with specific understandings of scientific models in cognitive science.

Computation, Dynamics, and Cognition

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Giunti
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Computational System ◽  
Turing Computability ◽  
Conceptual Foundation ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Dynamical Approach ◽  
Computation Theory

Currently there is growing interest in the application of dynamical methods to the study of cognition. Computation, Dynamics, and Cognition investigates this convergence from a theoretical and philosophical perspective, generating a provocative new view of the aims and methods of cognitive science. Advancing the dynamical approach as the methodological frame best equipped to guide inquiry in the field's two main research programs--the symbolic and connectionist approaches--Marco Giunti engages a host of questions crucial not only to the science of cognition, but also to computation theory, dynamical systems theory, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. In chapter one Giunti employs a dynamical viewpoint to explore foundational issues in computation theory. Using the concept of Turing computability, he precisely and originally defines the nature of a computational system, sharpening our understanding of computation theory and its applications. In chapter two he generalizes his definition of a computational system, arguing that the concept of Turing computability itself is relative to the kind of support on which Turing machine operate. Chapter three completes the book's conceptual foundation, discussing a form of scientific explanation for real dynamical systems that Giunti calls "Galilean explanation." The book's fourth and final chapter develops the methodological thesis that all cognitive systems are dynamical systems. On Giunti's view, a dynamical approach is likely to benefit even those scientific explanations of cognition which are based on symbolic models. Giunti concludes by proposing a new modeling practice for cognitive science, one based on "Galilean models" of cognitive systems. Innovative, lucidly-written, and broad-ranging in its analysis, Computation, Dynamics, and Cognition will interest philosophers of science and mind, as well as cognitive scientists, computer scientists, and theorists of dynamical systems. This book elaborates a comprehensive picture of the application of dynamical methods to the study of cognition. Giunti argues that both computational systems and connectionist networks are special types of dynamical systems. He shows how this dynamical approach can be applied to problems of cognition, information processing, consciousness, meaning, and the relation between body and mind.

Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 63-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Conscious Mind ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Ice Cube ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 201) — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

scholarly journals Psychopathology and the Enactive Mind

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanna Colombetti
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Living Organism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Specific Structure ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
The Mind ◽  
In Virtue Of

According to the "enactive" approach in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, mental states are neither identical with, nor reducible to, brain activity. Rather, the mind is enacted or brought forth by the whole situated living organism in virtue of its specific structure and organization. Although increasingly influential in cognitive science, the enactive approach has had little to do with psychopathology so far. This chapter first outlines this approach in some detail, and then illustrates its conceptual and methodological connections to psychopathology. It also provides some indications on how to develop a more explicitly "enactive psychopathology."

Philosophy and Psychology

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Antony ◽  
Georges Rey
Keyword(s):  
Computer Science ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Research Program ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Noam Chomsky ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

Philosophy and psychology have always been inseparable, particularly with regard to issues of methodology. The chapter begins with a brief history of the a priori and introspectivist traditions of both, and of the various forms of behaviorism that were a reaction to them. It then turns to the “computational” and “functionalist” approaches to the mind that grew out of the development of the computer and especially the linguistic work of Noam Chomsky. These blossomed into the research program of “cognitive science” that combines work in linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, biology, and computer science to empirically address questions about the nature and architecture of the mind, and issues in semantics, epistemology, and moral psychology. the chapter concludes by briefly discussing two important cases concerning the nature of consciousness, its supposed “unity,” and various forms of self-blindness, which raise surprising empirical questions about our introspective access to our mental states.

scholarly journals The exploratory status of postconnectionist models

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-164
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic ◽  
Vanja Subotic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Neural Nets ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Connectionist Models ◽  
Learning Techniques ◽  
History Of ◽  
Alternative Methodology ◽  
Connectionist Approach ◽  
Sharp Criticism

This paper aims to offer a new view of the role of connectionist models in the study of human cognition through the conceptualization of the history of connectionism - from the simplest perceptrons to convolutional neural nets based on deep learning techniques, as well as through the interpretation of criticism coming from symbolic cognitive science. Namely, the connectionist approach in cognitive science was the target of sharp criticism from the symbolists, which on several occasions caused its marginalization and almost complete abandonment of its assumptions in the study of cognition. Criticisms have mostly pointed to its explanatory inadequacy as a theory of cognition or to its biological implausibility as a theory of implementation, and critics often focused on specific shortcomings of some connectionist models and argued that they apply on connectionism in general. In this paper we want to show that both types of critique are based on the assumption that the only valid explanations in cognitive science are instances of homuncular functionalism and that by removing this assumption and by adopting an alternative methodology - exploratory mechanistic strategy, we can reject most objections to connectionism as irrelevant, explain the progress of connectionist models despite their shortcomings and sketch the trajectory of their future development. By adopting mechanistic explanations and by criticizing functionalism, we will reject the objections of explanatory inadequacy, by characterizing connectionist models as generic rather than concrete mechanisms, we will reject the objections of biological implausibility, and by attributing the exploratory character to connectionist models we will show that practice of generalizing current to general failures of connectionism is unjustified.

There Are No Killer Apps but Connecting Neural Activity to Behavior through Computation Is Still a Good Idea

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Read Montague
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Simple Model ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

The quest to understand the relationship between neural activity and behavior has been ongoing for well over a hundred years. Although research based on the stimulus-and-response approach to behavior, advocated by behaviorists, flourished during the last century, this view does not, by design, account for unobservable variables (e.g., mental states). Putting aside this approach, modern cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, neuroeconomics, and behavioral economics have sought to explain this connection computationally. One major hurdle lies in the fact that we lack even a simple model of cognitive function. This chapter sketches an application that connects neuromodulator function to decision making and the valuation that underlies it. The nature of this hypothesized connection offers a fruitful platform to understand some of the informational aspects of dopamine function in the brain and how it exposes many different ways of understanding motivated choice.

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