scholarly journals Conjuring the spirit of multilateralism: Histories of crisis management during the ‘great credit crash’

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMIN SAMMAN

AbstractIn recent years, critical scholars have emphasised how the recollection of past events as traumas can both constrain and widen the political possibilities of a present. This article builds on such research by suggesting that the management of contemporary financial crises is reliant on a ritual work of repetition, wherein prior ‘crisis’ episodes are called upon to identify and authorise specific sites and modes of crisis management. In order to develop this argument, I focus on how past crises figure within the public pronouncements of four key policymaking organisations during the financial instability of 2007–9. I find that while the Great Depression does enable these organisations to reaffirm old ways of managing crises, both it and the more recent Asian crisis are also made to disclose new truths about the evolution of multilateralism as a form of governance. In so doing, I argue, these historical narratives reveal how the management of global financial crisis depends upon a kind of ‘magic trick’. Rather than a strictly rational, historical process of problem solving, contemporary crises are instead negotiated through a contingent and self-referential conjuring of crisis-histories.

2021 ◽  
pp. 205789112199169
Author(s):  
Kana Inata

Constitutional monarchies have proved to be resilient, and some have made substantive political interventions even though their positions are mostly hereditary, without granted constitutional channels to do so. This article examines how constitutional monarchs can influence political affairs and what impact royal intervention can have on politics. I argue that constitutional monarchs affect politics indirectly by influencing the preferences of the public who have de jure power to influence political leaders. The analyses herein show that constitutional monarchs do not indiscriminately intervene in politics, but their decisions to intervene reflect the public’s preferences. First, constitutional monarchs with little public approval become self-restraining and do not attempt to assert their political preferences. Second, they are more likely to intervene in politics when the public is less satisfied about the incumbent government. These findings are illustrated with historical narratives regarding the political involvement of King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand in the 2000s.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 36-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albrecht Ritschl

AbstractThe Great Recession of 2008 hit the international economy harder than any other peacetime recession since the Great Contraction after 1929. Soon enough, analogies with the Great Depression were presented, and conclusions were drawn regarding the political response to the slump. This paper is an attempt to sort out real and false analogies and to present conclusions for policy. Its main hypothesis is that the Great Recession resembles the final phase of the Great Contraction between 1931 and 1933, characterized by a fast spreading global financial crisis and the breakdown of the international Gold Standard. The same is also true of the political responses to the banking problems occurring in both crises. The analogy seems less robust for the initial phase of the Great Depression after 1929. The monetary policy response to the Great Recession largely seems to be informed by the monetary interpretation of the Great Depression, but less so by the lessons from the interwar financial crises. As in the Great Depression, policy appears to be on a learning curve, moving away from a mostly monetary response toward mitigating counterpart risk and minimizing interbank contagion.


Author(s):  
Chika Sehoole

This article makes case of how South Africa has been able to use its laws and policies to achieve its objectives of regulating private higher education. This happened in the context of an ascendancy of neo-liberal policies which favoured deregulation and the rolling back of the state. Through these policies the government was able to protect the public even during the global financial crisis as it had registered credible and financially sound institutions which could weather off the financial crises which affected many private companies worldwide.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-512
Author(s):  
Andrzej Sławiński

Abstract During the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009 and the currentCovid-19 debacle, central banks acted quickly, boldly, and effectively. The paper argues that they did so thanks to the lessons learned from the past financial crises, which provided them with opportunities to reconsider their previous beliefs. A case in point is the banking crisis in the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s that taught central banks to act rapidly and decisively in order to prevent an initial liquidity crisis from escalating into a solvency crisis leading to bankruptcies of banks with potentially disastrous consequences for the entire economy. The paper revisits the consequences of the currency crises of the 1990s, which transformed exchange rate regimes across the world: the EMS one of 1992–1993 that accelerated the launch of the euro, and the Asian one of 1997–1998 resulted in the proliferation of floating exchange rates in emerging economies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 111-134
Author(s):  
Johannes Lindvall

AbstractThe Riksbank, founded in 1668, is the world’s oldest central bank. It has played a central role in Swedish economic policymaking for centuries and enjoys a great deal of confidence among the public. This chapter explains how the Riksbank became what it is today: an independent and widely respected institution. The bank’s high status has emerged because Sweden’s political elites regard the delegation of policymaking authority to the central bank as a way of managing and containing potentially harmful political conflicts. The bank’s status also benefitted from its crisis management performance, navigating Sweden through two large-scale financial crises.


