scholarly journals Categorization, Fast and Slow

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-212
Author(s):  
Василь Старко
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
New York ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Linguistics ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Psychological Review ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

The title of this study is inspired by Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow. In it, the Nobel Prize winner explains in great detail the working of two systems of human reasoning: System 1, which is fast, automatic, associative, subconscious, involuntary and (nearly) effortless, and System 2, which is slow, intentional, logical, conscious, effortful and requires executive control, attention, and concentration. This distinction applies to human categorization as well. Each of the two labels refers, in fact, to a set of systems, which is why the designations Type 1 and Type 2 processes are preferable. The default-interventionist architecture presupposes the constant automatic activation of categories by Type 1 processes and interventions of Type 2 processes if necessary. Type 1 categorization relies on the ‘shallow’ linguistic representation of the world, while Type 2 uses ‘deep’ extralinguistic knowledge. A series of linguistic examples are analyzed to illustrate the differences between Type 1 and Type 2 categorization. A conclusion is drawn about the need to take this distinction into account in psycholinguistic and linguistic research on categorization. References Barrett, F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. (2004). Individual differences in working memorycapacity in dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130(4), 553–573. Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork, NY: Guilford Press. Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlledcomponents. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. (2013) Dual-process theories of higher cognition:Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–241. Geeraerts, D. (1993). Vagueness’s puzzles, polysemy’s vagaries. Cognitive Linguistics,4(3), 223–272. Heider, Eleanor Rosch (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semanticcategories. In: Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language, (pp. 111–144).T. E. Moore, (ed.). New York: Academic Press Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgement and choice. American Psychologist, 58,697–720. Kahneman, D. (2015). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitutionin intuitive judgement. In: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,(pp. 49–81). T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (eds.). Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press. Lakoff, G. (1973). Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts.Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 458–508. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago, London: University ofChicago Press. Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge. Oxford, England: OxfordUniversity Press. Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning.Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R F. (2000). Individual difference in reasoning: implications forthe rationality debate? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726. Старко В. Категоризаційні кваліфікатори// Проблеми зіставної семантики. 2013,№ 11. С. 132–138.Starko, V. (2013). Katehoryzatsiini kvalifikatory. Problemy Zistavnoyi Semantyky, 11,132–138. Sun, R., Slusarz, P., & Terry, C. (2005). The interaction of the explicit and the implicit inskill learning: A dual-process approach. Psychological Review, 112, 159–192. Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Multi-level theories of cognition–emotion relations. In: Handbookof Cognition and Emotion, (pp. 665–681). T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power, (eds.). Chichester,England: Wiley. Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3,141–154. Whorf, B. L. (1956). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In:Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, (pp. 134–159). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. (originally published in 1941) Wierzbicka, A. (1996). Semantic Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Inner Speech and Outer Thought

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Frankish
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Complex Problems ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

It is plausible to regard inner speech as an activity, whose functions are continuous with those of outer speech. Yet there is also a case for thinking that inner speech has a cognitive role, as a vehicle for conscious thought. This chapter reconciles these apparently conflicting claims by showing how outer speech can itself play a cognitive role. Drawing on dual-process theories of reasoning, it develops a view of conscious (‘Type 2’) thinking as an activity, initially performed in outer speech. By engaging in self-directed speech, we can break down complex problems into subproblems that can be solved by nonconscious (‘Type 1’) processes, thereby vastly extending our reasoning powers. It is as the subsequent internalization of such ‘outer thinking’ that inner speech has a cognitive function. The chapter also extends this account to show how acts of inner speech can function as judgements and decisions.

