The presumption of consciousness
2014 ◽
Vol 37
(1)
◽
pp. 26-27
◽
Keyword(s):
AbstractThroughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.
2021 ◽
Vol 17
(2)
◽
Keyword(s):
2008 ◽
Vol 31
(4)
◽
pp. 444-445
◽
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
2019 ◽
Vol 22
(8)
◽
pp. 1083-1100
◽
Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 41
◽
pp. 45-54
◽
2019 ◽