2021 ◽  
pp. 18-38
Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Anna Knaps

Are financial crises actually remembered—and if so, how and by whom? Surprisingly, there has hardly been any attempt to answer this question, whether by economists or historians or indeed other social scientists. And yet they are extremely important questions to address, if we want to understand not only the causes and consequences of financial crises, but more generally how the modern financial system has been shaped. This chapter is a preliminary attempt to answer these questions. This will be done in two steps: first by considering the notion of memory and the extent to which it can be used to in connection with financial crises; and second by providing some evidence, mostly drawn from the press, on the memory of the financial crises of the Great Depression, especially in connection with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia Alonso ◽  
Rubén Ruiz-Rufino

The objective of this article is to analyse the costs of responsible governance on the national political establishment of the Eurozone in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Our analysis tests two main hypotheses. First, we argue that financial crises like the one unleashed by the global financial meltdown of 2008 have an asymmetric impact on the electoral records of establishment parties depending on whether the countries affected by the financial crisis were financially intervened in or not. Our second hypothesis states that externally imposed austerity affects Left and Right national establishment parties differently. By choosing to act responsibly, that is, assuming the conditions of the intervention, the establishment Left pays a much larger electoral price than the one paid by the establishment Right under the same circumstances. To test our argument, we use a panel data set of 12 countries from the Eurozone in the period between 1999 (stage III of the monetary union) and 2015 that contains 54 country-election-year observations. Our findings show strong support for our two hypotheses.


2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-243

Malcolm Sawyer of Leeds University Business School reviews “Why Minsky Matters: An Introduction to the Work of a Maverick Economist”, by L. Randall Wray. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Provides an introduction to Hyman P. Minsky's alternative approach to economic theory and policy, including his writings on the causes of financial crises and his vision of an economy that is not necessarily equilibrium-seeking. Discusses an overview of Minsky's main contributions; macroeconomics, where it went wrong, and the road not taken; Minsky's early contributions—the financial instability hypothesis; Minsky's views on money and banking; Minsky's approach to poverty and unemployment; Minsky and the Global Financial Crisis; Minsky and financial reform; and reforms to promote stability, democracy, security, and equality.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-77
Author(s):  
Sebastian Zemla

AbstractCrises cause attentiveness in our society and awaken, depending on the degree of consternation, our ongoing interest. These events include financial crises, phenomenal incidents that shock the economic world and pose significant challenges for the governments. Two crises which stand out in this context are the Great Depression in 1929 and the financial crisis in 2007/2008. In addition to the comparative approach, the paper focuses directly on the typical repetitive mechanism (“recurrent pattern of banking and sovereign debt crises” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011): overheating, the forming of a bubble and the bursting of the bubble, largely started in the USA. Specific aspects included in this research area are crisis management in the decades mentioned above, the role of governments and banks, as well as the observation as to which crisis can be expected next. We can conclude that the current monetary systems led by complex financial instruments and addicted to low interest rates are prone to deliver another serious financial crisis.


Author(s):  
Finke Jasper

This chapter evaluates the possible impacts of financial crises, which can be devastating. Prolonged economic recessions or depressions impede the State’s ability to provide public goods. Especially sovereign debt crises force States to reduce public spending, which requires cuts in the public health and education system, a decrease in social welfare benefits generally, lower salaries and pensions for public employees, and fewer public employees. Both a decline in public safety and higher poverty rates can cause mass migration, which can destabilize neighbouring States or even entire regions. While financial crises do not necessarily have all these consequences, they do have a destructive potential beyond the individual State. It might therefore be unsurprising to learn that one can observe structural and conceptual similarities in how States respond to situations that are more broadly perceived as security crises and financial crises. The chapter then demonstrates how an ‘emergency mindset’ is present in debates on what role law has played and should play in responding to financial crises. It considers two case-studies to illustrate the presence of an ‘emergency mindset’ in such situations that is conceptually similar to traditional security crises: the 2008 global financial crisis and the still unresolved multilevel financial crisis in the Eurozone.


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