If you think about it more, do you want it more? The case of fairtrade

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2556-2581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Konopka ◽  
Malcolm John Wright ◽  
Mark Avis ◽  
Pamela M. Feetham
Keyword(s):  
Block Design ◽  
Brand Choice ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Impact

Purpose There are substantive disagreements about whether encouraging deliberative thinking increases consumer preference in low-involvement product categories. The authors draw on dual-process theory to add rare experimental evidence to this debate. They also investigate whether the effect of deliberative thinking increases with familiarity of the stimuli, as different theories of memory yield different predictions on this point. Finally, they provide evidence on whether the effectiveness of the Fairtrade logo arises more from mere exposure or attention to the ethical claim. Design/methodology/approach The context for the research is the use of ethical logos in packaged coffee, as this provides a realistic setting for the desired experimental manipulations. The fieldwork consists of two sets of trade-off experiments – rankings based conjoint analysis (n = 360) and best-worst scaling with a balanced incomplete block design (n = 1,628). Deliberative thinking is manipulated in three ways: by varying logos between visual (Type 1 processing) and lexical (Type 2 processing) treatments, by post hoc classification of time taken, and by imposing either time constraints (Type 1) or cognitive load (Type 2) on the completion of the task. Familiarity is manipulated by varying logos between the Fairtrade and a fictional Exchange Ethics logo. Findings Consumers do have higher preferences in the deliberative treatment conditions; thinking more results in an 18 per cent increase (Cohen’s d = 0.25) in the preference for choices that display an ethical cobranded logo. Surprisingly, the impact of deliberation is not greater for the more familiar Fairtrade logo than the fictional Exchange Ethics logo. This result is inconsistent with strength-based theories of memory, as these predict that deliberation will have a greater effect for more familiar stimuli. However, it is consistent with newer theories of memory that acknowledge familiarity can lead to activation confusion, reducing retrieval of pre-existing knowledge into working memory. The research also shows that the Fairtrade logo has substantial utility to consumers, and that this is approximately 59 per cent due to the ethical claim and 41 per cent due to the familiarity of the logo. Research limitations/implications In field conditions, attempts to manipulate deliberation may not be effective or may simply result in reduced attention. Also, the costs of increasing deliberation may outweigh the benefits obtained. Practical implications The research confirms the heuristic value of the Fairtrade logo and shows that the effectiveness of ethical logos may increase with additional deliberation by shoppers. Originality/value There is relatively little work in marketing that applies dual-process theories to investigate consumer behaviour. The present study extends the use of dual-process theories in marketing, demonstrates a new method to investigate the effect of deliberation on brand choice and shows how deliberation magnifies the effect of endorsing logos, including unfamiliar logos.

scholarly journals Individual differences in anchoring effect: Evidence for the role of insufficient adjustment

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Systematic Effect ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Anchoring Effect ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor’s direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.

scholarly journals The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiment 1 and 4), likeability (Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and brightness (Experiment 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments. However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Balance in psychological research: The dual process perspective

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Process Perspective

Krueger & Funder (K&F) are right that various imbalances characterize social psychology, but I question whether they are characteristic of psychology or cognitive science as a whole. Dual-process theories, popular in the latter fields, emphasize both processing biases and the adaptiveness of human cognition in a more balanced manner.

EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110446
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon J Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

scholarly journals Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Thought ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

scholarly journals A test of two processes: The effect of training on deductive and inductive reasoning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Gloria Stephens ◽  
John C Dunn ◽  
Brett Hayes ◽  
Michael Kalish
Keyword(s):  
Argument Structure ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Single Process ◽  
Logic Training

Dual-process theories posit that separate kinds of intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) processes contribute to reasoning. Under this view, inductive judgments are more heavily influenced by Type 1 processing, and deductive judgments are more strongly influenced by Type 2 processing. Alternatively, single-process theories propose that both types of judgments are based on a common form of assessment. The competing accounts were respectively instantiated as two-dimensional and one-dimensional signal detection models, and their predictions were tested against specifically targeted novel data using signed difference analysis. In two experiments, participants evaluated valid and invalid arguments, under induction or deduction instructions. Arguments varied in believability and type of conditional argument structure. Additionally, we used logic training to strengthen Type 2 processing in deduction (Experiments 1 & 2) and belief training to strengthen Type 1 processing in induction (Experiment 2). The logic training successfully improved validity-discrimination, and differential effects on induction and deduction judgments were evident in Experiment 2. While such effects are consistent with popular dual-process accounts, crucially, a one-dimensional model successfully accounted for the results. We also demonstrate that the one-dimensional model is psychologically interpretable, with the model parameters varying sensibly across conditions. We argue that single-process accounts have been prematurely discounted, and formal modeling approaches are important for theoretical progress in the reasoning field.

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